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An Embodiment Constraint on Theories of Affect 
Emma Bjorngard, PhD 
University of Connecticut, 2018 
 
  Abstract: Any good theory of emotions should, among other benchmarks, be able to 
accommodate that emotions can be embodied (I call this the embodiment fact). In particular, it 
should be able to show that; for every emotion type there is at least one emotion token that is 
embodied. With this in mind, I will in this dissertation review various well-known philosophical 
accounts of emotions with the intention of considering whether or not they succeed in capturing 
such benchmarks. If one or more theories do well on most benchmarks, but fail to do so in 
regards to embodiment, I will discuss whether it is possible to modify the theory or theories in 
order to help them do so. If not, I will consider further what a successful theory or theories might 
look like. To clarify, I am not trying to vindicate or establish a particular account of emotions; it 
could be that multiple theories are able to include the embodiment fact. Instead, my intention is 
to narrow down the range of available theories by seeing which ones, if any, can do so. 
  The first chapter focuses on elucidating what embodiment comes down to, and I consider 
examples where manifestations of the affective can be identified in someone’s behavior. I also 
discuss various features that these embodied tokens share such as being adaptive and the emoter: 
rather than experiencing the emotion as an emotion of a particular type is having experiences 
appropriate it, is not engaged in judgments or other cognitive processes either avowing the 
emotion to herself or expressing it, and is involved in conceptualization of a minimal kind; one 
that enables her to see something in a certain way and that demands action.  
   In the second chapter, I discuss some phenomena, or benchmarks, that theories of 
emotions ought to be at least consistent with and, ideally, able to explain.  
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 The third chapter, considers the leading current views of emotions. In particular I discuss 
representative versions of; the feeling theory, the cognitive theory, the non-cognitive theory, the 
modified-cognitivist theory, and the hybrid theory together with some problems that can be 
raised against each of them. In my discussion of these views I at the end of each section, briefly 
assess whether or not a specific theory can account for, or at least accommodate, the embodiment 
fact as well as the other benchmarks.  
  In the fourth chapter I look at and discuss one of the most recent embodied views of 
emotions, namely, Rebekka Hufendiek’s theory of emotions as embodied, action-oriented 
representations set up to represent affordances. However, even though she presents an embodied 
theory of emotions, there are objections that can be raised against it, which in the view’s current 
formulation, renders it unacceptable. In particular, she falls victim to the Cinnamon-Nutmeg 
understanding of emotion phenomenology. This is the view that, just as for cinnamon and 
nutmeg, for every distinct pair of emotion types, they have different phenomenology.  
  Finally, in chapter five given the issues with Hufendiek’s account, the question becomes 
whether it is possible to adhere to a view somewhat like hers, without running into the 
Cinnamon-Nutmeg problem. I argue that Lisa Feldman Barrett’s view of emotions as being 
constructed offers hope along these lines. Although this view does not have the resources to 
accommodate the embodiment fact, we can draw something from it in order to modify what we 
learned from Hufendiek in characterizing a proper space of emotion theories. Specifically, 
Feldman Barrett’s account of affect may provide nearly what we need to account for the 
phenomenology of emotions.  
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  After my discussion of Feldman Barrett, I take stock of where we are and reemphasize 
that for every emotion type there is at least one token of that type that is embodied, they often 
occur in the context of a somatic marker, they involve affect, and there is a construal right in the 
embodiment. Lastly, I consider the present emotion landscape and establish that it is possible to 
have two opposing theories of emotions that are both compatible with the embodiment fact; the 
Hybrid theories and the non-hybrid, Uniform theories. Lastly, I also discuss potential future 
research. 
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1) INTRODUCTION 
  In the most influential philosophical emotion literature something important about 
emotions has received inadequate attention—I call it the embodiment fact.1 According to it, a 
creature can undergo an emotion in a way that is constituted at least in part by some combination 
of behaviors both of a bodily and “mental” kind; examples of the former are gross movements of 
the limbs, various facial expressions, and verbal tics (e.g., vocal fry and uptalk)2 whereas 
examples of the latter are the way one directs one’s thoughts and attention.3  
  The embodiment fact is suggested by the possibility of a generalization from the way in 
which cognitive states are arguably embodied (i.e., as manifestations of intelligence in the 
behaving itself) to a view of affective states as embodied (i.e., as manifestations of the affective 
in the behaving itself). For instance, if embodied cognition means that my very fast and accurate 
                                                        
1 When I talk about ‘emotions’ (or affect) I am going to use the notion in a broad enough way to include what some 
people call moods; being giddy, anxious, gloomy, exuberant, etc.  
2 Vocal fry: In the recent study Habitual Use of Fry in Young Adult Female Speakers, Lesley Wolk, Nassima B. 
Abdelli-Beruh, and Dianne Slavin (2012), measured and investigated a vocal pattern prevalent in young American-
English speaking women with no vocal pathology. The vocal pattern is described as “low, creaky vibrations,” and is 
often referred to as “pulse register, creaky voice, stiff voice, or glottal fry” (e111). Adopted by young women vocal 
fry most likely appeared toward the end of utterances, but never in sustained vowels (e.g., ‘aaa,’ ‘ooo’) (e114). 
Uptalk: Another vocal phenomenon has become known as ‘uptalk.’ In her Atlantic piece “A Female Senator 
Explains Why Uptalk Is Part of Women’s ‘Nature,’” Emma Green (2014) describes uptalk in the following way: 
“You know, uptalk? That oft-mocked conversational style, usually attributed to the “Valley Girl”? The one that 
implies a question mark at the end of otherwise perfectly declarative statements.” Basically then, ‘uptalk’ is an 
individual’s applying “a rising intonation at the end of a phrase or sentence” that is very similar to the sound of, say, 
an English speaker asking a question” (Seitz-Brown, 2014). 
3 My use of ‘behavior’ above refers to things of an agentive type, i.e., it is under one’s control either directly or 
indirectly. Directly in the way that I am able to consciously choose to do something. Indirectly in the sense that were 
I to become conscious of the behavior (i.e., pay attention to it), I could modify it. 
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knitting (a form of intelligence) is constituted by the way in which I move my fingers,4 so too, 
embodied affect can be constituted by the sensitivity with which I, say, move my hands as I 
stroke a person’s hair. 
 Any good theory of emotions should be able to accommodate both the embodiment fact 
and other important benchmarks (see chapter II). With this in mind, I will in this dissertation be 
reviewing various well-known philosophical accounts of emotions with the intention of 
considering whether or not they succeed in capturing such benchmarks. Moreover, if there are 
one or more theories that are not faced by any serious objections, and do well on most 
benchmarks, but fail to do so on the embodiment fact, I will then ask the question: Is it possible 
to modify the theory or theories in order to make them able to do so? If not, I will discuss further 
what a successful theory (or theories) might look like. To clarify, in this dissertation I am not 
trying to vindicate or establish a particular account of emotions; for after all it could be that 
multiple theories are able to accommodate the embodiment fact. But rather, my intention is to 
narrow down the range of available theories by seeing which ones, if any, accommodate the 
embodiment fact. By doing this we will in turn approach a more accurate understanding of 
emotions. 
  To add further nuance to the above discussion, as I am not defending a particular emotion 
view, what I am aiming to explain is what happens when we accept that emotions can be 
embodied. Once we have considered this possibility, then the question becomes: what form does 
                                                        
4 Other examples of intelligent behavior are: First, the way in which someone, without measuring, can tell how 
much of a certain spice is needed for a particular food recipe by feeling the weight of it in their hand, or between 
their fingertips. Second, the way a person, say a nurse, can locate a blood vein in someone’s arm by feeling around 
for it. Pamela Olton, “who has been drawing blood at the Haight Ashbury Free Medical Clinic in San Francisco 
since 1976…” says that you have to “develop intelligence in your fingers….[she describes it as follows] 
Instincively, you will look for the telltale blue of veins, but the veins of some people need to be felt rather than seen, 
including those of scarred intravenous drug users, the obese, the heavily tattooed and anyone with very dark skin. 
Learn to trust your fingertips by palating skin with your eyes closed. Even hidden under an inch of fat tissue, a vein 
will have a distinctly bouncy feel that Olton likens to pressing on a water bed” (Wollan, 2017). 
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that acceptance take? A weak form would be that all emotion types are sometimes embodied, 
while a stronger form is that all emotion types are always embodied. To be clear, the weak claim 
asserts that for every emotion type there is at least one token of that type that is embodied, and 
the strong claim asserts that for every emotion type every token of that type is embodied. For our 
purposes we will be arguing for and defending the weaker claim while remaining neutral on the 
stronger one.  
  In an attempt to elucidate what the embodiment fact comes down to I am going to below 
begin by considering a couple of examples where manifestations of the affective can be 
identified in someone’s behavior, and I will then continue on by discussing various features 
those behaviors share. 
2) EMBODIMENT IN COGNITION & EMOTIONS 
 
a. Examples of the embodiment fact & common characteristics 
  Example 1. One night when Destiny is watching a movie with her 5-year old son Miles, 
he puts his head in her lap while the film is playing. When Miles does this, Destiny begins to 
lovingly stroke his head. We may assume further that Destiny is sensitive to her surroundings, 
e.g., she is sensitive to where and how her hand is being placed, the amount of pressure she is 
exerting, and how fast she is stroking his hair, but aside from that the majority of her conscious 
attention is on what is happening in the TV show. What is more, the “lovingness” here is in the 
way Destiny strokes her son’s hair and not in, say, the way in which she thinks about doing so. In 
fact, in this scenario Destiny need not be thinking any thoughts to herself at all about what she is 
doing (e.g., inner speech thoughts such as ‘I love Miles and I want to him to know that’), nor 
does she have to engage in complex conceptualization and categorization (as some other views 
necessitate, see chapter V). All she needs to have is the perceptual experience (visual and tactile) 
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necessary for her to be aware of her environment, and conceptualization of a minimal kind.5  
  Example 2. During her sophomore year of college, Jordan meets a man at a party. After 
two weeks he asks her out on a date, and later that same night picks her up in his car to take her 
to the movie theater. Jordan does not realize that something is wrong until he pulls into an 
unfamiliar parking lot and tells her to get in the backseat. When she refuses to do as he says and 
instead asks to be let out, he tells her that she is not going anywhere until she has sex with him. 
Then he climbs on top of her and rapes her. Several months later while socializing at her friend 
Jane’s house, Jordan begins fearfully clutching the arm of the couch, as Jane utters words such as 
rape, molest, attack, trapped describing the plot of a movie that she had recently seen (Waldman, 
2016). 
 As in the case with Destiny above, in this situation Jordan is sensitive to her 
surroundings, e.g., she is sensitive to where and how her hand is being placed, and how hard she 
is pushing her fingers into the arm of the couch; however most of her conscious attention is on 
her friend and the words coming out of her mouth. What is more, in the example, the 
“fearfulness” is in the way Jordan grasps the couch’s arm, and not in thoughts that she is 
entertaining. Indeed Jordan need not be having any thoughts at all (i.e., inner speech thoughts 
such as ‘I think he is a threat to me and I wish I could hide somewhere’), all that is required is 
the perceptual experience (visual and tactile) necessary for her to be aware of her surroundings. 6 
Jordan also does not have to engage in conceptualization and categorization of a complex kind, 
but rather conceptualization of a minimal kind is enough. 
                                                        
5 In this situation then, she is only focusing her conscious attention on the TV show that she is watching and Miles’ 
head on her lap—not on some thoughts that she is telling herself. 
6 In this situation then, she is only focusing her conscious attention on what her friend is saying and the couch’s arm 
that she is grasping on to—not on some thoughts that she is telling herself. 
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  Example 3. Isabel is a first-year student at a private college on the East Coast. She is 
feeding her passion for German by majoring in German Studies, and she is picking up a minor in 
European Geography. As a High School student she loved her German teacher, and most of her 
best friends she met in her language classes. Finally in college she finds her German Professor 
rather boring, however, that is not the worst part. One of the people assigned to Isabel’s project 
group this semester is Christina, a young woman who also lives in her Residential Hall, and 
whom Isabel can barely stand. Not only is she loud and rambunctious whereas Isabel is quiet and 
careful, she also chews her snacks loudly in class and laughs a little too intensely at the 
professor’s jokes. One day while they are watching a documentary about the Berlin wall, 
Christina starts to loudly pull out a bag of almonds from her backpack. Even though Isabel 
doesn’t stop watching the movie, with the noise coming from right in front of her where 
Christina sits, her eyes contemptuously take one spin around the sockets and she moves her chair 
away from her. Her professor notices Isabel’s eye roll and thinks to herself that she needs to pay 
attention to this group; she refuses to have any teasing going on in her classroom. 
  In this example Isabel is sensitive to her surroundings, e.g., she is sensitive to the 
pressure of her hands against the seat of the chair as she moves it further away from Christina, 
how her eyes move in their sockets, and where her classmates are relative to her. However, it 
would seem that the majority of her conscious attention is still on what is playing out on the 
screen. The contemptuousness is in the way she moves her eyes, and not in any thoughts that she 
is having (such as ‘This individual is so stupid, I cannot stand her”). As in the other cases 
discussed above, she need not be having any thoughts running through her head about Christina, 
nor does she have to engage in complex conceptualization and categorization. Rather, all that is 
required is that Isabel has the perceptual experience (tactile, auditory, and visual) needed for her 
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to be aware of her surroundings, and also that conceptualization of a minimal kind is present.  
 Example 4. After a long day at work during which Lauren clashed with one of her co-
workers Mark, she comes home to a sink filled with dirty dishes. Before she gets started on the 
mess, she turns to the radio on the kitchen table and locates the latest news program. Even 
though she is not actively thinking about her argument from earlier in the day (e.g., how mean 
and unfair the other person had been to her, and that she wants to punch him), Lauren picks up 
the dish sponge and starts angrily scrubbing all the glasses and plates. In this example as in the 
above cases, Lauren is sensitive to her surroundings, e.g., she is sensitive to where and how she 
moves her hands, and to what she sees in the sink as she washes the dishes, but the majority of 
her conscious attention is directed toward what she hears on the news. Moreover, the “angriness” 
here is in the way she scrubs the glasses and plates, and not in thoughts that she is having. Lauren 
need not be thinking any thoughts to herself at all about what happened at work (i.e., inner 
speech thoughts such as ‘I am so frustrated with Mark and I wish it was his face that I was 
scrubbing with the sponge’), rather what she needs is the perceptual experience (visual and 
tactile) that makes her sensitive to her environment.7, 8  Lastly, just as in the other examples 
above, only minimal conceptualization is necessary here.       
  Example 5. It is the weekend and Clark has made plans to hang out with his friend 
Carole. Together they spend their Saturday morning looking for a new pair of shoes for Clark at 
the local market, and while doing so they incessantly discuss the fact that they will be living in 
Los Angeles next year. Both Clark and Carole put in requests for relocation a couple of months 
ago, and just the other day they were granted permission. After they buy Clark’s shoes they head 
                                                        
7 That is, with the majority of her attention being on the news program there is no room left for thoughts like: “I’m 
sure angry at person x,” but still her body seems to embody it.  
8 In this situation then, she is only focusing her conscious attention on the radio program that she is listening to and 
the dishes that she is washing—not on some thoughts that she is telling herself. 
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over to the nearby mall to have lunch and catch a matinee at the Imax Theater. When they sit 
down to eat, Carole with a concerned look on her face, asks Clark; ‘You seem so gloomy, are 
you OK?’ Clark answers; ‘What do you mean ‘I seem gloomy’?” Carole continues; ‘Well, you 
have been walking around in a hunched over posture all morning, and every time you talk to me 
you do so with a small and quiet voice. Also, you just seem to be moving slower than usual.’ As 
Clark thinks about what his friend has just told him, he realizes that, yes—in fact, he is gloomy 
(i.e., he is in a gloomy mood); he just had not noticed it before. In fact, he cannot even think of a 
reason for it.               
 In common with the previously discussed examples even though the majority of Clark’s 
attention throughout the day is on Carole and their conversation about moving to Los Angeles, 
one can still say that he is sensitive to his surroundings. For instance, he is sensitive to what he is 
saying (e.g., he both asks and answers questions about what living and working in Los Angeles 
will be like), what he sees in front of him, and where he is walking (e.g., he does not walk into 
things). Furthermore, the “gloominess” is in the way Clark behaves; in the way he hunches over 
as he walks next to Carole, in the way his voice is quieter than normal, in the way his pace is 
slower, and thus, it is not in any thoughts that he is having (i.e., he is not thinking to himself ‘I’m 
so boring, she shouldn’t be hanging out with me’ or ‘I don’t want to move away from my 
family’). Further, Clark does not have to engage in complex conceptualization and categorization 
in this instance. In fact, all that is necessary is that Clark has the perceptual experience (visual 
and tactile) required for him to be aware of his environment, and that conceptualization of a 
minimal kind is taking place.  
 After having considered the above five examples, a common structure begins to emerge. 
However, before I discuss this common structure more in-depth, I want to draw the reader’s 
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attention to something else important. Let us separate three different things; an individual can 
undergo an emotion, they can experience an emotion, and they can experience and emotion as an 
emotion of that type.  
  Now, in an attempt to make more apparent the particular distinction between an 
individual experiencing an emotion, and her experiencing an emotion as an emotion of a 
particular type, we can look to the philosophy of perception. An individual can perceive x, and 
she can perceive x as a y. The first does not entail the other. As an example, when I rode my bike 
and looked to the left, unbeknownst to me what I saw (what I was looking at and therefore 
perceived) was actually a nuclear reactor. However, I just saw it as a building. I did not 
conceptualize it in a more specific way, so I did not see it as a nuclear reactor. Now, of course I 
can do the latter too, but that would require the application of a more sophisticated conceptual 
apparatus. Consequently, it does seem that in everyday life we say things like, “I saw x, but I did 
not realize that what I was seeing was an x.” I saw without knowing that that was what I was 
seeing. I still saw something, but I did not conceptualize it in the way that I could have. 
  Based on my discussion in the above paragraph, we know that an individual can either 
perceive a nuclear reactor or perceive it as a nuclear reactor. The first does not guarantee the 
second. Similarly, you can also experience an emotion without also experiencing it as an emotion 
of that type. The latter twofold distinction will be made clear below as I explain the tripartition 
referred to previously, and which the former distinction is part of. 
  First, at level 1, an individual can undergo an emotion with no phenomenology present (a 
“what it is like” quality)9, and this might be the case with strictly unconscious emotions. The 
                                                        
9 The point of talking about phenomenal aspects of mentality here is to distinguish them from cognitive and 
affective aspects of relaity. In particular, some affective states need not have a phenomenological representation, and 
some phenomenological states need not have an affective representation (when I for example smell lemon there is 
nothing essentially affective about that).  
9 
   
reader might wonder if there are such things as unconscious emotions, and for present purposes I 
do not have to take a stand on it.10 However, nothing in the logic of emotions seem to rule out 
that there could be such things. That is, it is nothing in the nature of emotions that requires, for 
example, that they be conscious. Now, if an emotion is not conscious, then there is nothing that it 
is like to undergo that emotion. This appears similar to instances of blind-sight; i.e., perhaps 
blind-sight is a case in which you see things even though there is nothing that it is like to do so 
(Weiskrantz, 1990). So, if there were such things as unconscious emotions, then those would be 
cases of undergoing an emotion without experiencing it.  
  Second, at level 2, an individual can also experience an emotion such as anger without it 
presenting itself to her as anger. In such cases of experiencing emotions there is a 
phenomenology, and it is in this way that the individual is experiencing the emotion, but she is 
not experiencing the emotion as that emotion. In these instances then, the emoter is having an 
experience, and not just that; it is one that is appropriate (or a natural counterpart) to the emotion 
that they are undergoing. However, it does not represent itself to her as that emotion. The 
following would be an example of this. Think back to Jim Crow times in the Southern United 
States, and someone cringing with disgust when he for example do not want to touch the water 
faucet that a black person just drank out of. In this case, the individual is experiencing 
unpleasantness, but he may or may not be experiencing it as disgust. Here the disgusted person 
did not conceptualize his experience as a particular emotion (i.e., disgust). This means that, 
someone could cringe with disgust, and experience his disgust about having to drink from the 
faucet, but not yet be representing that experience as one of disgust for touching the faucet. Thus, 
                                                        
10 For present purposes we need not settle the question of whether or not there are such things, we are merely 
making a tripartition; a distinction among three different things. It is a further question whether or not we are going 
to claim that that tripartition has any elements falling into its extension.  
10 
   
if we imagine that the individual cringes spontaneously, he may or may not notice that “yes, this 
is disgust.” 
  The following is another example of someone experiencing an emotion without it 
presenting itself to her as that emotion. In this case a young college woman who is implicitly 
racist fearfully moves away when an African American man sits down next to her in class. That 
is, she creates more personal space between herself and the man by moving her chair a couple of 
inches toward the right side of the room. In this case then, as in the other examples above, there 
is something experientially real (i.e., it is not purely behavioral), because she sees him as 
something to be avoided (i.e., he is somatically marked negatively, see below). Consequently, 
these kinds of inadvertent or spontaneous emotions (that someone is experiencing without 
thinking about what he or she is doing) are clear cases of when an individual could be 
undergoing an experience, but does not have to know that it is an experience appropriate to a 
certain emotion type.  
 Third, at level 3, an individual can experience an emotion as an emotion of a particular 
type. For instance, when Anna finds out that her boyfriend cheated on her with her best friend, 
she feels extremely angry. That is, she is experiencing her emotion as one of anger. She might 
even say to herself “Ahh, I’m so angry I feel like I’m boiling over inside” or “I’m so angry I 
want to punch him in the face.”   
  To see how the distinction between someone experiencing an emotion and someone 
experiencing an emotion as an emotion of a particular type connects with the emotion examples 
considered in the beginning of the dissertation, let us take a look at how it applies to the case of 
Lauren washing the dishes angrily. When Lauren washes the dishes angrily, she is undergoing an 
experience, although she need not be representing it to herself as an instance of anger. As the 
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reader now knows, this is a subtle, but important distinction. Moreover, when Lauren washes the 
dishes angrily there is not just the phenomenological experience that is important to notice, but 
also that the way in which she is washing those dishes is appropriate to the emotion that she is 
experiencing (i.e., she is not washing the dishes lovingly).  
  I will now return to my discussion of an emerging common structure among the emotion 
examples considered above. First, in each case there is a person who rather than experiencing the 
emotions as the particular emotion that it is, is instead having experiences that are appropriate to 
it. They are also not engaged in inner speech that describes or expresses, say, love, fear, anger, or 
gloominess.11 That is, it is not the case that they are engaging in judgments and other cognitive 
processes that in some sense either avow the emotion to themselves or expresses it. Further, no 
complex conceptualization and categorization is required, but rather, what is involved here is 
conceptualization of a very minimal kind. The form of conceptualization that I am referring to is 
one that enables the individual to see something as attractive or repulsive, satisfying or 
dissatisfying, enticing or un-enticing, appealing or unappealing, safe or dangerous, good or bad, 
etc. Hence, it is a minimal differentiation of the world that is not as demanding as other theories 
necessitate (see for example Lisa Feldman Barrett’s account in chapter V).  
  Now, when it comes to instances of an organism experiencing an emotion, and instances 
of an organism experiencing an emotion as an emotion of type E, all of these things are certainly 
possible (i.e., they could be describing or expressing some particular emotion, and conceptualize 
and categorize in a complex way), but it is not necessary for the organism who is merely 
experiencing an emotion. That is, it is going to take a rather high-level of sophistication, not 
required for level 2 emotions, to be able to at level 3 say; “this is shame,” “this is regret,” or to 
                                                        
11 An example of a person who, either in inner (or overt speech), is describing an emotion is him or her saying ‘I am 
angry at John,’ whereas an example of someone expressing (in inner or overt speech) an emotion is that individual 
saying, ‘John is an idiot’ or ‘I hope that a ton of bricks falls on him.’ 
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have other emotion specific thoughts typical of these kinds of emotions (see discussion above 
under level 3 emotions). Moreover, as the reader has considered emotion examples 1-5 
previously, I suspect that he or she is moved to agree with the claim that we do not have to 
represent ourselves as emoting in a certain way to have an emotion. Now, it is furthermore 
natural to suspect also that a pre-linguistic child or a nonhuman animal would emote at stage two 
and not at stage 3. Next I am going to consider two such cases; I will start with a case of a young 
child being angry, and then follow it with a discussion of a squirrel experiencing fear. 
  Example 6. Joan is the mother of 5 month-old Steve. One day when she has just given 
him his dinner-bottle the telephone rings, and she walks over to answer it. It is Joan’s coworker 
Betty, who wants to go over some details regarding a new project that they recently started 
working on together. The two women end up talking for 15 minutes or so, and when Joan comes 
back to Steve’s crib she leans over and takes the bottle away from him. She reasons to herself, 
‘by now he must be done with his dinner anyway.’ However, this was not the case.  
  As a result, when she removes the bottle Steve angrily clutches his fists and moves his 
arms up-and-down. In this example as in the others above, it is plausible that Steve is sensitive to 
his surroundings; he is sensitive to where and how he places his arms and fists in front of him, 
but other than that, the bulk of his attention is on the bottle in his mother’s hand. Further, the 
anger in this case is in the way Steve clutches his fists and moves his arms, and not in thoughts 
that he is having. To be clear, Steve is not thinking any thoughts to himself at all about the 
situation (e.g., that he was wronged by his mother and that he wants the bottle back), after all, he 
does not possess language yet. But what he is having is the perceptual experience (visual and 
tactile) sufficient for him to be aware of his surroundings. Also, no complex conceptualization 
and categorization is required in this instance, but rather all that is needed is conceptualization of 
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a minimal kind (i.e., he sees his mother’s hand removing the bottle as negative, or un-satisfying, 
or bad, or threatening etc.) 
  Example 7. Imagine a squirrel roaming around a university campus looking for leftover 
food. One day as he is crossing the big lawn in front of the library, a hawk comes into his field of 
vision (it is circling right above where he is scavenging). When this happens, the squirrel 
fearfully cowers. Again, I want to say that in this example the squirrel is sensitive to his 
surroundings; he is sensitive to where and how he moves his body, but other than that the 
majority of his attention is on the hawk. In addition, the ‘fearfulness’ of the squirrel’s behavior is 
in the way he cowers to the ground, and not in thoughts that he is having (after all, the squirrel 
does not possess language). Instead and as in the previous examples, he is simply having the 
perceptual experience (visual and bodily) required for him to be aware of his environment. 
Lastly, the squirrel is here only engaged in conceptualization and categorization of a minimal 
sort (i.e., he sees the hawk as negative, or bad, or threatening, etc).  
  As in the first four cases with Destiny, Jordan, Isabel, Lauren, and Clark in the examples 
involving the pre-linguistic child Steve and the squirrel, they too have the marks of the common 
structure. There is an organism that rather than experiencing an emotion as an emotion of type E, 
is experiencing it. And further, neither the pre-linguistic child nor the squirrel is engaging in 
inner speech through which they are describing or expressing, in these examples, anger and fear. 
There is also no complex conceptualization involved (as some other view necessitates, see 
chapter V), but rather only minimal conceptualization is present (i.e., a minimal differentiation of 
the world).  
b. Somatic Markers & more common characteristics 
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  At this time the reader might wonder: If these affective behaviors are not the result of 
conscious deliberation, then what makes them happen? One answer to this question starts out 
with looking at what Antonio Damasio calls “somatic markers” as a source of their energy 
(Damasio, 2005). Damasio (2005) hypothesizes that many items of experience (where the notion 
of experience is used in a broad way to include hallucinations, imaginations, memories, as well 
as contemplated future scenarios, etc.,) are somatically marked so that perceptions are suffused 
with affect (p. 165-205). These phenomena are associated with what he calls the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis (Ibid).           
 As an example of how somatic markers are supposed to work, consider the 
uncomfortable feeling that you might have when seeing in your inbox an email from a student 
who you do not feel like dealing with. We can imagine that you cringe when you see it. In this 
case then, you perceive the email cringingly, i.e., it is somatically marked negatively. Another 
example would be a professor waiting to hear back from an agency that he has applied to for a 
grant. When he sees the name of the organization in the subject line he jumps with anxiety (or 
perhaps excitement). We can say that in this instance as he perceives the email it jumps or stands 
out to him. Moreover, whether or not the email is marked negatively or positively will depend on 
the professor’s personality. That is, if it is marked positively that might be a manifestation of his 
self-confidence (“Oh good, this is an exciting prospect”), whereas if it is marked negatively it 
might be telling of his insecure character (“Oh no, I’m going to get wacked again”). 
  Let us also look at cases that involve assessment and evaluation. As an example, consider 
your contemplating excitedly the prospect of meeting up with a friend that you have not seen for 
years. Perhaps you imagine giving him a vigorous hug. Thus, in this case the imagined scenario 
of you embracing your friend is somatically marked in a positive way. Moreover, Damasio also 
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gives us an account for how somatic markers can help us make decisions and choose how to act 
in particular situations. For instance reflect on the following scenario: you are considering 
whether or not to enter into business with your best friend’s archenemy (Damasio, 2005, p. 170). 
You are consciously and deliberately forming a mental image of your friend walking by just as 
you shake hands with the business associate. When this image comes up in your mind you cringe 
as you think about the eventuality. And as such you are presumably going to evaluate that 
possible decision in a negative way, i.e., it is somatically marked strongly negatively. In this way 
your negative response informs your decision and subsequent action to decline the business deal 
(Ibid).  
  One question to ask is: What does it mean to have an image marked in a negative or 
positive way? Damasio (2005) is going to say that somatic marking is associated with neuro-
chemicals of various kinds. For example, when you are either happily contemplating a positive 
prospect or angrily contemplating a negative one “domapine, 
norepinephrine…serotonin…[and]acetylcholine” are released in various degrees into your 
bloodstream making you feel in a certain way (p. 181). Thus, many somatic markers have both a 
physiology (i.e., the chemicals released) and a phenomenology (i.e., a way that they feel). 
Likewise, imagine that you have a negative association with a certain kind of food, because once 
it made you sick. And as a result, you are now associating the food with vomiting. Imagine also 
that when someone mentions the food years later it is still somatically marked in a negative way: 
that is, you say “ewwh” and make the facial expression characteristic of disgust. The 
phenomenology of the marker is that contemplating the food makes you feel bad, while the 
physiology of it is the chemicals released together with the facial expression. 
  In the beginning of this section I said that perhaps the reader might wonder; if the 
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affective behaviors expressed in the above examples are not the result of conscious deliberation, 
then what makes them happen? Moreover, I said that maybe Damasio’s somatic markers could 
account for their energy by introducing us to impulses. That is, the chemicals mentioned above 
can not only affect the way things in the environment appear to the individual, but they also 
produce the reaction (impulse), which itself tends to produce a behavior (e.g., the ones described 
in the examples above). Thus, they are physiological underpinning or anchorage of the affective 
behavior(s). For instance, when Destiny begins to lovingly stroke Miles’ head, we can think of 
Miles as being somatically marked positively (i.e., certain chemicals are released in her body as 
she looks at his hair thus influencing how she perceives it; it shimmers with wanting to be 
strokedness).12, 13 And what is more, as this happens Destiny has the impulse (or reaction) to start 
stroking his head.14  
  Further, on this picture, reflexive affective behavior such as when Jordan cannot help but 
fearfully grasping the armchair of the couch, happens when the individual is unable to (in any 
way) influence whether or not the impulse will produce the behavior. However, in the other 
examples considered before there is at least the possibility that the agent could.  
   An additional point that I want to make about somatic markers is that there is nothing 
about them that make them necessarily tied to visual imagery. Rather, it seems plausible that 
other senses can be involved in somatic marking as well. For instance, a friend told me that as a 
                                                        
12 Throughout this dissertation I’m going to have to be allusive and gesture at how I’m thinking of this “wanting to 
be strokedness” (and similar experiences in other emotion examples), but I’m not going to be able to fully describe 
it. Below (towards the end of chapter 1) I will give some examples trying to explain how I’m thinking of this type of 
experience—what it is like for the person experiencing the emotion, etc. 
13 This would be the case also when talking about moods, such as Clark’s being gloomy. In the latter case however, 
Clark’s whole perceptual experience would be somatically marked negatively (e.g., everything he sees cries out to 
him to ‘be kept away from’; as something to make yourself smaller in front of). And thus, bringing about impulses 
in Clark that in turn produces various gloomy behaviors (i.e., his hunching over, his talking with a small voice, his 
walking slowly).  
14 Main point: you can explain Destiny’s behavior without appealing to judgments, but by appealing to a perceptual 
object that makes actions of hers spontaneous so that she would have to exert an effort not to do it. She does not 
lovingly stroke Miles’ head because she tells herself to do it, but because it is her natural impulse to do so. 
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child growing up in Los Angeles there was a restaurant that he and his family would go to, and 
that had a very particular smell due to the cleaning supplies that they used there. And so, my 
friend would come to associate that particular smell with the place and the times that he had 
spent there with his family. Fifteen years later when he was traveling around in England, a hotel 
that he was staying at used those exact same cleaning supplies, and consequently he was again 
exposed to that certain smell. When he smelled the smell, he was brought back to the particular 
restaurant in Los Angeles. In this case the aroma was redolent with feeling, not just smell. Hence 
in this example, it does not seem as though first my friend smelled the smell and then he had an 
emotion, but rather the experience itself (the aroma) was infused with affect (i.e., certain 
chemicals was released in his body). Moreover, it would not surprise me if, say, nonhuman 
animals also somatically mark objects of perception when those objects of perception are heard, 
or tasted. 
  Another characteristic of the embodiment fact is that the affective behaviors generally 
are appropriate to the situation at hand.15 They are consistent with the types of behaviors one 
would expect someone who is experiencing emotions such as anger, intimidation, love, or fear to 
demonstrate. For instance, when an agent feels scared it makes sense that she would try to make 
herself look smaller (i.e., cower) so as to avoid attention.16 Or, that when a creature feels love 
toward someone else that she would touch that person (e.g., stroke him or her) to show her 
affection. 
  One other feature of the embodiment fact is that even though in the cases where an 
individual cannot call to mind why she did what she did (i.e., give a reason or reasons for the 
                                                        
15 Of course in some instances they might not be appropriate for the situation at hand, such as when someone due to 
a phobia of say, rabbits, experiences a pattern of fear behaviors as she sees a child playing with her bunny rabbit on 
the lawn.  
16 For example, in the animal kingdom this type of reaction appears beneficial to one’s survival—if one sees oneself 
as weaker, why draw the attention of someone stronger to oneself?  
18 
   
behavior), there might still be an explanation for it. Here I am prepared to give the traditional 
emotion critic, who thinks of reasons in a more cognitive way, that reasons are only ever had at 
the person level where they can be articulated by an agent as part of a reason-desire 
rationalization explanation. However, I want to suggest that there is another concept that could 
be useful here, namely adaptiveness. Adaptiveness stands between sheer intelligibility (i.e., I can 
understand why it happens, i.e., I can tell the causal story; why water boils at a particular 
temperature) on one extreme, and rationalizability in the sense that an agent can give reasons for 
why she behaves in the way that she does on the other extreme. And so, this explanatory concept 
falls somewhere in the middle of the two sides; it helps meet the organism’s needs. Moreover, 
while something being adaptive suggests optimal, or better than other kinds of options, it does 
not require conscious, sentient, reflective attention, etc. 
  Now, an adaptation is something that makes sense both at the level of phylogeny (i.e., the 
evolutionary history of a species) and ontogeny (i.e., the evolutionary history of an organism), 
but it also makes sense in that adapting to your social environment can happen within an 
individual’s lifespan where there is no genetic change. You can see how a person might adapt to 
a social niche without paying attention to the fact that they are doing so. Rather, they just adapt 
by sharing in the upspeak, the vocal fry, clothing style and/or the postures within their peer 
group, and this without ever having a conscious thought about it whatsoever.  
  Based on the above discussion then, perhaps we can think of emotions as being adaptive 
in the following two ways. First, and here the thought is something like this; just as the bird’s 
beak is well-suited to help it survive in some particular biological niche (i.e., it is the right size 
for cracking nuts and getting maggots out of the rotted wood), a person’s extreme repulsive 
behavior upon seeing maggots in her trashcan (i.e., she starts retching and makes a disgusted 
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facial expression) is well-suited to help her survive in the niche that she is in. Second, and this 
similarly to the adaptivness of upspeak and vocal fry within peer groups mentioned above, 
sometimes also emotions can be thought of as adaptive within an individual’s social environment 
(or niche). For instance, when I am at my grandparents’ house, which has always been a very 
strict and cold place, I experience my happiness differently than when I am with my friends. That 
is, when I am around my grandmother my happiness is less intense and animated, whereas when 
I am with my friends it is more all-consuming and expressive. Lastly, and importantly, here I 
could have adapted to this social niche without having paid attention to the fact that I was doing 
so. 
  Before I move on to considering the many other benchmarks that a good theory of 
emotions should be able to account for, I want to also briefly say something about what 
embodied cognition is and how it differs from the more traditional computational theories of 
cognition. Further, after having done so I will too discuss my previous suggestion that it is 
possible to move from embodied cognition to embodied affect (or emotion).  
c. Embodied cognition to embodied affect 
 According to the traditional account of cognition, the latter is best understood in terms of 
an appeal to rules and representations. For example, on this view for a baseball player to predict 
where the ball is going to end up “…a model of the projectile motion of the ball and some 
information about its initial conditions as it came off the bat (speed, direction, etc) [is needed]. 
Perception provides input, the brain uses a representation that implements the model to predict 
the landing location and then commands the body to move [to] the right location” (Thompson, 
2012). In contrast, the embodied claim is that the baseball player manages to solve the problem 
at least in part by keeping his eyes on the ball and using his body to move in a particular way. 
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Thus, he is neither required to engage in any predictive calculations nor does there have to be an 
“internal model” at work. Rather, the outfielder is working out the difficulty “by moving in a 
particular way” in a specific type of environment (Thompson, 2012). And so embodied 
cognition is happening as the player’s body moves in relation to the ball: his brain, perception 
and body working together to solve the task.  
  A question naturally arises here. Surely, the baseball player must have some fairly 
complex neurological activity occurring. But is this not to say that there will be some internal 
cognition occurring? To this we can respond with the following. Embodied cognition does not 
claim that any cognitive events happen entirely outside of the brain (i.e., that it is entirely extra-
cranial). It makes the weaker claim that certain cognitive states are constituted in part by events 
that are extra-cranial. In the case of the baseball player, the bodily movements are a part of his 
calculation of where to stand; this is what makes the cognitive state embodied. Furthermore, as 
in the above illustration with the outfielder, there are many activities that we would consider 
intelligent that do not involve the process described by traditionalists about cognition. But rather, 
that in part involve the organism having a combination of perceptual competence (i.e., visual and 
bodily perception) and her being in the right ecological niche (i.e., having her body within a 
particular environment). 17 
  Before I continue on to motivate the claim that at times cognition is embodied, I want to 
first briefly highlight that there at least two strands of embodied cognition visible in the 
                                                        
17 The authors of “Embodied cognition is not what you think it is” Andrew D. Wilson and Sabrina Golonka (2013) 
mention as one reason in favor of an embodied account of cognition over the traditional view, the fact that it is a 
simpler, more economical way for the organism to solve a specific problem: “Embodied cognition solutions solve 
specific tasks, not general problems, so identifying how an organism produces a given behavior means accurately 
identifying the task it is trying to solve at the time. Taking things one task at a time opens up the possibility of smart 
solutions. Organisms using smart solutions solve particular problems using heuristics made possible by stable 
features of the task at hand, rather than general purpose rote devices which apply algorithms to solve the task. For 
common tasks, smart solutions are typically more efficient, more stable, and more economical than rote solutions” 
(p.2).  
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literature. And second, I want to emphasize the strand that I am going to be concerned with as we 
move forward. One strand of embodied cognition is where the paradigm is the above-mentioned 
example with the baseball player catching a fly ball. He is working out a problem by moving in a 
certain intelligent way. Another strand of embodied cognition can be found in examples like the 
following. If I give you a mental image by means of a metaphor, for example I might tell you: 
“the knife is ripping the flesh” or “the velvet fabric felt soft between her fingers,” then, that will 
activate some mental imagery in you, and most likely something physiological as well. Or, 
imagine that you are telling a friend a story about how someone gripped the handles of a 
motorcycle very tightly. It would not be surprising as you were telling her this, if an fMRI 
machine caught your friend activating the muscles in her hands unintentionally.18  
  The second strand of embodied cognition focuses on perception and imagery, whereas in 
the baseball example it is more about the individual being out in the world directly doing 
something. In this dissertation my emphasis on embodied affect it more aligned with the baseball 
paradigm, and less like imagining something happening in the mind’s eye with physiological 
changes being part of the process. It is not that we could not consider the second strand; in a 
more extensive discussion one might. However, in this dissertation we will be concerned with 
embodied cognition as in the case of the baseball player. As a result, in what follows when I use 
the term ‘embodied cognition,’ the first strand is the type that I am referring to. 
  In an attempt to support the claim that at times cognition is embodied, I want to consider 
the following. If we asked a traditionalist about cognition what he thought about a case such as 
the baseball example discussed above, we can agree that: firstly, he would not simply insist that 
                                                        
18 Apparently, something similar happens for ballet dancers when they see another dancer perform moves that they 
have rehearsed before; their brain and muscles mimics what they see in front of them in the other dancer. “If they 
see someone performing an arabesque, for example, certain motor areas of their brains respond as if they were 
themselves performing the step” (Solway, 2007).   
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cognition always has to be in the form of inner speech. And likewise, secondly, he would also 
not insist that cognition is a kind of platonic grasp of objects, namely, propositions. So, what is it 
then? As we saw previously, for a traditionalist, cognition is constituted by processes that do not 
have to be in conscious awareness, and yet they are internal in the sense that they are required to 
be in the central nervous system. Now, my question is, why could not an environment-
modifying, jury-rigging kind of organism (human being, dragonfly, spider, etc.,) also use things 
outside of its cranium as part of its cognitive apparatus? That is, why would you expect such 
creatures to restrict these processes to what happens inside the cranium (or whatever other device 
the animal has) of the central nervous system?  
  Of course many cognitive types (states and processes) are ones which tokens can be 
realized purely intra-cranially, but there is no deep reason why certain other tokens of the same 
cognitive types (states and processes) could not involve something bodily. The responsibility 
then, is on the traditionalist to explain what the deep significance of the cranium (or whatever 
other device the organism has) is and why it is necessary to draw the line right there.      
 For an embodied cognition theorist, cognition is an application of intelligence; it is 
competence or skill as manifested in an organism’s behavior. To understand what this 
competence or skill is, think of a massage therapist’s, a knitter’s, or a glassblower’s expert 
hands. That is, she has expert, or competent or skillful hands in the way that they are sensitive to 
finding muscles that are in need of massage, to correctly and quickly working through intricate 
knitting patterns, or to moving the blowpipe accurately. In these examples one does not have to 
refer to cognition as constituted by complex processes to account for her intelligent behavior, but 
rather, she knows by touch what to do, and where and how to do it. For example in the case of a 
glassblower working on a new design, and similarly to the outfielder fielding the ball, he has 
23 
   
perceptual awareness of what is happening (i.e., he sees what he is doing), but it is not the case 
that he is merely following an internally represented rule. Rather, the way he moves his body in 
the environment is part of the solution to the problem of for the glassblower; to make the glass, 
and for the outfielder; to catch the ball.  
  As we have seen above there is no need to deny that in some cases cognitive states are 
wholly internally represented, however at other times it would seem that the proponent of 
embodied cognition has it right and that cognition, in fact, is embodied—it is competence or 
expertise realized in one’s bodily behavior. Now, as I said in the beginning of this chapter, I am 
suggesting that affect even though in some cases requiring cognitive occurrences as traditionally 
understood (such as judgments, beliefs, propositional acts) all emotions sometimes are 
embodied. That is, at times the occurrence of an emotion can be achieved, in part, by a 
physiological anchorage of some kind (such as a neurotransmitter or chemical, i.e., a somatic 
marker that marks your experience in a certain way) together with some physical behavior.19, 20 
Examples of the latter would be the many cases of affective behavior described previously, 
namely, Lauren’s angrily washing the dishes, Destiny’s lovingly stroking Miles’ head, and the 
squirrel’s fearfully cowering when perceiving the hawk, etc. To crystallize the idea of embodied 
affect the following is the definiendum of what it is for an affective state to be embodied (i.e., the 
definiens): 
                                                        
19 The way I’m thinking about this is as follows. Under certain perceptual and environmental conditions (more about 
these below) emotions can come in the form of various physiological changes together with a clenched fist, a 
shuddering, the looking enviously at someone, or the stroking of someone’s hair lovingly, etc. 
20 Perhaps as with embodied cognition, embodied emotions too can be understood as in a sense more efficient, more 
stable, and more economical solutions to problems. For example, evolutionary speaking emotions are problem 
solvers regarding things in an organism’s environment—the squirrel’s cowering solves the problem of something 
being a threat to the animal’s survival by making the animal smaller so as to not draw attention to itself. This 
affective behavior is more efficient than the organism performing various computations in its head and then acting. 
More about this below!  
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 An affective state A is embodied just in case some feature of the agent’s environment or  
  behavior is in part constitutive of A. 
 
 We can see then that body movement is to the mental process of calculation as, say, 
Destiny’s hair stroking is to the emotional event of “loving.” Before I continue on to discussing 
more precisely how I think of embodied affect here, I want to first consider and answer to a 
potential criticism that a critic now might not only raise to the embodied cognition account, but 
also to my suggestion of embodied affect. 
  The foregoing is a sketch of embodied affect, but as I said we should also notice what a 
traditionalist skeptic would say in response. The traditionalist will reply that these behaviors are 
manifestations or expressions of emotions, but that they are also distinct from them. For the 
traditionalist then, emotion itself (i.e., certain representations in the brain) causes the organism to 
behave in particular ways. That is, for such an individual the behavior in question is always a 
mere consequence of the emotion (i.e., the representation), and as such it can never be a 
constitutive part thereof. Below I will outline an answer to this criticism by first considering why 
embodied cognition in some cases wins over the traditional view, and then second, I am going to 
draw a parallel to embodied affect. 
   In general, intelligent behavior in the natural world is often the result of some lucky 
accident, jury-rigging, or repurposing of something that is already out there. For example, the 
bones in our ears are an evolutionary descendent of jawbones in lizard-like ancestors 
(“Homology,” n.d). Nature works with the material that is there, ties them together, and 
repurposes them into something that works. This appears to be a very common theme in 
evolutionary theory, and is often typified by saying: “nature is parsimonious.” At this time the 
reader might wonder; how does this have anything to do with traditional and embodied 
cognition? It is pertinent to it because it shows part of the attractiveness of embodied cognition, 
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at times, over the traditional view. 
   As we know, it is consistent with the embodied theorist’s claim that some internal 
representation guides the baseball player, the glassblower, and the massage therapist. That is, to 
say that some part of behavior is a constitutive part of the emotion or cognitive state is 
compatible with the claim that every time she emotes there is also something internal. However, 
the internal representation on the embodied view does not require such complex things as 
predictive calculations and internal models. Rather, on the embodied view the behavior is part of 
the calculation, and as such the kinds of representations demanded by the cognitivist are not 
necessary. Hence, the embodied theorist can explain what is happening in a more parsimonious 
way than the traditionalist. This puts pressure on the latter to explain why we should go his 
route—that is, what would it gain us to posit and rely on predictive calculations and internal 
models? 
  Similarly, for the embodied affect idea, one could say that what emotions are in cases 
such as when Lauren angrily washes the dishes or Jordan fearfully clutches the arm of the chair, 
are these internal complex representations. However, then the question becomes; what would 
that explain when you have another form of explanation where behavior is a constitutive part of 
the emotion? That is, why positing something that appears, given that nature is parsimonious, to 
be an unnecessary explanatory fifth wheel? Consequently, the onus is on the critic to justify why 
it is required that we do so. I will now return to my discussion of emotions and the embodiment 
fact, and further what such an idea consists in.  
 Based on my proposal that affect can be embodied (i.e., for all emotion types there will e 
at least one emotion token that is embodied), one question that I need to consider further is: how 
can we apply the embodied way of thinking about intelligence as expert or skillful behavior to 
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affect? One way of doing this is by saying that there are different levels of intelligence. For 
instance, perhaps we can say that there can be organismic intelligence, and that there can be 
individual intelligence. I will below discuss each of these levels of intelligence in greater detail.  
  Organismic intelligence is a rather basic-level intelligence, and further, it is not 
something that the individual has to build (or acquire) through training. Perhaps we can think of 
it as “first nature” rather than “second nature,” the latter requiring learning and skill-building 
whereas the former does not. Moreover, it also does not demand that the individual has any 
thoughts about what they are doing. Now, this is the type of intelligence that so to speak my 
whole body manifests as I sweat or get goose bumps from the air temperature around me. That 
is, my sweating when it is hot on the one hand and my getting goose bumps when it is cold on 
the other hand, are both in some ways intelligent responses to environmental changes. They are 
adaptive within my biological niche since they are beneficial to my well-being and survival.  
  Individual intelligence comes after, and sits on top of, organismic intelligence. It is 
something in which some but not all individuals learn to regulate their emotional expression in 
accordance with the social situation. Such learning will typically be conscious but it need not be. 
However, it is the type of intelligence that requires that the individual learn how to get by in his 
or her environment, and not everyone knows how to do that. Consequently, this form of 
intelligence requires skill. Furthermore, the emotional behaviors that we are concerned with here 
then (similarly to those discussed above) are intelligent responses to the individual’s 
environment. That is, they are adaptive within the individual’s social niche in that they increase 
his or her chances of being accepted within a social context. 
  Now, the reader might at this point ask, where do emotion examples like Lauren angrily 
washing the dishes discussed above fall? It seems appropriate to think of angrily washing the 
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dishes in this case as intelligent in an individual sense, because it requires social training to have 
a delayed response to your social environment (in this case your boss). Presumably what you are 
doing is sublimating your aggression into a different direction using the dishes as props (for your 
boss) since not doing so might get you into trouble. It would also seem that washing the dishes 
angrily is a rather individual form of intelligence in that it can be thought of as, if not intelligent 
in the sense of being therapeutic or helpful, at least as something that allows you to act on 
impulses (such as an impulse to attack). That is, the individual acts on impulses without doing 
something that gets her into a potentially dangerous situation, and this appears adaptive within 
the individual’s social niche. What is more, it is a better way for Lauren to redirect her anger in 
this way, than smashing the glasses and plates against, say, the kitchen wall.   
  At this point I want to also mention that there can be sophisticated individual learning for 
nonhuman animals as well. I am thinking here of the way in which an individual baboon for 
instance learns certain social hierarchies; who is allowed to groom whom? Who is allowed to 
hold whose baby? And, who eats first? All of these are very important to know for the 
individual’s continuous belonging to the group (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Now, since this is the 
case, one would not be surprised if baboons also learn to for instance redirect some of their 
expressions of, say, anger onto something else. And as such, that kind of emoting would also fall 
into the category of manifested individual intelligence. In contrast, the above example with the 
squirrel that fearfully cowers when the hawk enters into his field of vision appears to be an 
example of organismic intelligence. The squirrel’s emoting here is an intelligent response to an 
immediate environmental change. It is adaptive within its biological niche in that it ensures the 
nonhuman animal’s protection and survival.  
  Admittedly, many instances of affective behavior appear to be counterproductive, such as 
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my bodily manifestations of fear revealing to an audience that I am terrified of public speaking 
or their showing a potential killer that I am afraid of him. However, and in accordance with my 
previous discussion of emotions as being adaptive, they are still a byproduct of human evolution. 
That is, we can think of emotions as being imperfect tools for coping with our environment 
today; an environment that is much different than what it was thousands of years ago. Even 
though from an evolutionary perspective it makes sense that I would manifest fear in a 
potentially threatening situation, like the one described earlier (after all I could fail in my 
speaking endeavor and as a result be viewed as weak, or the killer could actually try to come 
after me next) from a contemporary point of view, it would appear more beneficial if I did not 
respond in such a fearful way. Thus, as the human nose is an imperfect solution given today’s 
pollen problems, affective behaviors are imperfect solutions to our contemporary environment.  
d. The role of the environment in embodied affect 
  The last remark I want to make before moving on to talking about the other benchmarks 
is that the environment plays a crucial part in embodied affect. That is, someone holding that 
affect can be embodied would have to agree that for an individual to experience it in some form 
or another certain things have to be present in her surroundings. Likewise, for the outfielder to 
catch the ball it must be on the right kind of trajectory (it has to be within a range of possible 
paths). As an example of required objects in such an organism’s environment, consider the 
previous case with Destiny lovingly stroking Miles’ hair. Here the presence of Miles’ hair as a 
thing to be stroked is necessary. Similarly, for Jordan to experience bodily manifestations of fear, 
words such as trapped, rape, or attack, etc., have to be present (i.e., in this instance words 
spoken by her friend Jane are apart of Jordan’s environment).21, 22 What is more, it is not merely 
                                                        
21 Physical objects, colors, tastes, smells, sounds, etc., are all part of one’s environment. 
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the case that the environment here is made up by particular physical things, but rather it is also 
the case that the emoter highlights these things in accordance with its emotional significance.   
  The way that I am thinking about this ‘highlighting’ of objects brings us back to our brief 
discussion before about somatic markers. The person experiencing the emotion ‘colors’ or 
‘charges’ her environment in a somatically marked way.23 To see how this is so consider for 
example again the case of Jordan. Suppose further that besides the above-mentioned words that 
she associates with her rape there is a certain place on campus that she connects to her rapist, 
such as, a seat in class in which he used to sit. We can imagine that this place now (i.e., the seat 
or the general area of the seat) is colored or charged in a certain negative manner to her. That is, 
certain chemicals are released in her body as she looks at the chair thus influencing how she 
perceives it. Hence, when Jordan sees the chair as she walks into the room, her perceiving is not 
merely the sheer perception of primary qualities, but rather she is perceiving it also as in a sense 
screaming out to her with, something like wanting to be avoidedness. Moreover, as this happens 
a certain fearful behavior is triggered in Jordan and she starts shaking and grasps on to her 
friend’s arm. In this case then, the affect (i.e., fear) is manifested or realized in her behavior.  
  In an effort to explain what I mean when I say that Jordan is not only perceiving the 
primary qualities of the chair, but also that she is seeing it as in a sense screaming out to her with 
wanting to be avoidedness, consider the following example. If Jordan’s experience was made 
into a movie, then as the camera is directed towards that particular chair the viewer might hear a 
soundtrack similar to the shrieking sound of the shower scene in psycho. Thus, intensifying her 
experience (her perception) of the piece of furniture. As an example of this, consider the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
22 Side note: In the case of Lauren angrily washing the dishes it might be that if there is nothing she can wash angrily 
(i.e., there are no dishes to be made, they are all clean), she perhaps will find herself throwing dishes on the wall. 
That is, she will move on to throwing dishes on the wall if she finds it hard to find something to use as a medium for 
her anger. 
23 Physical objects, colors, tastes, smells, sounds, etc., can all be somatically marked. 
30 
   
shrieking sound of the shower scene in Psycho; as the woman is being stabbed to death with a 
knife the eerie score plays repeatedly. Now, by having the music accompanying what is taking 
place in the scene, the viewer’s visual experience of it is intensified. Similarly in the non-movie 
example with Jordan, due to the chair being somatically marked negatively for her she perceives 
it as standing out (as being intensified) from the rest of the furniture. In this situation then, not 
only can Jordan not but perceive the chair as ‘charged’ (i.e., intensified), but, she will also be 
motivated to avoid it.   
  I acknowledge that in my above comparison to film and film music there is another 
experiential dimension present besides vision, namely, the auditory dimension. However, even if 
my example of Jordan’s experience being made into a movie does not get me all the way to an 
account of what it means to say that an object is ‘colored’ or ‘charged’ emotionally, it is a step in 
the right direction. In the next paragraph I expand on this idea. 
  John Locke in an Essay Concerning Human Understanding talks about a blind man who 
(never having seen colors) one day exclaims that he knows what the color scarlet is like; he says 
it is similar to the sound of a trumpet (Essay III. IV. 20). In line with Locke’s view, the blind 
man here does not have a full understanding of what the color scarlet is like, however, we can 
say that he has some understanding—the color scarlet is loud and shrill (Ibid). After all, you 
would not want to say the same things about the color brown. Rather, it would be better 
described as the sound of a trombone—low and rumbling. Now, it is not as though these various 
sounds capture exactly what the experience of colors is, but it gets one in the general vicinity of 
it. Drawing from this idea in this dissertation, I am trying to do something similar when I use 
metaphors regarding what things such as Miles’ hair or the chair are like to the emoter; e.g., that 
Miles’ hair shimmers with wanting to be strokedness or that the chair screams out with wanting 
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to be avoidedness. For even though the analogy to film music above does not perfectly capture 
what Jordan’s experience when she sees her rapist’s seat in class is like (i.e., as intensified), as it 
would not fully capture Destiny’s experience when perceiving Miles’ hair (i.e., as intensified), it 
does put us in the general direction of it. 
  We all have experiences of perceiving things in an emotionally charged way, and further 
we know that it is difficult to verbalize such experiences. But, the reader will know that this is 
not anything specific to emotion; anything qualitative is difficult to verbalize. Indeed that is the 
point I just made in discussing the examples above. However, it is an aspect of emotions that we 
need to be able to account for, but for now the above is the best description I can give. Taken 
together, one sees that the environment and our perception of it are crucial parts both in the 
embodied cognition and affect story. However, they constitute especially important parts in the 
affect case with beings “coloring” or “charging” the environment in ways that are emotionally 
important to them.  
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1) INTRODUCTION 
  Below I am going to discuss some phenomena, or benchmarks as I call them, that I think 
any theory of emotions ought to be at least consistent with and, ideally, able to explain. Now, the 
latter might cause the reader to raise the question: If you think that these are benchmarks, then 
why should not each theory have to accommodate all of them? To this I want to answer as 
follows; in philosophy often you have a theory that accounts for most of the intuitions or other 
phenomena that we want to consider, but not all of them. When this is the case the theorist is 
allowed to explain away the ones that are leftover. The theorist does not do this by making things 
up, but by saying that those are not real phenomena, or one of them, say, rests on a confusion, or, 
that they are really two different phenomena mixed into one. As we will see in chapter III, some 
of the emotion theories cannot explain all of the below benchmarks, however, this does not 
discount that theory automatically. I raise this since I want to acknowledge that there is room for 
theorists to navigate around some of the stated phenomena.  
2) BENCHMARKS 
a. Some emotions have a cognitive component  
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Emotions often involve thoughts. Perhaps you come to understand that someone has 
intentionally wronged you, such a realization might involve the following thought or belief: ‘she 
[e.g., a close friend] knew that I liked John, and still she went ahead and danced with him at the 
party.’ This would be a thought usually connected to the emotion of anger. Or, maybe after 
finding out about the passing of a beloved relative you have the thought or belief: ‘Karl is gone 
and I will never get to see him again.’ The latter being a thought (or belief) commonly associated 
with the emotion of sadness.  
b. Some emotions have a physiological dimension  
 
 Emotions often come with various physiological changes. For example, when you realize 
that your friend intentionally slighted you by dancing with your love-interest, perhaps your 
breathing rate and blood flow to the arms increase (preparing you to fight) (Ekman, 2003, p. 79). 
On the other hand, when you come to know that your family member has passed away, your 
heart might begin to beat faster, maybe you start sweating and turn pale.  
c.  Some emotions have a phenomenal character24 
 
  Emotions often involve a phenomenology—a way the emotion feels to the individual. As 
an example, the angry person might feel something like a pang of heat in her body when seeing 
her friend with the person she is in love with. In contrast, the individual who finds out that her 
family member recently died might experience a sinking feeling in her stomach.   
d. Emotions characteristically have behavioral signatures 
 
  According to some researchers on emotions,25 some emotions have certain universally 
recognized facial expressions. For example, surprise is said to involve, pan-culturally, “raised 
                                                        
24 I take myself to make a rather weak claim here, namely, that some emotion tokens lack a phenomenology. There 
is a stronger claim, namely, that some emotion types characteristically lack a phenomenology (which does not mean 
that they could never have one. For instance, it seems that the emotion type ‘national pride’ lacks a phenomenology. 
However, that does not mean that you cannot be in a particular situation where you find yourself bursting with pride 
about your country, but it is not as characteristic. In contrast, the emotion type ‘fear’ has a phenomenology).  
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curved eyebrows; long horizontal forehead wrinkles…wide open eyes…dropped-open mouth…” 
(Ekman et al (1971a &b) as described in Griffiths, 1997, p. 54). Whereas disgust supposedly can 
be recognized on “brows drawn down but not together…lower eyelids pushed up and raised, but 
not tensed…deep nasolabial folds and raising of cheeks; mouth either open with upper lip raised 
and lower lip forward and/or out, or closed with upper lip pushed up by raised lower lip…” 
(Ibid). However, more recent literature argues that it is not the case that a Scandinavian and a 
Papua New Guinean express and otherwise display their, anger, fear, surprise and so forth in 
similar ways (Russell, 1994). Instead, there can be uniformity in the following sense: this 
particular person has a uniform way of manifesting her anger, fear, surprise, etc. Thus, other 
individuals who are experts on that person can read her emotions. That is, it is likely that you can 
see an emotion in, say, your partner in ways that someone else not as familiar with her is able to. 
As an example of this, Lauren Bacall would describe how her husband Humphrey Bogart, when 
happy to see either her or their children, would engage in a kind of chewing-gesture (Bacall, 
1979, p. 314). Presumably, this is an emotion signature that someone who was not an expert on 
Bogart would not have been able to recognize.  
  Rather than committing myself to any kind of pan-cultural regularities among emotions, I 
want to make the weaker claim that there are regularities among emotional manifestations of 
emotional behavior, but that the regularities are idiosyncratic. It seems to me that emotions do 
have characteristic behavioral patterns that can look very different between individuals. 
e. Non-human animals and pre-linguistic children can have emotions  
 
 A good theory of emotion should be able to explain how emotions can occur also in pre-
linguistic children and nonhuman animals, whose thoughts do not have propositional content, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
25 Paul Ekman et al (1969 & 1971 a&b) work in particular on pan-cultural elements in facial displays of emotions.  
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who nevertheless behave in ways typical of various emotion experiences. For example, such an 
account should be able to accommodate the emotion process behind, say, the dog’s apparent 
anger when he growls, shows his teeth, and walks toward someone he perceive to be a threat, or, 
the 5 month-old child’s happiness when he smiles and makes cooing sounds upon seeing his 
mother entering into the room.  
f. Emotions can be irrational  
 
  In an effort to demonstrate what this benchmark comes down to, consider the examples 
below.  
  Example 1: Phobias. Imagine a classroom of 10-year old students with a teacher standing 
in the front asking them to come up to the board and draw their favorite animal. One of the 
students, call him Corbin, raises his hand and walks up to the teacher. He grabs a piece of chalk 
and begins drawing his favorite animal, a bunny rabbit. When the teacher sees what he has 
drawn, her heart starts beating faster, her blood pressure increases, tears begins streaming down 
her face, and eventually she flees the classroom. It is later determined by doctors that he teacher 
suffers from leporiphobia—an extreme irrational fear of rabbits (Palmer, 2010).      
  Example 2: Obsessions. One example of obsessive behavior can be seen in someone 
suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Research says that OCD “is an anxiety 
disorder in which people have unwanted and repeated thoughts, feelings, images, and sensations 
(obsessions) and engage in behaviors or mental acts in response to these thoughts or obsessions” 
(“Obsessive-Compulsive,” 2018). The individual often engage in these behaviors because they 
reduce “the impact or get rid of the obsessive thoughts” (Ibid). However, doing these behaviors 
only gives temporary relief, and further, not carrying them out can bring about great anxiety 
(Ibid). The disorder can be mild to severe, and when not treated can hinder the person from 
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leading a normal social and work life.  
  The following is an example of what life can be like for someone suffering from OCD as 
told by John Monahan (2018), whom himself battled the disorder through his teenage and young 
adult years. John describes how as a 14-year-old, his mom once remarked that he must really like 
that song since he’s been listening to it everyday over the past year. John continues: 
  “Yeah, it’s a favorite.” I nod, smilingly, before turning back toward the television with  
  what I hope is all the nonchalance of a typical 14-year-old boy. What I definitely do not  
  do is glance back and say, “Funny story about that song, while you’ve clearly noticed  
  I’ve listened to it every single weeknight this entire school year, would you believe I only  
  ever press play at exactly 8:38 p.m.? “And check this out, once the cable box hits 9:52  
  p.m., I will casually retire to my bedroom to initiate the final sequence of what has  
  recently ballooned into a near 90-minute nightly routine of humiliating compulsions: I’ll  
  touch the same four CDs laid out on my dresser in ‘order’; turn the stereo on and off;  
  move to the entertainment center; touch the ‘Twisted Metal’ video game case; turn on the  
  TV; boot up the PlayStation; shut it off  once the load screen finishes; press ‘channel up’  
  on the cable box until I hit channel 20, then 22, then 40; turn off the cable box, then touch  
  nothing else until it’s lights out at 9:58 p.m”’ (Monahan, 2018). 
 
Now, we can imagine further that all of these compulsive behaviors that John is engaging in 
above are the result of an irrational fear that if he doesn’t run through them, something is going 
to happen to his friends and family.   
  Example 3. Fetishes. What researchers call fetishistic disorder is described as “a 
condition in which there is a persistent and repetitive use of or dependence on nonliving objects 
[undergarments, footwear, gloves, rubber articles, and leather clothing] or a highly specific focus 
on a body part (typically nongenital [such as, feet, toes, and hair]) to reach sexual arousal” 
(“Fetishistic Disorder,” 2018). Further, it is only possible for the person to obtain sexual 
gratification when using the object or body part (Ibid). Now, an individual is diagnosed with the 
disorder if the fetish in some way impairs their functioning in social, occupational, or other 
important life areas (Ibid). However, if an individual identifies, as a fetishistic practitioner but is 
not clinically impaired in any of the latter ways, they have a fetish but not fetishistic disorder 
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(Ibid).  
  The following is an example of a young woman, Violetta, whom is a fetishistic 
practitioner (in particular she has a foot fetish) and thus can only experience sexual gratification 
if she is able to touch her sexual partner’s feet. Imagine that after a night of partying in one of the 
dorms on campus, she brings a guy with her home that she is interested in. Now, as they are 
getting undressed she cannot help but notice how “very soft and smooth-looking…[and how] 
masculine” his feet appear (Hills, 2015). And consequently, she has a strong emotional 
experience of elation. Furthermore, the way in which Violetta pays attention to the guy’s feet 
here is not in any way brief, but rather the body part becomes something that she cannot but 
fixate on.  
  Again, in each of these cases a convincing theory of emotion should be able to, if not 
explain the irrational emotions (i.e., the teachers fear, John’s fear, and Violetta’s elation), at least 
be consistent with them.  
g. Some emotions result from careful reflection whereas others are the result of automatic 
responses to stimuli. 
  
  One example of an emotion resulting from careful reflection is the anger that Jane 
Austen’s character in Pride and Prejudice, Elizabeth Bennet, experiences as a result of, first, 
having found out (and considered) that Mr. Darcy (a potential love interest) is the one behind the 
breakup between his friend Bingley and her sister Jane, and second, after witnessing the arrogant 
manner in which he boldly proposes to her. 
 “…When they were gone, Elizabeth, as if intending to exasperate herself as much as  
  possible against Mr. Darcy, chose for her employment the examination of all the letters  
  which Jane had written to her since her being in Kent…” (Austen, 2016, p.1) 
 
  “…In spite of her deeply-rooted dislike, she could not be insensible to the compliment of   
  such a man’s affection, and though her intentions did not vary for an instant, she was at  
  first sorry for the pain he was to receive; till, roused to resentment by his subsequent  
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  language, she lost all compassion in anger. She tried, however, to compose herself to  
  answer him with patience, when he should have done. He concluded with representing to  
  her the strength of that attachment which, in spite of all his endeavours, he has found  
  impossible to conquer; and with expressing his hope that it would now be rewarded by  
  her acceptance of his hand. As he said this, she could easily see that he had no doubt of a  
  favourable answer. He spoke of apprehension and anxiety, but his countenance expressed  
  real security. Such a circumstance could only exasperate farther, and when he ceased, the  
  colour rose into her cheeks…” (p. 3) 
  
  In the above quotations we see that Elizabeth holds a deep dislike of Mr. Darcy due to his 
involvement in the breakup, but that when his nonchalant tone and self-assured marriage 
proposal is added to the mix, she cannot but experience anger. Further, that Elizabeth is angry is 
emphasized by Austen when she points out that “the colour rose into her [Elizabeth’s] cheeks”—
a physiological characteristic typical of the emotion (Ibid). 
  In contrast, an example of an emotion resulting from an automatic response to a stimulus 
is the fear a creature experiences when, for example, she mistakes a branch on the ground for a 
snake. We can easily imagine that as a result her heart starts beating faster, blood rushes to her 
legs, and further that she jumps to the side. Another example would be the fear response an 
individual has when mistaking a branch in the water for a shark’s fin. Again, the person 
perceiving this, most likely as a result, will have a change in heart rate, an increase in adrenaline 
throughout her body, and abruptly move in the water (something like a jump to the side). Lastly, 
a third example is the surprise you experience when running into someone you know at a place 
where you did not expect seeing them—most likely, you will display a surprise facial expression 
together with physiological changes, such as, an increase in adrenaline.   
  As we can see then, emotions can be brought about either as a consequence of careful 
deliberation, or as the result of automatic responses to stimuli. 
h. Some emotions and moods are embodied         
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  Examples of embodied emotions, as I have suggested, are the ones described above in 
section I—Lauren’s washing the dishes angrily, Destiny’s stroking Miles’ hair lovingly, the 
squirrel’s fearfully cowering at the sight of the hawk, etc. What is more, a satisfying theory of 
affect should be one that not only discusses how emotions can be embodied, but that also talks 
about how moods can be. This is so since, many mood tokens are ones that are body involving; 
for instance, an anxious person might squeeze a stress-ball in her hand, spin a fidget-wheel 
between her fingers, or tap her hands on the table. Lastly, for a view that can account for tokens 
of emotions such as, anger and fear being embodied, it should be an easy case to explain how 
mood tokens can be. After all, it is harder to explain how the former can be embodied, than the 
latter.  
  Moreover, it is natural for a philosopher to suppose that one can give a conceptual 
analysis of emotions by looking at “the right and central usage” of emotion terms (Brotheridge, 
2004, 5). In the words of Paul Griffiths (1997) in his book What Emotions Really Are, for 
philosophers ascribing to conceptual analysis, the method “…can reveal to us the conditions for 
the application of various emotion terms [at this point in time]. Understanding these application 
conditions will allow us to frame “definitions” of these various emotions…using necessary and 
sufficient conditions…” (p. 34). For example, for Wayne C. Davis fear happens when 
propositional fear (“S is afraid that p iff S desires that not-p and is uncertain whether p, where 
S’s uncertainty is not based solely on his indecision about a course of action”) causes “both 
involuntary physiological arousal and “unhappiness” (Ibid). 26 However, Griffiths continues: 
i. At the moment it is not clear that emotions are the kinds of things open to conceptual 
analysis. For instance, according to some authors some emotions are natural kinds. 
 
                                                        
26 Griffith (1997) stresses that for Davis empirical finds about fear are not important: “such facts are not generally 
known, and so could not be part of the meaning of ‘fear,’ which is my concern in this paper” (p. 3). 
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  What are natural kinds? Philosophers and scientists often say that these are categories 
that “have boundaries that derive from nature” and not from the way human beings tend to 
organize or put things together (Prinz, 2004, 80). The metaphor commonly used to describe this 
is that nature has joints, or natural divisions. For example, lions, horses, birds, gold, and water all 
constitute natural kinds—they are classes of things that share certain properties, and which in 
nature are clearly separated from one another. In contrast, the things that we ourselves commonly 
sort into different categories, such as say, movies, works of art, and baseball games constitute 
non-natural kinds. Contrary to natural kinds, these do not exist or occur (i.e., have a reality) 
independently from us (i.e., in nature). One common scientific assumption is that emotions, such 
as anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and happiness, constitute distinct natural kinds (Barrett, 2006; 
Griffiths 1997, p. 78).  That is, each emotion can be identified by certain characteristics or 
features in, for example, the brain, face, physiology, and behavior (Barrett, 2006, p. 30).  
  Now, if the above theorists are correct and emotions are natural kinds, then, we can 
criticize the method of conceptual analysis by saying that it is inadequate. That is, if we really 
want to know what emotions are, “rather than about what is currently believed about 
emotion[s],” we have to take into consideration findings in the empirical sciences—we have to 
look at what happens in the brain, face, physiology, and behavior (Griffiths, 1997, p. 7). Since 
most emotion theorists appear engaged in conceptual analysis when putting forth their accounts, 
they should be able to provide a satisfying answer to why such a method is still valuable. And 
further, if it is, then how can it be reworked to account for the scientific evidence. 
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1) LEADING CURRENT VIEWS ON EMOTIONS 
 
 Below I will be considering the leading current views on emotions. In particular I am 
going to discuss representative versions of; the feeling theory, the cognitive theory, the non-
cognitive theory, the modified-cognitivist theory, and the hybrid theory together with some 
problems that can be raised against each of them. In my discussion of these views I will at the 
end of each section, briefly assess whether or not a specific theory can account for, or at least 
accommodate, the embodiment fact as well as the other benchmarks. However, I am reserving 
chapter V for a more detailed discussion of the embodiment fact benchmark. What is more, when 
looking at the above theories the reader might wonder where current views more tailored to 
account for and/or accommodate the embodiment fact are considered. In chapters IV and V I will 
give a detailed discussion of these accounts by looking at Rebekka Hufendiek’s embodied theory 
of emotions, and Lisa Feldman Barrett’s “constructed” theory of emotions. I will then further 
explain why a view weaving its path between these two accounts is preferable.  
   To briefly introduce the views I will be looking at two test cases of emotions, namely: 
(1) A basic emotion; fear27, and (2) a non-basic/not culturally specific emotion; national pride. 
                                                        
27 Other basic emotions are as identified by Paul Ekman in the 20th century: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
and surprise.  
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Imagine an individual, Sheryl, walking down a trail in the woods. Not paying attention to  
where she is putting her feet she fails to see the snake sunbathing on the trail in front of  
her. As a result, she comes upon it abruptly and when she finally sees it, she experiences 
a rush of fear. The agent jumps to the side, her heart beating fast in her chest and her 
palms sweaty. 
 
Picture an American, Frank, watching the gold medal match between Serena Williams 
and Maria Sharapova during the 2012 Olympics in London. When it becomes clear that 
Williams has beaten Sharapova he is beyond himself with excitement. However, Frank 
does not only feel keyed up about the win, he also experiences a great sense of pride over 
his national heritage. He feels great about being an American: as his fellow countrymen 
he is someone who is, successful, strong, determined, and who works hard to achieve his 
goals. 
 
a. The Feeling Theory 
 
  The Simple-Minded Feeling Theory. Let us imagine what a simple-minded version of 
the feeling theory might have looked like prior to its well-known James-Lange characterization. 
It would appear that it could be formulated as follows: an episode of anger is a particular 
qualitative experience, such as the feeling of a boiling up of sorts. By contrast, sadness is another 
particular qualitative experience, such as the feeling of being drained of energy, and so on for all 
of the emotions. To be clear, on this view each emotion has a distinctive qualitative aspect. Just 
as chlorine and sulfur have characteristic smells, so too anger, sadness, happiness, regret, etc., all 
have characteristic ways that they feel to the emoter.28  
 However, for many pairs of distinct emotions it is difficult to see how they would differ 
in phenomenology. Even if there is a characteristic way that regret and shame each feel it is not 
plausible that the two emotions have a distinct characteristic phenomenology. For most normal 
human sensory systems cinnamon has a distinctive way that it smells that is distinct from the 
                                                        
28 This account does not have to be given on a trans-species level; it can be given on an individual level. It is within 
the rights of the simple-minded feeling theorist to say that there are idiosyncratic patterns for the various emotions; 
e.g., for Julie there is a distinctive way that anger feels, a distinctive way that fear feels, etc. And further, those 
experiences do not have to be experiences that carry over to other individuals. For example, people suffering from 
panic-attacks usually claim that they can tell the signs when a panic-attack is coming on. But, those signs might be 
different from one person to another.  
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distinctive way that nutmeg smells. When applying this way of thinking to emotions, we get 
what I call the Cinnamon-Nutmeg understanding of emotion phenomenology. This is the view 
that, just as for cinnamon and nutmeg, for every distinct pair of emotion types, they have 
different phenomenology. However, the Cinnamon-Nutmeg understanding does not carry over 
naturally to emotions. For instance, regret and shame do not have distinctive phenomenologies.29 
Rather, they both just kind of feel like bummers, i.e., negative experiences.       
 Other emotions that bring out the above problem are happiness and pride. For instance, 
consider the 2016 Cubs fan; he or she most likely felt both happiness and pride when their team 
won the World Series in baseball. These are different emotions, but how are they different? 
Again, since both happiness and pride feel pleasant to the emoter, it is difficult for the simple-
minded feeling theorist to answer such a question. One might be tempted to say that they involve 
different judgments; however, this type of answer is not available to feeling theorist. And so, the 
forerunner to the James-Lange feeling theory is not satisfactory. As the dissertation develops, I 
will bring up the Cinnamon-Nutmeg criticism again against another emotion theory, and at that 
point I will expand on it further.  
  The James-Lange Feeling Theory. Looking ahead from the above naïve feeling theory, 
the James-Lange version distinguishes itself from the simple-minded account in that the qualia 
considered no longer are undirected. Rather, on this view the qualia are directed towards bodily 
changes; that is, emotions are (subjective) experiences of bodily responses, in which the emoter 
has a qualitative experience that has the bodily change as its object (James, 1884; Lange & 
James, 1967). On this account then, the claim is not merely that emotions are subjective 
                                                        
29 Regret and shame both feel unpleasant, but if there is anything that differientiates regret from shame it is that 
when I undergo regret I am whishing I had not done something in the past (such as dropping my iPhone in the 
puddle outside of my house), whereas when I am undergoing shame it is usually “a response to something [that I did 
and] that is morally wrong or reprehensible” (Burton 2014). 
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experiences caused by bodily changes, but also that they are subjective experiences that are 
perceptions of, or in some other way directed upon, the bodily changes. That subjective 
experiences are caused by bodily changes is implied by, for example, the quote below describing 
someone who is experiencing ‘morbid fear’: 
 “...Thus, to take one special instance, if inability to draw deep breath, fluttering of the  
  heart, and that peculiar epigastric change felt as “precordial anxiety,” with an irresistible  
  tendency to take a somewhat crouching attitude and to sit still, and with perhaps other  
  visceral processes not now known, all spontaneously occur together in a certain person;  
  his feeling of their combination is the emotion of dread, and he is the victim of what is  
  known as morbid fear” (James, 1884, p. 199). 
 
Moreover, that the subjective experiences are directed toward the bodily changes can be seen in 
the following “of-ness” (or aboutness) claims: 
 “What kind of emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart- 
  beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of  
  goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think” (p. 194). 
 
  A common objection to the James-Lange theory is that it fails to recognize the 
intentionality of emotions. It is said that on this version of the feeling theory the emotions are not 
intentional in an interesting enough way; i.e., they appear too brute. They are mere perceptions 
of the body, “they represent the body as being in such-and-such a state” (Prinz, 2004, p.54). 
However, this is not enough the critics say. Instead, any good theory of emotions has to be able 
to say that emotions are intentional in that they at least seem to be about things in the external 
world. For instance, you are angry at Bob, sad about your broken bicycle, or envious of that 
man’s car. Further, this makes emotions subject to normative assessment; it is important that one 
can say that emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate. 
  It is correct that a satisfying theory of emotion should be able to account for the fact that 
emotions can be subject to normative assessment; however, it seems the critics have been too fast 
in dismissing the James-Lange view on this point. For James-Lange an emotion inherits its 
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propriety/impropriety from the propriety/impropriety of the bodily changes themselves. For 
example, suppose that the bodily changes typical for fear are activated by a perceptual 
experience of a small spider running across your desk. In that case, your body has an 
inappropriate reaction to the perception of the spider (it is not really posing a threat to you).30 
And so, as a result, we can say that your body reacted inappropriately. In contrast, if the bodily 
changes typical of fear are activated by a perceptual experience of someone, say, about to attack 
you, your body has an appropriate reaction to that perception (the individual is posing a threat to 
you). Hence, your body reacted appropriately. 
  Taken together then, it appears too quick to say that we cannot get any purchase 
whatsoever of the notion of appropriateness and inappropriateness from emotions on the view. 
That is, even though the James-Lange version of the feeling theory might not get us all the way 
to a wholly satisfying account, it can at least make some headway in the right direction.  
  Before I consider some further frequently cited problems for the James-Lange 
formulation of the feeling theory, let us first look at how the view would handle the two test 
cases. Case 1: Sheryl perceives the snake on the ground. This brings about changes in her body, 
such as, an increase in heart rate and secretion of epinephrine affecting the sweat glands. These 
bodily changes cause in Sheryl an experiential state of fear that consists in the perception of the 
bodily change. Case 2: Frank perceives the situation (the U.S. winning Olympic gold) as 
reflecting positively on him as a fellow American. That is, by virtue of being from America he 
too is successful, strong, determined, and someone who achieves his goals. Consequently, certain 
bodily changes take place: e.g., adrenaline starts pumping through his veins, his heart is beating 
faster, and his muscles are activated. And so, the bodily changes excite in Frank a feeling state of 
                                                        
30 This is similar to other improper bodily reactions. As an example, as the temperature rises from 67-70 degrees 
something in your thermo-regulation makes you sweat like crazy. Now, this would be an improper reaction to a 
minor temperature change. 
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pride which itself consists in the perception of the bodily change.        
  Early commentators to James-Lange objected to the view in the following way: they 
argued that the account’s claim that each emotion involves the perception of a unique set of 
bodily responses, is not correct. For example, Walter Cannon (1987) said that his research 
showed that the bodily changes for emotions such as fear and rage are, in fact, identical: 
 “The visceral changes wrought by sympathetic stimulation may be listed as follows:   
  acceleration of the heart, contraction of arterioles, dilatation of bronchioles, increase of  
  blood sugar, inhibition of activity of the digestive glands, inhibition of gastro-intestinal  
  peristalsis, sweating, discharge of adrenalin, widening of the pupils and erection of hairs.  
  These changes are seen in great excitement under any circumstances. They occur in such  
  readily distinguishable emotional states as fear and rage. Fever and also exposure to cold  
  are known to induce most of the changes…” (p. 572, my emphasis added). 
 
  “As pointed out earlier by Cannon the responses in the viscera seem too uniform to offer  
  a satisfactory means of distinguishing emotions which are very different in subjective  
  quality. Furthermore, if the emotions were due to afferent impulses from the viscera, we  
  should expect not only that fear and rage would feel alike but that chilliness,  
  hypoglycemia, asphyxia, and fever should feel like them. Such is not the case” (Ibid). 
 
Moreover, work following on Cannon’s findings added to his conclusions by saying that it was 
only what the individual thought, i.e., how he or she interpreted the situation at hand, that 
distinguished one emotion from another (Schacter & Singer, 1962).  
 However, given the findings of more recent research it seems that the James-Lange 
position is in better shape than Cannon might have thought. For example, Ekman reports that: 
   “Recent research has found contrary evidence: not only distinctive expressions for anger,  
  fear, sadness, and disgust, but different patterns of bodily changes for each of these  
  emotions. Research with my colleague, the American psychologist Robert Levenson, has  
  shown such emotion-specific changes in ANS activity. We believe that the particular  
  changes that occur are preparing us to engage in actions which in the course of our  
  evolutionary history have been most adaptive. For example, we found that in both anger  
  and fear the heart rate accelerates. This prepares the person for strong exertions, as  
  Darwin says, with the blood going to the hands in anger (preparatory to hitting), and to  
  the limbs in fear (preparatory to flight)” (Ekman, 2009, p. 80, my emphasis added). 
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  Thus, Ekman shows that at least some emotions can be distinguished in the way the 
James-Lange view suggested (i.e., in the case of fear the blood flows to one’s legs and in the 
case of anger to one’s arms). Now, even though a handful of emotions have different bodily 
profiles and hence will be distinguishable on the James-Lange account, not all emotions are 
going to be—specifically, the more cognitively sophisticated ones (such as regret and shame).31 
Consequently, the James-Lange version is going to be struggling with the same issue as the 
Simple-Minded Feeling Theory from before. Both regret and shame plausibly involve some 
unpleasantness in the body, and both plausibly involve a perception of that unpleasantness. 
However, it is difficult to see how those perceptions will be different from each other.  
 Peter Goldie’s Feeling Theory. According to Peter Goldie, an emotional episode has a 
sui generis quality similar to the way experience has a sui generis quality (Goldie, 2009).32 To 
motivate this, he asks us to remember Mary the scientist who goes from living in a black and 
white room to life in a fully colored world. Imagine that Mary while living in the black and white 
room knows that the apple her friend is holding in his hand is red. However, once she enters the 
colored world she also knows what the red apple looks like, and what it is like to experience red. 
Thus, she has a different experience once she leaves the black and white room. Further, the 
experience that Mary has when she is let out into the world is not something that she could 
possibly grasp as long as she is still inside the room. For Goldie something similar is true of 
emotion episodes. To see this, we will next consider his showcase example of emotional 
experience. Namely, the ice-cold ice scientist, Gerda, who falls on the ice and for the first time 
                                                        
31 Perhaps one can build in ‘imaginings’ to the phenomenology of the various emotions. If I regret dropping that 
expensive vase at my friend’s house, I may keep imagining how I may have held it or caught it. Likewise if I am 
ashamed about something I did I may keep imagining people pointing their fingers at me and looking at me in a 
harsh way. Now, if this is correct, then you can distinguish the emotions by your kinds of imaginings.  
32 One might say that of course emotions are sui generis, because they have phenomenal dimensions. There is a way 
anger feels, and there is a way sadness feels. Beyond that, all I can say is metaphorical. Thus on this view, emotions’ 
sui generis-ity is due entirely to the phenomenological dimension. However, Goldie does not agree with this. For 
him, emotions in their very nature bring another level of sui generis-ity with them.  
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experiences fear.  
  Gerda has never felt fear before, but she knows everything there is to know about ice and 
the psychology of emotion. As such, Gerda is fully capable of coolly believing that the ice is 
dangerous, or judging that it is slippery. However, Goldie explains, it is not until she falls on the 
ice that she actually experiences fear (using our earlier distinction, she might also experience that 
fear as fear, but she need not do so). When this happens her thought that the ice is dangerous, her 
perception of what something dangerous looks like, smells like, and tastes like, and her 
phenomenology; the what it is likeness of the experience are united in one event (in experience) 
(Goldie, 2009, p. 234). Furthermore, on my understanding of Goldie, Gerda’s phenomenology 
consists of both bodily feelings directed at her body, and feelings-toward that are directed at 
things in the world beyond the surface of her skin.    
  This new way of thinking of the ice “subsumes and transforms the old way of thinking, 
so that the new way of thinking cannot be decomposed into the old experience plus something 
added” (Ibid). The latter a characterization of emotion views that Goldie ascribes to so-called 
add-on theorists, individuals who believe that feelings are mere additions to some other essential 
part of emotional experience. As we have seen, Goldie in contrast thinks that when Gerda is 
afraid of the ice, she is having a “whole, indivisible, experience” that is different from before 
(Ibid). This fear experience is truly sui generis.    
  Another dimension to Goldie’s view of emotions is that he takes feelings-toward and 
bodily feelings to be distinct. However, he thinks they are closely connected in conscious 
experience (Goldie, 2004, p. 92). Thus improving on the James-Lange theory, Goldie says that 
bodily feelings “borrow intentionality” directed at the world (beyond the body) from the 
individual’s feelings-toward (Goldie, 2000, p. 57). He also says that our feelings-toward gain a 
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bodily feel from the bodily feelings. To see that this is so, consider the following example. An 
individual is reading a philosophy paper and comes across a particularly difficult problem. As he 
struggles to get through the section, he becomes increasingly frustrated; he has a frustrated 
feeling-toward the section. As the frustration intensifies he furrows his brows in concentration 
and senses a tightness over his forehead. He also feels his body temperature go up, and his teeth 
clutching together hard. As Carolyn Price (2015) relates it in the Emotions, although the feelings-
toward and the bodily feelings are distinct, in conscious experience the emoter takes them to be 
the same. They are “impossible to separate,” and he experiences them together as a unity” (Price, 
2015, p. 30). As this happens, the person’s bodily feelings are directed toward the difficult 
paragraph, and his feeling-toward gains a “bodily feel” (Ibid).33  
  As hinted at above, and as will be clear by the end of chapter III, most emotion theorists 
identify as their answer to the question what an emotion is, one particular component of an 
emotional response. In contrast however, Goldie takes a different approach. As Price summarizes 
Goldie, an emotion is a “whole response” consisting of many components such as episodes of 
emotional experience including perceptions, thoughts, imaginings, kinds of feelings (feelings-
toward and bodily feelings), bodily changes and, dispositions to further emotion experiences, 
thoughts, feelings and behaviors (Price, 2015, p. 25-6).34 Goldie only excludes as components 
actions and behaviors done out of emotions, instead holding these to be consequences (Goldie, 
2000, p. 12-3). He also claims that emotions are episodic and dynamic since the elements can 
come and go, “and wax and wane” (Goldie, 2000, p.12-3). Thus, for him, an emotion is a 
complex process unfolding over time.     
                                                        
33That this is indeed how Goldie characterizes the closeness between feelings-towards and bodily feelings, is 
communicated it his statement that the bodily feelings are “thoroughly infused with the intentionality of the 
emotion; and in turn, the feeling towards is infused with a bodily characterization” (Goldie, 2000, p. 57). 
34 “The actions which we do out of an emotion and the various ways of expressing an emotion, are also seen as part 
of the same narrative, but not themselves as part of the emotion itself”(Goldie, 2000, p. 12-3).  
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  To add more clarity to this general account of emotion I am going to give an example of 
how Goldie would differentiate between an emotion and an emotion episode. Emotions are long-
term and can stretch out over days and even years, such as when a married couple undergoes 
love; sometimes they touch each other lovingly (e.g., she strokes his cheek), they think about one 
another (e.g., she thinks about how beautiful he is when he brushes his hair from his eye), and 
when they are apart they daydream about being together (he fantasizes about holding her hand as 
they walk into a restaurant). Emotion episodes take place in the here and now such as when the 
wife experiences love for her husband as she sits down on his lap and smiles at him slightly.35 
Taken together thus, an emotion can be thought of as a trajectory, and emotional episodes as the 
high-points or low-points on it. This makes sense since what Goldie calls an emotion stretches 
out over time; just like a trajectory, and it can have emotional experiences interwoven within it; 
just like the trajectory can ascend and descend.  
  Goldie’s account of emotions appears to be able to capture the distinctiveness of different 
emotions as well as their intentionality. By having the qualitative states being directed towards 
objects in the environment, he gives us both the appropriate intentionality and the relevant 
fineness of grain to distinguish between emotion experiences.36 Hence, the way to differentiate 
between them is in the way their experiential content is different. When I undergo fear my 
emotional experience is qualitatively different from the way it would be when I am happy, and 
                                                        
35 The emotional episode is a component of the emotion, but it does not have to be. Goldie (2000): “An emotion is 
complex in that it will typically involve many different elements: it involves episodes of emotional experience, 
including perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of various kinds, and bodily changes of various kinds; and it involves 
dispositions, including dispositions to experience further emotional episodes, to have further thoughts and feelings, 
and to behave in certain ways” (p.13). 
36 Since Goldie does not exclude thoughts and imaginings as potentially being part of an emotion episode, these can 
further aid in distinguishing the emotions. For example, in the case of shame and regret; besides the feelings towards 
being distinct, different thoughts and perhaps even imaginings can be different for each emotion.   
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therefore, the emotions are distinct. 37  
  On the other hand there is a problem with Goldie’s sui generis account, namely that he 
seems to make things too fine-grained. With an account like his, according to which each 
emotion episode is unique and onto itself, we would seem to have to give up the view that there 
is something important that all cases of, say, fear episodes share in common. That is, Goldie’s 
appeal to sui generisity gives him all the fine-grainedness that he might want, but it gives him too 
much. It provides no principled way of explaining how emotion episodes can all be episodes of a 
single emotion, i.e., how they can all be beads on the same pearl necklace. Moreover, in the 
previous case with Gerda falling on the ice and breaking her leg, if she, for instance, later in the 
afternoon thinks of the ice and says to herself, “I sure wish I had not gone ice skating today,” 
then, is that fear? Well, she still might have some physiological and phenomenological reactions 
to it, but there is something else present as well. Now, if Goldie responds that in the latter case 
Gerda is having regret and not fear, then he seems to be helping himself to a prior definition of 
emotion, which as the reader will agree, would not be acceptable.   
  Now, in response to our suggested fine-grainedness problem, Goldie might want to bite 
the bullet and say that actually distinguishing among the classic emotions like fear, sadness, 
anger, happiness, surprise, and disgust is not scientifically or philosophically useful, and hence 
that we should give it up. This would be similar to how at one point in time common sense told 
us to distinguish between the four humors, however, we eventually relinquished that view under 
pressure from scientific evidence.        
  Let us next take a look at how Goldie would handle the two test-cases. Case 1: when 
                                                        
37 In the beginning of his book The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration Goldie (2000) says that emotion 
episodes involve perceptions, feelings of various kinds, and bodily changes of various kinds (p. 12). However as 
discussed before, he also mentiones that they can include thoughts. Based on this it seems to me that even though 
perhaps some of the more complex emotions, such as guilt and shame, might have similar experiential content, they 
can still be distinguished based on the different thoughts that they involve.  
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Sheryl experiences fear as she comes upon the snake on the trail, feelings (bodily feelings and 
feelings-toward) are bound-up with thought (she believes that the snake is threatening) and 
perception (she perceives the reptile as dangerous) in a way such that it constitutes an indivisible, 
whole, sui generis experience. Case 2: When Frank watches William’s win Olympic Gold in 
tennis and feels proud, feelings of various kinds (bodily feelings and feelings-toward) are bound 
up with thought (he believes that he too has certain uniquely American characteristics that 
Williams’ holds, such as being determined, and strong) and perception (e.g., he sees her as apt to 
challenge her rival), and together they make up an indivisible, whole, sui generis kind of 
experience.  
  Evidently, the most controversial aspect of Goldie’s theory is his commitment to 
emotions as being sui generis. While it seems clear that you cannot reduce emotional episodes to 
purely cognitive phenomena on the one hand, and purely qualitative phenomena on the other, 
perhaps we can challenge his sui generis account by suggesting a reduction to a combination of 
the cognitive, the phenomenological and maybe bodily types of states. Given that reduction is 
not reducing away (e.g., reducing lightening to electrical discharge does not imply that lightening 
is unreal), we can acknowledge the reality of emotions. The question is if the reduction that we 
have on the table is a plausible one. Speaking in favor of our suggestion is that it is more 
parsimonious. Goldie has to posit a new thing whereas all we are suggesting is that we reduce 
emotions to a combination of already established phenomena such as cognitive states, 
phenomenological states, bodily behaviors, physiological reactions, etc. 
  Our last criticism of Goldie will consider the fact that bodily behaviors do not play a 
substantial role on his view. As mentioned in the beginning of my discussion of Goldie’s 
account, he sees bodily behaviors as a mere consequence of emotions, meaning that they are not 
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part of them and do not seem important to the way he understands emotional experience. What is 
more, Goldie (2009) also says the following: 
  “[A]n emotional experience typically involves a wide range of different intentional states,  
  often including desires, beliefs, hopes, wishes, imaginings, fantasies, bodily feelings, and  
  so on, each one of which can be bound up with feelings towards the object of the  
  emotion; we can see or hear with feeling, just as we can desire or hope with feeling” (p.  
  237). 
 
With my claim in chapter I that any good theory of emotion should be able to account for the 
embodiment fact, were Goldie more enlightened he would have thought about behaving-towards 
as a possibility, and not just, say, hoping-towards or thinking-towards. As we will see in chapter 
IV this is what Rebekka Hufendiek’s embodied theory of emotions appears to do. Hence, at this 
point I am going to let Hufendiek take the baton from Goldie, and he will not be brought through 
to chapter V. However, some of the spirit of Goldie will be carried on in the work of Hufendiek, 
and by putting her under the microscope; we will still be assessing the spirit of his view if not the 
letter. 
  Next I want to give a brief overview of how the Feeling theory fares in terms of the 
benchmarks discussed in chapter II. Benchmark i: emotions can have a cognitive component 
(depending on the feeling theory you are looking at), benchmark ii: emotions have a 
physiological dimension, benchmark iii: emotions have a phenomenology, benchmark iv: 
emotions can have characteristic behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and 
pre-linguistic children can have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark 
vii: emotions can be both the result of careful reflection and an automatic response to stimuli, 
benchmark viii: emotions and moods can cannot be embodied, and lastly, benchmark ix: on this 
view emotions are natural kinds and not open to conceptual analysis.  
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b. The Cognitive Theory 
  There are different interpretations of the cognitive theory; I will be considering the one 
proposed by Martha C. Nussbaum (2004).  
  For Nussbaum (2004) judging comes in two stages. First, an object appears to the 
individual in a certain way (p.198),38 and second, she accepts, rejects, or remains uncommitted to 
the appearance (p. 191). And so, when she embraces or rejects it, it becomes her judgment.  
  According to Nussbaum (2004), something is an emotion if and only if it is an evaluative 
judgment about something important. What is important depends on the emoter, and thus our 
emotions are connected to what matters to us—to our well-being. Consequently, George might 
have an emotion directed toward his ant farm, such as happiness, because even though it seems 
trivial to us, it really matters to him that ant x managed to carry the large leaf to the top of the 
ant-hill. Further, these judgments reveal something about us; namely, that we are the kinds of 
individuals that allow for our own well-being to depend on things beyond our control 
(Nussbaum, 2004, 193). Nussbaum (2004) gives the following example of an emotion. When she 
                                                        
38 For Nussbaum her view of ‘an appearance’ is different from the traditional Stoic view. That is, whereas the Stoic 
thinks of a judgment as the individual assenting to an appearance, where the appearance has a propositional 
character or content, Nussbaum’s account allows also for the appearances to take the form of the world ‘striking’ the 
creature in a certain way. For example, for Nussbaum, an infant or an animal judges how things are in the world by 
assenting to how the world is presented to it—e.g., objects in the creature’s environment will appear important or 
significant (as having value) in relation to its goals/aims (see below). 
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found out that her mother had died it struck her “that a person of enormous value, who was 
central to my life, is no longer there…I see…her wonderful face—both as tremendously loved 
and as forever lost to me” (p. 192). The appearance in this case she says is propositional: “it 
combines the thought of importance with the thought of loss, its content is that this importance is 
lost,” and it is evaluative; it accounts for the fact that her mother is important to her (Ibid).39 She 
describes how she embraced the appearance, and as such did have sadness (Ibid). 
   But, the reader might wonder, do we not need something more than judgments to 
experience emotions? After all, emotions usually feel a certain way to us, or as Nussbaum (2004) 
puts it; “even if one concedes that the seat of emotion must be capable of many cognitive 
operations, there also seems to be a kinetic and affective aspect to emotion that does not look like 
a judgment or any part of it” (p. 194). She foresees our question and answers it by saying that 
bodily feelings are incidental to emotion and that the feelings that truly matters might as well be 
called judgments (p. 195). For Nussbaum, judgments themselves hold many of the kinetic 
properties which emotion theorists use bodily feelings to explain (Ibid).40 Thus, when she 
experiences sadness about her mother’s death this judgment is an “upheaval”; it is able to house 
the “disorderly motions of grief” (p. 193-4). Nussbaum emphasizes that she does not want to 
infuse thoughts with the kinetic properties of the arms, legs, or bloodstream (Ibid). Rather, she 
appears to think of the kinetic properties of thought as somehow unique; in the case of grief as 
intense movements, they are “feelings of pain and tumult” (p. 195).41 
  Let us next take a look at how Nussbaum can explain the test-cases. Case 1: Sheryl feels 
fear when she sees the snake on the ground. First, it appears to her that her well-being, which she 
values is threatened; i.e., she believes that the snake could attack and hurt her. Second, Sheryl 
                                                        
39 For Nussbaum the fact that emotions require thoughts explains their intentionality (their aboutness that is).  
40 I assume that for Nussbaum this is the case also for infants and non-human animals. 
41 She does not expand on why, and in what way, she thinks that the kinetic properties are unique. 
56 
   
embraces or accepts the appearance; “takes it into [her] as the way things are”(Nussbaum, 2004, 
p. 191). She recognizes that the snake is potentially dangerous, and further, this makes her 
judgment evaluative (p. 189). Now, since Sheryl judges that she is endangered, she does have 
fear. Moreover, her judgment feels in a certain way to her; it has particular kinetic properties. 
The bodily and physiological changes described in the beginning of the chapter accompany 
Sheryl’s fear. However, they are not necessary for it.     
  Case 2: When the U.S. wins Olympic gold, Frank takes pride in his national heritage. It 
strikes him that something of great value and importance, namely his nationality, which he 
believes to be crucial to his identity42 is reinforced by Williams’ win. It appears to Frank that 
being apart of this group of Americans gives him distinctive qualities that cannot be achieved by 
other means, such as accumulation of wealth and fame. Frank embraces the appearance; this is in 
fact what the world is like. He judges that by being American he too, as Williams, is successful 
and strong, and this makes his judgment evaluative. Since Frank judges that he has these 
uniquely American characteristics, he experiences pride. His judgment feels a certain way—it 
has particular kinetic properties. Also, the bodily and physiological changes accompany the 
emotion, but are not required for it.  
  One objection to Nussbaum’s view of emotions can be put in the form of a dilemma. 
Either Nussbaum thinks of emotions as judgments in a relatively traditional sense of the word 
‘judgment’ and in which case they seem anemic (someone could judge that they are in danger 
without yet necessarily becoming afraid), or, she thinks of emotions as dynamic judgments, and 
in which case her account is not explanatory. For example, if one were to ask Nussbaum what a 
dynamic judgment is, then the answer would seem to be that it is permeated with, say, feelings of 
“pain and tumult.” But, that answer makes it sounds like she is characterizing the notion of 
                                                        
42 I am assuming here that Frank’s nationality is closely connected to his well-being. 
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‘judgment’ that she needs in terms of the affective notions that we are trying to understand (she 
would be assuming what needs to be explained). This does not mean that what she is saying is 
not true, but it does mean that it is not going to be very helpful in understanding what emotions 
are.  
  Another objection to Nussbaum’s view is that she thinks judgments are evaluative and 
thus always bring with them something of the form ‘this is good’ or ‘this is bad’. But, this is 
much too restrictive. It is plausible that emotions like anger, fear, and sadness might sort their 
objects into these two categories. However, this is not the case for all emotions. Consider 
surprise for instance. This emotion can fall into either camp depending on its object. Sometimes 
you are pleasantly surprised about something, whereas other times you are unpleasantly 
surprised. An example of the former is the surprise that a child experiences when her father, a 
soldier, returns unexpectedly from the war. She is surprised seeing him walking through the 
door, but the emotion has a positive tone to it. In contrast, the military strategic planner who is 
trying to decide his country’s next move is unpleasantly surprised when realizing that the enemy 
has successfully entered into their territory. He is surprised to see that they managed to do it, but 
the emotion has a negative color.  
  A further common objection to Nussbaum’s view is that it fails to account for emotions 
in nonhuman animals and infants. After all, they do not have language and thus cannot make the 
required judgments to emote. The way she modifies her theory to make room for emotions in 
these cases is by allowing for the appearances to not be propositional in nature (Nussbaum, 
2003). To make this suggestion plausible, she first has to explain what it is that enables the 
appearances to have value (evaluative content) (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 125-6). She does this by 
drawing from psychological research both on the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals and on 
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early childhood development (p. 89-125, 174-237). This kind of “work show[s] extensive 
cognitive involvement by animals and very young children with objects in their environment, 
despite their lacking language...” and further, by looking at the animal and child’s behavior the 
researchers can conclude that certain objects present themselves as important or significant “in 
virtue of its goals” (Deigh, 2000, p. 303, 304; Nussbaum, 2003, p. 126). Hence, when they 
accept or reject these appearances, they are emoting.     
 Even if we agree with Nussbaum that it makes sense to say that objects will appear 
important or significant (as having value) to organisms in relation to their goals, one can still 
object to her overall modification of the view. This is so since, she says nothing about what it 
means for someone lacking in language to be judging, to accept or reject appearances (Deigh, 
2000, p. 304-6). Once we acknowledge this, another dilemma for Nussbaum becomes apparent. 
Either she has to populate the minds of infants and nonhuman animals with fairly complex 
cognitive acts, or she has to use the notion of judgment in such a broad way that it says almost 
nothing. The latter is the case since it now seems that any creature that has an emotion is thereby 
judging. This is just an empty stipulation; she needs an independent criterion for what a 
judgment is, otherwise she is just asserting the truth of her own theory. Both of these options are 
problematic, and thus the initial challenge to her view stands.  
  Next we will summarize how the Cognitive theory does on the various benchmarks. 
Benchmark i: emotions always have a cognitive component, benchmark ii: emotions do not have 
a physiological component, rather the physiological component follows upon the emotion itself, 
benchmark iii: emotions have a phenomenology since the judgments have kinetic properties, 
benchmark iv: emotions do not have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals 
and pre-linguistic children can have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, 
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benchmark, benchmark vii: emotions are the result of careful reflection, they are not automatic 
responses to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions and moods cannot be embodied, unless we 
rethink cognition in embodied terms, and lastly benchmark ix: emotions are open to conceptual 
analysis. 
Emotions 
can have a 
cognitive 
compon-
ent 
Emotions 
can have a 
physiol-
ogical 
dimens-
ion 
Emotions 
can have a 
pheno-
menology 
Emotions 
can have 
behavioral 
signatures 
Non-
human 
animals & 
pre-
linguistic 
children 
can have 
emotions 
Emotions 
can be 
irrational 
Emotions 
can be the 
result of 
careful 
reflection 
vs. 
automatic 
response 
to stimuli 
Emotions 
and 
Moods 
can be 
embodied 
Emotions 
are open 
to 
conceptu-
al analysis 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes, No Emotions: 
No 
Moods: 
No 
Yes 
 
c. The Non-Cognitive Theory 
 Jenefer Robinson, just as Goldie previously, takes issue with cognitive accounts of 
emotion, and she does so for two particular reasons. First she points out that a person can make a 
judgment of the right kind, yet not be in an emotional state. As an example, if someone is 
atypical in that something is wrong with their emotional system, perhaps they can stand by the 
side of the road and look at someone who just ran over their cat and think, “You wronged me, 
you killed my cat with your car.” However, because there is something off with their emotional 
system, they do not get angry. Or, when someone cuts you off in traffic as you are driving home 
from work, you may judge that they did so and that it was offensive and insulting. But, you 
might not get angry (Robinson, 2004, p. 29.) Instead, Robinson says, “[you] may be resigned or 
saddened or even cynically amused” (Ibid). Moreover, and characteristically of Robinson’s view, 
organisms can emote without judging in the traditional sense where “an emotion either is or 
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essentially includes a judgment or belief” (p. 28-29, Robinson, 2005, p. 77).43 
 For Robinson an emotion is a process started by a non-cognitive appraisal with a negative 
or positive valence, which focuses the emoter’s attention and “brings about characteristic 
physiological and behavioral changes,” such as a certain facial expression and changes in 
galvanic skin response (Robinson, 2005, p. 3; Harold, “Deeper”).44 The latter she says, may or 
may not be felt. 45 Moreover, following upon the former is a cognitive appraisal that assesses the 
various physiological and behavioral changes in regards to their appropriateness to the situation 
at hand, or the individual’s belief(s) (Robinson, 2005, p. 3, 59). Further, because the non-
cognitive appraisal is valenced it can bring about the physiological and behavioral responses 
typical of the emotion.46 The appraisal is non-cognitive for Robinson since it can “occur without 
any conscious deliberation or awareness, and [does] not involve any complex information 
processing” (Robinson, 2005, p. 45).47 Elsewhere she describes the appraisal as taking place 
“under the threshold of awareness,” and cites psychological research arguing for circuits in the 
brain able to compute the affective value of something without the organism having to recognize 
                                                        
43 With infants not having the cognitive abilities to judge that something is a threat, but then we still think they can 
be afraid, she says this supports her view that emotions don’t have to involve judgments. This would be the case for 
animals as well, she says; “…[T]he non-cognitive appraisals (in both humans and ‘lower’ animals) are themselves 
monitored or appraised by higher cognitive processes, and the action tendencies initiated by the affective appraisals 
are modified in accordance with subsequent cognitive appraisals” (Robinson, 2005, p.77)  
44 Based on her writings and reviews of her book, it appears to me that only the non-cognitive appraisal and the 
physiological changes are necessary for emotions, whereas bodily behaviors and the cognitive appraisals merely 
typically follows. 
45 The fact that she says that the physiological responses may or may not be felt puts her in opposition to the James-
Lange view, which says that all physiological responses (bodily changes) must be felt. 
46 One thing that Robinson says, and that I find interesting, is that “autonomic arousal typically continues even after 
cognitive monitoring has changed my appraisal of the situation” (Robinson, 2004, 38). This means that there is 
something like physiological residue leftover even after the emotion process has subsumed. I think we can recognize 
this in our everyday experience as well. For example, we can imagine that I have an argument with my mother about 
coming home late after a night out with my friends. We can also imagine that when this happens I undergo all of the 
physiological and behavioral changes typical of anger. Now, even though my mother and I stop arguing and we 
come to an agreement, I might still walk around for a time after with clenched fists and the surge of adrenaline 
pumping through my body.  
47 It seems as though non-cognitive affective appraisals for Robinson are not guided by rationality, hence we can 
account for phobias as well. That is, someone who has a phobic fear of dogs will have an affective appraisal 
activated no matter if, say, the dog is small or large. 
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what the stimulus is (Robinson, 2004, p. 35). 
  We can see that Robinson holds a view of appraisals according to which they work fast 
and automatically “through lower brain-centers,” and that “in a rough and ready way” focuses 
the individual’s attention on, and evaluates objects in the environment of significance to its well-
being (Robinson, 2005, p. 62).48 Robinson recognizes that since the non-cognitive appraisals are 
not describable in propositional terms, it is hard to know how to characterize them using ordinary 
language. The most successful way, she claims, is by saying that corresponding to each basic 
emotion (as identified by Paul Ekman) is a basic non-cognitive appraisal (p. 77). To use her 
example, fear is brought about by the non-cognitive appraisal, which would be expressed with 
such words as “this is a threat,” but the agent does not have to say any such words either out 
loud, or to herself (Robinson, 2005, p. 68).49  
 To make this more intuitive, let us look at an example of what the emotion process would 
be like in the case of someone being startled from hearing what seems to be the sound of a 
gunshot.50 First there is a non-cognitive appraisal of the potentially harmful information (the loud 
sound) that not only focuses the individual’s attention on the direction where the sound came 
from,51 but also brings about certain physiological and behavioral changes (an increase in 
adrenaline and a jump) that might feel a certain way. After the response to the gunshot, the 
individual changes her behavior “as cognitive monitoring kicks in”; perhaps she realizes that the 
sound came from her cat pushing something heavy over on the kitchen counter and she smiles in 
relief, or she realizes that a gun was in fact fired outside her apartment and throws herself on the 
                                                        
48 The environment here can be either internal or external. 
49 This is intended to at least gesture at how the organism is likely to respond, but not necessarily at anything 
psychologically real. 
50 Robinson wrote a paper arguing for startle to be considered an emotion. In her article she says that it was thinking 
about startle as an emotion that she came up with the above general emotion theory. 
51 In other situations, the individual’s situation could be focused on a belief or an object. 
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ground in fear (Robinson, 2005, p. 60).52         
 Something else to reflect on is how the non-cognitive appraisals activated in the basic 
emotions, are preprogrammed to be elicit in connection to certain stimuli. A snake on the ground 
or a gunshot will always activate non-cognitive appraisals. However, Robinson also says that 
appraisals can be brought about by more complex, non-preprogrammed, input such as the 
recognition that your boss insulted you.  
  Next, I want to briefly discuss what Ekman has to say about emotions. This is so since, as 
the reader saw above, Robinson appears to get her intuition and idea about non-cognitive 
appraisals and the unfolding physiological and behavioral changes from his emotion account. By 
looking at Ekman’s view then, we can get a better grasp on how Robinson is thinking about her 
own theory. 
  For Ekman, objects in the organism’s environment trigger the essence of an emotion, 
namely an affect program, automatically. As summarized by Paul Griffiths(1997), Ekman’s 
affect programs have many different elements that unfold in a predictable and coordinated 
manner: “(a) expressive facial changes, (b) musculoskeletal responses such as flinching and 
orienting, (c) expressive vocal changes, (d) endocrine system changes and consequent changes in 
the level of hormones, and (e) autonomic nervous system changes” (p. 77).53 Griffiths adds that 
the phenomenological experience of the emotion and a change in attention are further good 
candidates for inclusion. 
                                                        
52 Potential problem: When something, say a car, comes towards me suprisingly as I am driving, and I cognitivly 
monitor the situation: I might think that I’m too close I better slow down a little bit, but then the physiological 
change happens a little bit later and I can feel the chemicals being released inside of my body (like a quarter of a 
second later).  In this case it is as though the actual perception and the cognitive response happens first and then the 
bodily changes happen a little bit slower. One way to think about this is by asking if there is something misleading 
about taking startle as a paradigm (as in the case with the gunshot above which is her example, and based on which 
she developed her view on emotions), especially when the startle case is one that understood as: I’m startle and I 
don’t even know what it is that is startling me when it happens.  
53 The environment here refers to the internal or eternal environment of the individual. 
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  Besides fear, other examples of emotions that have these distinct affect programs are: 
sadness, happiness, contempt, surprise, anger, pride, and disgust. These programs can be 
triggered by many different things: directly from an automatic appraisal of a person, place, 
image, memory, imagining, thought, smell, sound, or idea as being, say, dangerous, or, from a 
reflective appraisal of a situation as being, say, threatening with an automatic appraisal following 
upon it (as when it takes me awhile to realize that what my coworker is saying is threatening my 
job) (“The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” n.d; Ekman, 2003, p. 31). 
  What Ekman calls an automatic-appraising mechanism (Robinson’s affective appraisal) 
constantly scans the environment for objects and situations relevant to the organism’s concern(s). 
It is looking for things that is similar to what is stored in the “perceptual database,” and when it 
does, an emotion is triggered (“The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” n.d.). Likewise, this is what 
Robinson means when she says that non-cognitive appraisals are preprogrammed to be elicit by 
certain stimuli. The database is composed in part by “our biology…and in part by our individual 
experience” (Ekman, 2003, p. 29). Ekman explains that it allows for new information to be 
added, so that when we experience something similar to “a theme or variation” in it, we emote 
(p. 30). Thus, the database, similar to Robinson’s memory database, describes our “universal 
[and] hardwired responses and our individually acquired emotional memories” (“The Ekman’s 
Atlas of Emotions,” n.d.).  
  With the hopes of adding more nuance to Ekman’s account I will next consider how he 
would explain an instance of fear. I will also introduce some new terminology that he, in his 
more recent writings, uses to more wholly describe the emotion “timeline” (“The Ekman’s Atlas 
of Emotions,” n.d.). The example goes as follows. Lately Kristi has been waking up at 5am every 
day, and as a result, has not been getting enough sleep and is tired. The latter is what Ekman calls 
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the “precondition” for an emotion (Ibid).  
  Kristi lives with her older sister Summer. One day as Kristi arrives home, Summer gets 
angry with her for having left dishes in the sink. Summer who is taller than Kristi towers over 
her and yells loudly. This is what Ekman calls the “event,” and it is automatically appraised as a 
threat. As we know, Kristi’s appraisal mechanism is continuously scanning her environment, 
looking for things crucial to some concern of hers (i.e., objects and situations similar to things 
stored in her perceptual database). In this instance the threatening situation of her sister yelling 
matches up with Kristi’s saved memory of her mother screaming at her for leaving her toys out, 
something which as a child would cause Kristi to feel scared. Together the precondition of Kristi 
being tired (which makes her prone to get agitated), and the automatically appraised event 
matching to her stored memory constitutes a threat, and thus trigger the fear affect-program. This 
program holds instructions for what facial expression she will exhibit, the physical changes she 
will undergo, what the mental changes will be (i.e., what the felt experience is), and what actions 
she will engage in.  
  The instructions that the affect program dictates produce impulses that bring about the 
physical changes; Kristi’s body becomes tense, her heart starts beating faster, she raises her 
eyebrows, her eye lids tighten, and her lips stretches back, and, the mental changes; she feels 
threatened. Also, “the emotional experience that is triggered includes [both] subjective feelings 
and physical sensation,” which color her perception of the situation (“The Ekman’s Atlas of 
Emotions,” n.d.). Together the physical and mental changes constitute her emotional state; she 
feels afraid. Consequently, just as Griffith suggested, Ekman includes in the affect program the 
experience of an emotion.  
  There are many ways that Kristi could respond to the state of fear she is in. She could 
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have a constructive response that helps her reach her goals. Kristi can remind herself that her 
sister is not her mother and that she loves her; she just wants to keep her house clean. Or, she can 
have a destructive response and start thinking about what happens if Summer kicks her out. She 
could also have an ambiguous response and yell back at Summer. This could be either helpful or 
un-helpful; it might be beneficial if it caused Summer to back-down, or it might be unhelpful if it 
caused the argument to continue. However, we can imagine that in this case Kristi reminds 
herself that her sister just wants to keep a nice home for them, and thus apologizes and cleans up 
after herself.    
  One important nuance to Ekman’s view is what he calls display rules, these explains why 
universal emotion expressions vary between cultures. They allow us to manage our emotion 
expressions depending on who we are, and what situation we are in. The display rules in Japan 
are different from the display rules in the United States, and we learn them socially. Here in the 
U.S. we learn that it is not socially acceptable to laugh at a funeral, and so when my friend 
relates a funny joke at my aunt’s funeral, I keep myself from laughing out loud. The rules decide 
when we “diminish, exaggerate, hide completely, or mask” the expression of the emotion 
experience (Ekman, 2003, p. 4). Another aspect of the emotion timeline that Ekman stresses is 
that during the emotion state and its resulting actions, i.e., the “selective filter period,” Kristi’s 
attention is more highly focused on the perceived threat (“The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” 
n.d.). She has an increased sensitivity to her sister yelling and towering over her than to anything 
else in the environment. Again, we can see that Ekman includes as part of the emotion Griffiths 
suggested addition; a change in attention.  
  In the Kristi example, what Ekman calls the “post-condition” is the time after she has 
calmed herself down and has acted constructively, but still might continue to be “jumpy” (“The 
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Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” n.d.). This is when Kristi should be reflecting on her fear and 
potentially understands its trigger better, how it felt, and its impact on her. This could also be an 
opportunity for Kristi to reflect on the fact that she is still carrying around emotional baggage 
from her childhood. And further, she can talk to her sister about why she must not yell at her in 
the way she did, or she can work with a therapist on how to move away from feeling threatened 
in these types of situations. 
  Now, since Ekman’s and Robinson’s views appear similar, it is important to keep in mind 
how they are different from one another. Based on the above discussion, Ekman is answering a 
slightly different question from what Robinson is trying to do. Namely, his question is: how do 
emotions develop and evolve over time? Whereas her question is: What is it for an event to be an 
emotion? Moreover, even though there are similarities between Robinson’s account and Ekman’s 
view of the basic emotions, she goes beyond him. As will be made clear below, she gives a story 
also about how we can have more cognitively complex emotions, such as jealousy, love, and 
embarrassment, whereas he does not.   
  We have seen Robinson explain how the basic emotions work, but what about the more 
complex ones? In these cases the cognitive monitoring that comes in after both the non-cognitive 
appraisal and the physiological and behavioral changes, plays a crucial role in how we ourselves 
label the response as one of, say, embarrassment or jealousy. Consequently, the emotion process 
could have been one of anger, but the emoter labels it as one of jealousy (Robinson, 2004, p. 38; 
Robinson, 2005, p. 80). After Julia glanced over at Lena’s exam and saw that she got an A, she 
snapped at her when she asked if she wanted to get coffee after class. When this happened, we 
can imagine that Julia thought to herself: ‘I see now why I reacted the way I did, I was jealous of 
how well Lena did on the midterm” (Robinson, 2004, p. 39). 
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  As we know, non-cognitive appraisals can be activated by, say, a thought or a belief (i.e., 
something more cognitively complex than perception), and they can involve relatively 
sophisticated cognitive appraisals and reappraisals. Even so for Robinson, “at the core of 
emotion will always be physiological responses caused by an automatic affective appraisal and 
followed by cognitive monitoring” (Robinson, 2005, p. 59). Now, as summarized by James 
Harold in his review of Deeper Than Reason, this quote is misleading since the cognitive 
monitoring is not required for an agent to emote. “According to Robinson…if a stimulus 
produces an affective appraisal, the appraisal will produce physiological changes whether or not 
it is accompanied by a cognitive appraisal,” and further the appraisal and physiological changes 
are enough for a “genuine emotion” (Harold, “Deeper”). Hence, emotions do not mandate 
cognitive states: they are unconscious experiences but they are automatic and so too fast to be 
judgments, however they do permit them: they might be provoked by judgments or they might 
cause judgments later on. 
  Another aspect of Robinson’s view is that the different parts of the emotion process can 
work to reinforce each other. The appraisal helps focusing the individual’s attention on 
something in her environment, but the bodily changes and behaviors following the appraisal aid 
in keeping her attention fixed. She also adds how the way the event feels (its subjective feel) can 
further focus the emoter’s attention on the relevant object. The cognitive appraisals and 
reappraisals modifying her physiological and behavioral reactions, not only can help changes and 
behaviors to subside, but can also incite them further. Just as when I see that what I took to be a 
spider on my desk, in fact, is merely a binder clip, I calm down, when I see that what I took to be 
a snake on the trail actually is one, I create more distance between myself and the reptile. In each 
instance cognitive appraisals (there is no spider, I am safe, or, there is a snake, I should move 
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away) are working to either subside or induce my physiological and behavioral changes 
(Robinson, 2004, p. 37-8).  
  Let us consider now how Robinson would analyze the test cases. Case 1: Sheryl 
experiences fear when she sees a snake in the periphery of her vision.54 It is not her conscious 
belief or judgment that there is a dangerous snake on the ground that brings about her fear. 
Rather, an affective appraisal does. Without requiring Sheryl’s attention, it determines whether 
the snake is posing a threat to her and activates the proper physical and bodily changes. In this 
case, as the latter takes place the cognitive monitor kicks in and determines that the response was 
in fact appropriate; it is a real snake and it is posing a threat to her. Case 2: Frank makes the 
judgment that a fellow American won gold and he acknowledges its positive effects. He believes 
that Serena’s success will rub off on all Americans, and thus that they have certain qualities 
unobtainable by other means. This realization triggers an affective appraisal in Frank and he 
experiences the physiological changes typical of happiness. However, based on his culture’s 
understanding of pride and when it is appropriate, Frank labels his emotion ‘pride’. 
  One question that the reader might have is if it is truly the case that there always have to 
be a physiological response(s) when someone is having an emotion? It seems clear that there will 
be physiological responses for, say, both fear and startle (e.g., an increase in various chemicals 
throughout your body, in blood flow to your legs, etc), but is it required for the more complex 
emotions? Could it not be the case that someone is hopeful about a future prospect (e.g., about 
what the new laws that the candidate they voted for, and that won, is going to do to for him) 
without having physiological changes such as an increase in adrenaline or a quickened heartbeat? 
It appears intuitive that this is a possibility, and as such Robinson should say something about it.     
                                                        
54 This is a slightly revised version of test case 1. 
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  Below is how the Non-cognitive theory accounts for the benchmarks. Benchmark i: 
emotions do not always involve cognitive components, but they allow for them. ii & iii: 
emotions have both a physiology and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have 
behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children have 
emotions, benchmark vi: emotions are sometimes irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can be 
both the result of careful reflection and an automatic response, benchmark viii: emotions and 
moods can only be embodied in a shallow way (see Intermission section), benchmark ix: 
emotions are not open to conceptual analysis, they are natural kinds.  
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d. The Modified-Cognitivist Theory 
   According to Robert C. Roberts, emotions are concern-based construals (Roberts, 2003). 
To explain this idea he asks us to consider the famous old woman/young woman gestalt figure 
(p. 70). Most people see this figure either as an old woman or as a young woman, and with effort 
one can switch from one way of seeing it to the other (p. 71). For Roberts the difference between 
these ‘seeings as’ is a difference in the way the figure presents itself to us. Therefore, there is a 
perceptual difference: it looks different in the two construals. Moreover, what distinguishes 
between them is not sensory (Roberts, 2003, p. 71). In fact, the sensory input in the seeings as is 
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identical; they are made up of the same lines and shades. However, we are having two distinct 
perceptions.  
  So, the reader might wonder: What is the difference between the ways we perceive the 
figure? Roberts responds that “[i]t is…[the] organization of the sense-perceptible lines ” (Ibid). 
By this he means that even though the perception remains the same, the conceptualization has 
changed:   
  “We might say that construal is conceptual perception, as distinguished from sensory  
  perception, inasmuch as it depends on how you conceptualize, in perception, the parts or  
  aspects of the construal’s occasion...Still, there is sensory information involved in the  
  construals of the [old woman/ young woman figure], so the experience is a kind of visual  
  (sensory) experience, despite its conceptual nature (p. 5).”  
 
In seeing the old woman we are structuring the figure as an old woman; we are integrating 
various parts of the image so that they appear to us in a particular way. Furthermore, the way that 
we do this is by, in perception, assigning “old woman part” concepts to the various aspects of the 
figure (Roberts, 1996). The horizontal line in the middle of the image is in one case assigned the 
role of a necklace (young woman) and in the other the role of a mouth (old woman). Hence, it is 
the organization of the parts of the figure that produces the kind of perception. Roberts also 
emphasizes how resemblance plays a crucial role in how the old woman/young woman gestalt 
figure works, “it looks a little bit like both [an old woman and a young woman], and if it didn’t it 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to construe it as such” (Roberts, 2003, p. 5). 
   In order to get emotions on Roberts view we need to have not just construals, but 
construals that are based on a concern. As such, there is an element in the emotion case that is 
not present in the old woman/young woman example. Roberts suggests that just as the old 
woman/young woman figure has various features so does real life situations. Hence, what we do 
when we experience an emotion is bringing these features together in a sense-making way. 
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Importantly, we do this on the basis of a concern; “‘interest’, ‘enthusiasm’, ‘desire’, ‘wish’, 
‘attachment’, and ‘caring’ are all words for concerns“ (Tappolet & Roberts, 2006, p. 146). As 
concern-based, the construals are affected by what the subject cares about, what matters to them. 
We can construe (or see) something as being in danger (which would be the case for fear) 
without caring about it; however in that case, we would not have an emotion (Roberts, 2007, p. 
11-12).  
  In his Plantinga Fellow Lecture Roberts explains an instance of an emotion as follows. 
Coming into a situation the individual has certain concerns (2011 a & b, “Emotions, Perception, 
and Moral Judgments”). These can be active (in fear you might be thinking about how the well-
being of someone you care about is threatened) or dispositional (you might not be thinking 
anything at all about what you are going to encounter). When you enter the situation, and 
because of your before-mentioned concern, the concern is triggered by the way you see or 
construe the state of affairs. Thus, you perceive “the whole situation (with its aspects thus 
perceptually assigned) through the lens of [your] care” (Roberts, 2007, 10). 55 This is the 
emotion. Although when describing the emotion episode, we can talk about the concern and the 
construal as two distinct things, experientially they are synthesized into one appearance: 
  “Experientially the emotion is not a two-stage process in which I first perceive [the  
  situation in some particular way, such as, dangerous]…and then add to this perception a  
  concern that is somehow relevant to it. Rather, the concern enters into the perception so  
  as to characterize the appearance of the object…Thus the concern is…taken up, or  
  synthesized into, the appearance of the situational object and/or its salient elements”  
  (Roberts, 2003, p. 80, my emphasis added).  
 
When this happens you also have a desire to perform some action so that your concern is 
satisfied, and further the desire motivates you to act (Roberts, 2013, p. 46). When you are afraid 
                                                        
55 Moreover and as in the case with Goldie’s account,  it does not appear necessary on Roberts emotion view that the 
concer-based construals are guided by rationality. Hence, his view can account for the above benchmark regarding 
phobias. 
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you might remove the individual you care about from the dangerous situation.  
 To contextualize the above discussion, let us consider an example of fear. Kendall is the 
mother of 2 year-old Kim. One day while in the park Kendall looks up (and this without thinking 
anything to herself, like how much she loves her daughter) and sees Kim crawling right on the 
edge of a three-foot high wall. As a result, Kendall has an episode of fear. The fear for Roberts in 
this example is a combination of the integration of her concern for her daughter (she has a 
dispositional concern; she cares for her daughter even though she is not actively thinking about 
it), and her seeing the nearness of Kim to the edge of the wall as a threat to her. When this 
happens she perceives the whole situation through the lens of her concern, and experiences 
fear.56 Moreover, Kendall’s fear episode results in a fear desire; she wants to keep her child away 
from the danger. Further, she is motivated to run over and pull Kim out of harm’s way.  
  For Roberts each emotion has a set of concepts in terms of which you see the elements in 
the situation. In the case of fear, the terms are: threat to wellbeing, thing threatened, and 
avoidance (protection) (Roberts, 2013, p. 47). Thus, in Kendall’s construal of the situation above 
she sees it and organizes it in a meaningful way. The situation has a certain meaning because she 
is assigning roles to the elements, and she is doing this in the way characteristic of fear (e.g., the 
child’s nearness to the edge is seen as a threat to her wellbeing, and as such she desires that the 
threat on the behalf of her child is avoided). Roberts associates with each emotion a 
characteristic proposition outlining “the way in which the elements of the situation are sense-
makingly ordered in an emotion of that type” (Roberts, 2013, p. 47).57 The proposition for fear 
                                                        
56 Again, here the concern is taken up, or synthesized, into the appearance of the situational object (the construal) 
(see discussion above). 
57 Roberts explains that these propositions are what distinguishes the different types of emotions. “Human emotions 
come in a variety of more or less names types…and these are distinguished from one another by their defining 
propositions” (Roberts, 2003, p. 110). Moreover, he says “to think that such propositions are determining the 
individual’s construal of the [situation], we need not hold that he explicitly contemplates them or rehearses them to 
himself [even though he could do this]. They propositions he would utter were he to explain his [emotion x]. His 
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goes like this: “X presents a threat to Y of a significant degree of probability; may X or its 
threatened consequences for Y be avoided” (Ibid). Although the concern is not specifically stated 
in the definition, it is implied by the usage of the word ‘threat’ (Ibid). 
  Roberts briefly discusses affect, the way an emotion feels to the emoter, in perception. 
Affect arises from the concern on which the construal is based, and as such the perception is 
colored in value; negative or positive.  
 “As a concern-based construal—one in which the subject’s concern is integrated into his  
  perception of the situation in terms of the concepts that structure the emotion type in  
  question—the construal is a perception that is “colored” in value…in the case of  
  emotions, affect is pleasant or unpleasant. Fear is unpleasant, hope pleasant” (Roberts,  
  n.d). 
 
 Affect for Roberts then is the phenomenological difference between an emotion and a non-
emotion construal; between Kendall’s concern-based construal of Kim on the wall (her fear), and 
say a stranger’s construal of Kim as being in danger (someone that does not have the same 
concern as Kendall for the well-being of the child) (Roberts, n.d., “Emotions, Perception, and 
Moral Judgments,” p. 11).   
 Let us look at how Roberts would handle the test-cases. Case 1: Sheryl has a dispositional 
concern for her own well-being. When she enters into the situation with the snake, she construes 
it as dangerous (e.g., she sees the nearness of it to where she is standing as threatening) and when 
this happens her dispositional concern (for her own well-being) is triggered. Sheryl perceives the 
situation through the lens of her concern, and experiences fear.58 Her perception of the situation 
as dangerous is colored with negative value; her qualitative experience is unpleasant. A desire is 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
[emotion x] (construal) is expressible in such propositions. Perhaps he is initially inarticulate about them; they need 
to be draw from him artfully, as in psychotherapy. But…even in such a case some propositions or thoughts 
determine the character of his experience: In inquiry about his emotion, they can be drawn from him, or could be 
drawn from him with the right prompting” (Ibid).  
58 Again, here the concern is taken up, or synthesized, into the appearance of the situational object (the construal) 
(see discussion above). 
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produced in her; she wants to remove herself from the situation, and she is motivated to run 
away.  
  Case 2: Imagine that Frank has the dispositional concern that it is important for him to 
have high worth (as an American he wants his country to do well in comparison to other 
nations).59 When he watches fellow American, Serena Williams, beat her opponent and win 
Olympic gold, he construes or perceives the situation (i.e., Williams’ athletic superiority over the 
other player) as rubbing off on him; he too as an American is stronger and more determined than 
the Russians. When this happens his concern for high worth is activated, and he now views the 
situation through the lens of this concern.60 Consequently, he has an episode of pride. Frank’s 
perception of the situation has positive value; the qualitative experience of pride is pleasant. A 
desire is produced in Frank to show off his superiority, and he is motivated to lift his arms up in 
the air and puff out his chest.  
 Next, we will briefly be considering how nonhuman animals and young children can have 
emotions on Roberts’ view. Because construals are not necessarily propositional (as is the case in 
the old woman/young woman figure), there is room on Roberts account for nonhuman animal 
and pre-linguistic infant emotions (Roberts, 2003, p.116). What is needed for the latter 
organisms to have an emotion is:  
  “A power of perception that is not merely sense perception, but some organization of  
  sense perception that can impinge on and incorporate some concern (perhaps instinctual,  
  perhaps learned) of the [emoter] (Ibid)” 
 
This works as follows. A rabbit reacts with fear to a snake on the ground, but is indifferent to a 
stick in the grass (Ibid). Although the rabbit does not see the snake as ‘dangerous,’ after all it 
                                                        
59 Roberts proposes the following formula for the defining proposition of pride: “It is important for me to have high 
worth; and X (attributem possession, accomplishment, associate), by its goodness and its association with me, 
confersm enhances, or confirms such worth” (Roberts, 2003, p. 277). 
60 Again, here the concern is taken up, or synthesized, into the appearance of the situational object (the construal) 
(see discussion above). 
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does not have language, it does “see the snake in a different way than it sees a stick that has 
much the same sensory properties as the snake” (Ibid). To be clear, while there is a slight 
difference in sense perception, the main difference in perception is in the distinct construals 
involved.  
  In the animal and pre-linguistic infant case the slight difference in sensory input “triggers 
a qualitatively different perception, and this is a difference in the way the sensory input is 
organized—where “organized” denotes the kind of thing that has happened in the perception of 
the old woman/young woman figure when a subject sees one of the figures in the lines” (Roberts, 
2003, p. 116). Instead of explaining how this organizing of sensory perception happens, Roberts 
merely says that nonhuman animals and pre-linguistic infants come hard-wired with construals 
for particular sensory input, and that it activates or triggers their animal instinct through which’s 
lens they perceive the object.61 The animal instinct thus being the animal analog of a human 
concern (Ibid).   
  One criticism of Roberts is that the states he calls construals appear so different from 
each other that it is difficult to see what they have in common (Tappolet, 2006, p. 145). This is a 
problem since, he says that emotions constitute a unified category; all emotions are concern-
based construals. As we know, he argues that human emotions appear to be largely dependent on 
concepts,62 whereas the emotions of nonhuman animals are not (as discussed before, they do not 
have language). However, he still wants to say that both human’s and nonhuman animals’ 
                                                        
61 Again, as in the human case, here the concern is taken up, or synthesized, into the appearance of the situational 
object (the construal) (see discussion above). 
62 Except for our fear of heights that apparently is more like animal fear:“It seems instinctual in us that when, unused 
to the experience, we look down from a precipe, we recoil with something analogous to fear. As human beings, we 
probably also see the precipe as dangerous…but the experience precedes and seems to be largely independent of the 
concept of danger, and so it is natural to suppose that it is something like the animal reaction involving sense 
perceptions that we have been discussing. But with experience some people overcome this perception when looking 
precipitously down; rock climbers and roofers learn to see the precipitous drop differently” (Roberts, 2003, p. 117). 
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emotions involve construals. As argued by Christine Tappolet (2006) in her review of Roberts 
(2003):  
 “[W]hat seems to happen when we experience fear of heights [or when animals  
  experience emotions] is that we [or the animals] perceive the higher-order property of  
  being a threat [this is captured by Roberts’ claim above that the rabbit perceives the snake  
  in a “different way”]. The question is why we should say this is a construal and not  
  simply a perception” (p. 145).  
 
She says that even if we can, in some sense, say that this perception is a construal (although 
Roberts doesn’t explain how this would be so), it still seems different from the construals 
involved in human emotions involving concepts. It is fair to ask thus, what exactly it is that these 
construals share. 
  Tappolet (2006) also suggests that maybe the concerns are the unifying factor for 
Roberts. Perhaps all emotions, human and nonhuman, involve them (p. 145). But, this does not 
seem satisfactory either. After all, for him concerns can be many different things, such as 
interests, enthusiasm, desires, wishes, attachments, cares, etc (Roberts, 2003, p. 146). Hence, he 
also has to explain what concerns have in common.  
  Let us now look at how the Modified-cognitivist theory does on the benchmarks. 
Benchmark i: the notion of a construal is cognitive, benchmarks ii & iii: emotions have both a 
physiological component and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have behavioral 
signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children have emotions, 
benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can both be the result of 
careful reflection and they can be automatic responses to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions and 
moods cannot be embodied. And lastly, benchmark ix: emotions are open to conceptual analysis.  
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e. The Hybrid Theory 
 Similarly to the James-Lange theory, for Jesse Prinz (2008) emotions are perceptions of 
bodily changes, however, on his account “by perceiving the body, we also perceive losses, 
threats, achievements, and other matters of significant concern” (p. 707). In accordance with 
Richard Lazarus’ appraisal theory of emotions thus, he thinks emotions represent different core 
relational themes. By drawing heavily both from what Prinz (2008) calls James-Lange’s 
“embodied approach,” and the cognitive appraisal theory, emotions for Prinz are embodied 
appraisals (p. 707-8).           
 On the James-Lange conception of emotions, emotions are perceptions of changes in the 
body. “[F]ear is a perception that includes muscles freezing, respiration becoming 
constricted…hairs standing on end” and an increase in blood flow to the legs (Prinz, 2008, p. 
707-8). By perception here Prinz refers to a state that is caused by and also represents bodily 
changes. Moreover, when afraid I can feel my muscles tensing up, my breathing getting shorter, 
my heart beating faster, and I might have a sensation of the hair on my arms standing-up. For 
                                                        
63 At least in the sense that his view allows for the fact that the behaviors following on the desires can be typical for 
a certain emotion.  
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Prinz the job of the feelings of the bodily changes is not to let us know about the changes, but to 
inform us of the kind of situation we are in. The tightness in my chest might be caused by too 
much oxygen pumping through my body and my heartbeat raising, but what it tells me is that 
there has been a loss (that is relevant to me). Hence, the perception of bodily changes makes up 
an “embodied appraisal” of the situation (Price, 2015, p. 32). 
   To account for the objection that emotions for James-Lange are too brute (i.e., they 
cannot explain how emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate when all they represent are 
bodily states), Prinz follows Lazarus by evoking the idea of core relational themes.64  
  Prinz (2008) explains: 
  “An appraisal is a judgment about an organism-environment relationship that bears on  
  well-being, such as the judgment that there has been a great loss or that there has been an  
  offense against me. Following Richard Lazarus, I call the states of affairs represented by  
  these judgments ‘core relational themes’” (p. 708, my emphasis added).  
 
But how can it be that a perception of particular bodily changes can represent a core relational 
theme? Citing contemporary theories of mental representation, in particular Fred Dretske’s view, 
Prinz (2008) says that a mental state can represent in virtue of its causal relationship to the 
world: 
“If a particular bodily perception reliably occurs under certain circumstances and was 
learned or evolved for that purpose, then that perception represents that situation. When 
dangers confront us, there are certain muscular, circulatory, and respiratory changes that 
take place in order to prepare the body for fleeing, fighting, of freezing. The mind has the 
ability to recognize this pattern of changes perceptually, and to use that pattern to inform 
decisions about what to do next. Thus, the perception of the pattern is…a representation 
of danger. Core relational themes are represented by perceptions of patterned bodily 
changes” (p. 709, my emphasis). 65 
 
                                                        
64 See my discussion above regarding the criticism against James-Lange that their view is too brute. It appears that 
this objection might be slightly misguided. 
65  It would seem that on Prinz’ view my phobic fear of snakes can be accounted for as well. This is so, since my 
seeing the snake on the ground triggers a certain bodily response in me that my mind perceives (the bodily 
perception could have been either learned or evolved to serve this purpose).   
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   Prinz is drawing from both the feeling theory (ala James-Lange) and the cognitive 
appraisal view (Lazarus’ account) here. For Prinz, James-Lange were correct in their claim that 
emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, but they did not account for the fact that the 
perceptions can represent “exactly what judgments (cognitive appraisals) represent. They 
represent via the body, rather than via disembodied, freely recombinable concepts that we use in 
thought” (Ibid).  
  As we are aware, an emotion does not represent a particular object, but rather a core 
relational theme. This means that when an individual for example is sad about the death of a 
child, her mental representation of the object is distinct from the emotion; “cognitions are prior 
conditions, not constituent parts of emotion” (Prinz, 2004, p. 98). Thus, the individual is going to 
have one mental representation “that corresponds to the child’s death and another, [her] sadness, 
that corresponds to there having been a loss” (p. 62-3). We should think of these two 
representations as constitutive of one “complex representation that means that the child’s death 
has been a loss to me” (p. 63). Further, to this Prinz ads a negative valence marker (I will discuss 
this below), and as a result, there appears to be three different representations at work at same 
time (Goldie, 2006, p. 455). 
  Prinz improves on the James-Lange view further by saying that although on their view 
emotions are feelings, a claim which seems to imply that they must be conscious,66 on his 
account they do not have to be. Since he wants to take contemporary research into consideration 
                                                        
66 Goldie seems to agree with this interpretation of James-Lange as well. To see this consider his commentary on the 
following quotation of James’: “Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely 
cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might see the bear, and judge it best to run, 
receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or angry” (Goldie, 2000, p. 53). 
Here is Goldie’s reply: “This reads as if it is the bodily changes which are required for there to be an emotion, not 
the bodily feelings, but James can put it like this because, he says, all bodily changes are felt ‘every one of the bodily 
changes, whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs’. So it is not really the bodily changes 
that are the emotion, as the above citation suggest, but rather the feelings which necessarily accompany them: ‘every 
change that occur must be felt’” (Ibid., my emphasis added). 
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and say that unconscious perception is possible, there can be unconscious emotions as well 
(Prinz, 2008. P. 711). 
 Another point that Prinz makes is that we need an explanation for how to account for 
some emotions being positive while others are negative. Why are some bodily patterns good 
(positive), and others bad (negative)? To explain this Prinz introduced ‘valence markers’ or 
‘inner reinforcers’ (Prinz, 2004, p. 163-5; Prinz, 2008, p. 711). These are states that have 
“imperative content,” and as Goldie (2006) states in his review of Prinz’s Gut Reactions, “can be 
glossed by the instruction “More of this”…or “Less of this!”’ (p. 455). The positive marker, tells 
the individual to remain in the emotional state, whereas the negative emotion marker tells her to 
get out of the emotion state. The emotion markers also motivate us to act in various ways: “If I 
am overjoyed by a chocolate soufflé that I am eating, then I will recognize that the “More of 
this!” command would be best served by having more soufflé. If I am tormented by an awful 
movie that I am watching, the “Less of this!” command would best be served by leaving the 
theater” (Prinz, 2004, 174). Thus, emotions are embodied appraisals together with a valence 
marker.  
  As we can see the valence markers complements the embodied appraisals; they mark the 
object or situation as being good or bad (Price, 2015, 32). And as could be gleaned above, the 
embodied appraisals and the valence markers together bring about the behavioral changes typical 
of the emotions. When I feel fear as I hear footsteps downstairs but know that no one but me is 
home, there is an embodied appraisal (i.e., I feel my heart raising and I can feel the adrenaline 
through my body) that tells me about the danger, and further, there is a valance marker signaling 
the badness of the situation and that I should withdraw. As a result, I hide in my closet. Based on 
all this, we can see that for Prinz, the embodied appraisal (i.e., the emotional feelings) and the 
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valance marker constitute the emotional evaluation of the situation, and “together they make-up 
the emotion” (Price, 2015, 32).   
  Let us now apply Prinz’s view to the test-cases. Case 1: When Sheryl sees a snake on the 
ground certain bodily changes are activated; there is an increase in blood flow to her legs, her 
heart starts beating faster, and she begins to breathe rapidly. She feels fear when she perceives an 
occurrence of this state (which represents the core relational theme ‘danger’). There is a negative 
valence marker connected to the latter perception, and thus, she is motivated to move away. Case 
2: The feeling of happiness (i.e., perception of the bodily change) has been caused by Frank’s 
thought of the American as superior to other peoples in connection to various athletic pursuits. 
Beliefs about victorious people sharing “my” nationality are arranged in memory to be triggers 
for individuals’ experiencing national pride.67 Further, a positive valence marker goes with the 
perception of the bodily changes, and thus Frank is motivated to puff out his chest and raise his 
arms above his head.  
  My main criticism of Prinz’s theory is that it is not clear what he means when he says that 
appraisals are embodied. When he states that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, I 
understand him as saying that the perceptions simply are the appraisals (and by the same token 
that the appraisals just are the perceptions). This is so since, for Prinz to qualify as an appraisal 
“a state must represent an organism-environment relation that bears on well-being”; it must 
represent a core relational theme (Prinz, 2004, p. 77). And as discussed, emotions do just that. 
But, if this is so, the only thing that makes my appraisal embodied is that it takes place inside my 
                                                        
67 This is how Prinz describes another complex emotion, namely jealousy: “When romantic jealousy occurs, there is 
first a judgment to the effect that one’s lover has been unfaithful and then an embodied appraisal. The emotion 
jealousy, is comprised entirely by the embodied appraisal. Under other conditions, an embodied appraisal of the kind 
that comprises a state of jealousy may qualify as another emotion. When an embodied appraisal occurs as a response 
to judgments regarding infidelity, it constitutes jealousy; when it has another cause, it may constitute another 
emotion. On this proposal, the cognitive concomitant of a cognitively elaborated emotion is not part of the emotion, 
but it plays a role in determining the identity of the emotion” (Prinz, 2004, p. 99).  
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body.68 However, standard accounts of embodiment require more than that emotions occur inside 
one’s body. It is one thing to say that the bodily change is embodied (of course it is); it is quite 
another thing to say that the appraisal is. There is nothing in Prinz’ theory that says: every 
emotion type must have a token that is an embodiment of that type by virtue of the agent’s 
behavior being a constitutive part of the emotion.   
  Next I want to briefly look at how the Hybrid view fares in terms of the benchmarks. 
Benchmark i: emotions can have a cognitive component; they can be cognitive elaborations of 
basic emotions, benchmarks ii & iii: emotions have both a physiology and a phenomenology, 
benchmark iv: emotions can have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and 
pre-linguistic children have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: 
emotions can be the result both of careful reflection and they can be automatic responses to 
stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions and moods can be embodied, but the view suggests a weak 
notion of embodiment, and lastly, benchmark ix: emotions are natural kinds and thus they are not 
open to conceptual analysis.  
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68 This observation appears supported by Prinz’ only quote about what he means when he talks about “embodiment” 
in his 2008 review of his own book: “Gut Reactions develops and defends an embodied theory of the emotions. The 
embodied approach emerged in the late 19th century when William James proposed that emotions are feelings of 
changes in the body” (Prinz, 2008, p. 707).  
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not natural 
kinds, but 
social 
constructions 
 
                                                        
69 The Embodied Theory is discussed in chapter IV. 
70 This Constructed Theory is discussed in chapter V. 
71 One can invision a radical revision of the cognitive theory on which one starts out with embodied cognition, and 
then build embodied affect ontop of that. Moreover, an account like that is very different from the so-called 
cognitive theories offered at this time.  
84 
   
Intermission: Review & Prospect 
  In this section, which is intended to serve as an intermission in the dissertation, I briefly 
remind the reader what we have done so far, and indicate how we will be moving forward from 
here. What we set out to do in this project was to answer the question: what can we learn about 
emotions by accepting the embodiment fact, which I have understood as the claim that for every 
emotion type there is at least one token of that type that is embodied. Along the way we laid 
down a number of benchmarks that any good theory of emotions should satisfy, and further, we 
considered prominent theories deciding that some of them are not going to be consistent with the 
embodiment fact, whereas others are. To refresh the reader’s memory, I will next review the 
accounts that we are not bringing with us to chapter IV, and then there will be a short discussion 
of Roberts’ Modified-Cognitive Theory and Goldie’s Feeling Theory and the aspects of each that 
will be carried through. 
  Standing in sharp contrast to Rebekka Hufendiek’s emotion theory, which as the reader 
will see in the next chapter argues that emotions can be embodied, accounts such as Prinz’ 
“Embodied” Theory of emotions and Robinsons’ Non-Cognitivist theory of emotions do not. At 
least not when we are considering embodiment in a substantial enough way. After all, these 
emotion theories only claim that emoting occurs inside the body. Unsurprisingly then, and as we 
know from chapter I, this would be a too weak of a view to get embodiment right. 
  Nussbaum's cognitive theory of emotions will also not be brought through into the next 
phase of the dissertation, and this because it comes up against some rather serious objections. In 
particular, we considered the dilemma that either Nussbaum thinks of emotions as judgments in a 
relatively traditional sense of the word ‘judgment’ and in which case they seem anemic (I could 
judge that I am in danger without necessarily becoming afraid), or, she thinks of emotions as 
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dynamic judgments, and in which case we said that she would be presupposing what needs to be 
explained (she would seem to have to characterize judgments in terms of the affective notions 
that we are trying to understand). As a result of this then, I am choosing to leave her account of 
emotions behind. 
  We now get to the first theory that we will be bringing aspects from with us into the next 
chapter; Roberts’ Modified-Cognitive Theory. As the reader knows from Chapter III, for Roberts 
a concern-based construal is a way of perceiving the world through a concern. In fear for 
example, a person might perceive though her concern for the wellbeing of someone she cares 
about, an object construed as a threat (such as the car coming toward her friend with great 
speed). What is more, as this happens a desire to behave in a certain way is brought about (e.g., 
she wants to keep her loved one away from the danger), and she is motivated to act (e.g., she 
pushes her friend out of harm’s way). Thus, on Roberts’ view, it appears the behaving itself is 
not necessary for an emotion, only the concern-based construal is. As such, construals for 
Roberts are always a cognitive phenomenon.  
  By cognitive phenomena I mean to say that on Roberts’ construal view, perception takes 
place in traditional narrow cognitive processes. That is, something external is registered, you 
perceive it, and you are aware of it phenomenologically as well as consciously. Now, in contrast 
to Roberts’ traditional view as described here, I want to suggest that we consider a more 
inclusive notion of perception. On this interpretation, the organism takes initiative from the 
environment, does something with it, but none of this happens to be located in conscious 
experience. Moreover, it also does not have to be located in traditional cognitive processes.  
  As we will see in the next chapter, and as suggested by my previous point regarding the 
more inclusive way of thinking about perception, Hufendiek puts forth a view of emotions 
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according to which the perception of what she calls affective affordances, can itself be in the 
form of bodily reactions. As the observant reader, who agrees that any good theory should be 
able to explain how emotions can be embodied, might think to themselves at this point: Is it 
possible that construals, in fact, are able to be in my affective behavior? My response to this 
question is that, yes, I think they can. On this understanding, my construing the situation 
fearfully, at least in some instances, is my running away from it (such as when I come across a 
snake on the ground and recoil). Or, to take another example, my construing a situation with 
jealousy, at least sometimes, is my eyeing something that I want to have, but cannot get (such as 
the sherry glasses that you bought in our favorite antique shop, and that I want, but cannot 
afford). In contrast to Roberts account where a construal must take place in perception, on the 
above interpretation an organism can be construing something also by behaving in a certain way.  
  Taken together, such truth as there is to Roberts’ view of construals I think we can 
plausibly say that it is subsumed by Hufendiek’s discussion of emotions. Hers then is a good way 
to make more precise and specific the notion of a construal as embodied. In a way, bringing 
Roberts back after the intermission, and this even though we are not claiming that his discussion 
of construals is completely wrong, would be like bringing back an outdated theory to explain 
something current.  
  The last emotion theorist up for consideration is Goldie and his account of emotions as 
always importantly involving feelings-towards. As the reader recalls from the beginning of 
chapter III, because Goldie do not consider bodily behaviors to be crucial components of 
emotions, meaning that they are not a part of them and do not seem important to the way he 
thinks about emotional experience, his view too will (at least in one sense) be set aside at this 
point. This is especially so since, for Goldie it seems clear that he does not think that an emotion 
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could ever be embodied in the sense that a suite of behaviors would ever itself be sufficient for 
the occurrence of an emotion, whereas we think that it can.72 Now, as mentioned previously, had 
Goldie been more enlightened he would have considered the possibility of behaving-towards, 
and not just, hoping-towards and thinking-towards. However, as we will see in the next chapter, 
Hufendiek and her embodied emotion theory seem to do just this. In a sense then, Goldie’s 
theory is going to be carried on in the work of Hufendiek, and as such by putting her under the 
microscope; we will still be assessing the spirit of his view if not the letter. 
  Even though we have seen that aspects of Roberts’ and Goldie’s emotion theories fall 
under Hufendiek’s embodied account of emotions, as will become clear in the next chapter, she 
fine-grains the phenomenology of emotions too much. Just as the Feeling-theory, Hufendiek too 
holds the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of emotion phenomenology. Consequently, in chapter V we 
turn to Lisa Feldman Barrett’s account of emotions for an alternative. As we will see, although 
Feldman Barrett’s “constructed” emotion view is able to account for some of the shortcomings of 
Hufendiek’s theory, it is faced with others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
72 That is, Goldie does not think that an aspect of an agent’s behavior could ever be a constitutive part of emotion. 
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Chapter IV 
Table of Contents: Chapter IV  
1) Introduction 
2) Rebekka Hufendiek’s discussion of cognitive accounts of emotions 
3) Hufendiek’s position: Emotions are embodied, action-oriented representations set up to 
represent affordances 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
  As mentioned in the Intermission, in this chapter we will be looking at and discussing one 
of the most recent embodied views of emotions, namely, Rebekka Hufendiek’s theory of 
emotions as embodied, action-oriented representations set up to represent affordances. However, 
and importantly, as the reader will soon see, even though Hufendiek presents an embodied theory 
of emotions, there are objections that can be raised against it, which in the view’s current 
formulation, renders it unacceptable. 
2) REBEKKA HUFENDIEK’S DISCUSSION OF COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS OF EMOTIONS 
  According to Hufendiek (2014, 2015), cognitive accounts are committed to two claims 
about emotions. First they say that emotions have a certain meaning that cannot be accounted for 
by bodily feelings and behavior. That is, emotions have “directions” or “targets,” they are about 
something, they are Intentional. To see what this means, consider a situation in which I am angry 
with my husband for eating the candy that I had saved from our date-night last weekend, and 
which I had told him not to touch. In this instance my anger is Intentional (it is directed at my 
husband’s action), i.e., it’s about his eating my candy knowing full well that he was not supposed 
to do so. Moreover, Hufendiek (2015) explains that the relationship between a person’s being 
angry and what he or she is angry about is representational. That is, the object of the emotion, in 
this case my husband eating my candy, is given to me in a certain mode of presentation; as an 
offense (p. 24).  
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  The simplest way to make sense of the above mentioned representational relationship is 
by looking at another example. Imagine a young child, 2 year-old John-John (or JJ as his mother 
calls him), who is playing in the living room with his new toy car. As JJ is sitting on the floor 
pushing his car around in circles, his sister Marilyn runs into the room, grabs the car, and throws 
it against the wall. As a result of this sudden outburst of anger, one of the car’s wheels falls off, 
and when JJ sees this he starts crying uncontrollably. According to a cognitive view, JJ’s 
emotion (i.e., his sadness) is directed toward the toy car, but it has a formal aspect, which is the 
loss. That is, the emotion is Intentional (directed toward an object, the car), but it also has a 
formal aspect, or a “particular way” that it represents its object (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 25). In this 
case JJ’s sadness represents the broken car as being a loss. The latter is what Hufendiek 
describes as the “particular mode of presentation in which the object is given in experience” (p. 
24).   
 The second claim that cognitive accounts make is that emotions are normatively 
assessable; i.e., they can be appropriate or inappropriate. Hufendiek (2015) explains that the 
phenomenon of normative assessability involves three different claims: semantic norms (whether 
or not the formal aspect of the representation is correct), rational norms (according to which the 
representational character of the emotions are “the result of reasoning processes that stand in 
certain rational relations to the situation, other thoughts, and other emotions”), and social norms 
(that the emotions “represent values that concern not only biological well-being but also social 
norms”) (p. 27, 33).73 74 I will discuss these various dimensions in greater detail below. 
                                                        
73 I will discuss these three different claims in greater detail below when discussing how Hufendiek’s view is able to 
account for them.  
74 Hufendiek does not think that one needs to accept all of these claims, in fact she says, there are accounts of 
emotions that do not accept any of them. However, she says, views “that dent that emotions have semantic, rational, 
or social norms need to come up with an alternative explanation of the normative assessability of emotions to avoid 
inadequate reductionism” (Hufendiek, 2015, 23). 
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  Hufendiek criticizes certain cognitive theories by pointing out that they over-
intellectualize emotions, and furthermore, she holds up her own view as an alternative to such 
accounts. One of the first cognitive theories that she criticizes is Richard Lazarus’ 
characterization of emotions as representing core relational themes. Hufendiek ends up adopting 
the notion of core relational themes to her own positive approach, but tries to separate out the 
aspect of it that seems too cognitively sophisticated. Further, and this as a general overview, 
from here Hufendiek builds up to James Gibson’s (1986) account of affordances to make her 
own position successful. By doing so Hufendiek, as we shall see incorporates the embodiment 
component discussed in chapter I.  
  In line with her explanation that cognitive accounts are committed to two claims about 
emotions, Hufendiek (2015) turns to Lazarus’ view with these in mind. For Lazarus, she says, 
the first claim (i.e., that emotions are about something) is expressed in his previously mentioned 
conviction that emotions represent core relational themes. “Emotions seem to be about things 
that fundamentally concern us, that are relevant for our goals and well-being; when we are afraid 
we represent that we are in danger, when we are sad, we represent irrevocable loss” (2014, p. 
355-6, my emphasis added).75 And so, ‘being in danger’ and ‘being an irrevocable loss’ are both 
core relational themes. Furthermore, Hufendiek (2014) gives the following helpful breakdown of 
what one can take the term core relational theme to express:  
 “(1) [T]he fact that emotions always represent things that matter or that are of core  
 relevance, (2) the fact that emotions always represent things that matter to us or that  
 their meaning is relational,76 (3) the fact that every type of emotion has a particular theme  
 that is always represented when the emotion in question is present: I might be afraid of  
                                                        
75 It might be mentioned here that talk about ‘irrevocable loss’ is unnecessarily strong, for our purposes it suffices to 
say ‘loss.’  
76 The notion of “emotions mattering to us” is worth spending a little time reflecting on, since it appears to me to be 
slippery. It seems like I can get emotionally involved in a movie that I’m watching (what happens to its characters, 
etc), just as it seems like I can care about a sports team because they are the underdog. However, do these things (the 
characters in a movie and the sports team) really matter to me? We want to avoid a view that says that well if you’re 
happy about it, it must have mattered to you. That seems very suspect. 
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 many different things and in many different situations but no matter if I am afraid of a  
 spider, a possibly coming war, or an upcoming oral exam, whenever I am afraid I  
 represent a situation as dangerous”(p. 356).  
 
 The reader might wonder why Hufendiek thinks that representing a core relational theme 
is cognitively sophisticated? She explains that this is so because when, for example, someone is 
angry his representing an object or state of affairs as ‘being an offense’ is the result of a complex 
process involving “several appraisal dimensions and language-like judgments” (Hufendiek, 
2014, p. 356). That this is what she thinks comes out in her writing in the following quotation, in 
which she explains what is required for a person to represent something as being a certain way:  
  “When a person is angry, he or she is representing a core relational theme (being an  
  offense), however, doing so is the result of a complex process involving several appraisal  
  dimensions and language-like judgments. “”First one has to judge whether the current  
  situation has any relevance for one’s goals and only if it does can an emotion occur.  
  Second, one has to judge whether the situation is congruent or incongruent with regard to  
  one’s goals. If it is congruent, any positive emotion can be elicited; if it is incongruent  
  with one’s goals, any negative emotion can be elicited. The further evaluations further  
  distinguish which kind of emotion is present: if an emotion is directed to the self it will  
  be pride, guilt, or shame. Several other emotions such as anger and envy, are directed at  
  other persons. If an emotion involves guilt it will be either anger or guilt depending on  
  whether the emotion is directed at another person or oneself” (Ibid).  
 
 When Hufendiek above criticizes Lazarus’ view saying that emotions involve “language-
like judgments,” what she is saying is that they involve concepts. That is, she believes that 
Lazarus’ judgments are concept involving, whereas what she wants is nonconceptual content. 
Later on in this chapter I will discuss in-detail what this type of content is. In principle though, 
an approach like this is one that we should find appealing since it is going to make sense of how 
animals and infants can emote. However, as the chapter develops, it will become clear that we 
have other reasons to think her view needs improving.   
  Next, I want to briefly discuss how Lazarus’ view, according to Hufendiek, is able to 
account for the normative assessability of emotions referred to above. In particular, how his 
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account can handle what she calls: emotions’ three normative assessability dimensions.  
  (Assessability Dimension 1) Semantic norms: for Lazarus emotions are concerned with 
relations between the individual and the environment, so the formal property in, for example fear 
would be ‘being dangerous.’ Thus, the dimension of normative assessability concerned with 
semantic norms would be satisfied if there actually were such a relational property between the 
individual and the environment. (Assessability Dimension 2) Rational norms: Lazarus’ appraisal 
structure explains how emotions can be subject to rational norms:  
  “When somebody seriously claims to envy herself for her brand-new car, we are at a loss  
  to understand her. It is a conceptual truth that we can only envy the goods that belong to  
  others, and it can be read off the appraisal structure that the rationally appropriate  
  emotions in this case could either be joy or pride because these are emotions that relate  
  valued objects or achievements to the self and not to others” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 31).  
 
 (Assessability Dimension 3) Social norms: some emotions for Lazarus are concerned 
with biological value, e.g., “if we think of fear as a response to “an immediate, concrete, and 
overwhelming physical danger,” it makes sense to “think of danger as something that is of 
[biological] disvalue for the organism and therefore should be avoided” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 
32). However, others are not. Instead, these emotions have to do with social value. And thus, as a 
result, they are fundamentally concerned with social rules and norms. For instance, Hufendiek 
says that for Lazarus guilt is about violating a moral command, and jealousy is about resenting 
another individual because he or she is a threat to another person’s affection. He makes clear that 
this does not mean that the latter emotions have nothing to do with evolution, or that they have 
not played a role in the overall fitness of the individual. To the contrary, when looking at the 
development of shame and pride in apes, and their connection to rank-hierarchy within groups, it 
becomes clear that they developed by virtue of being “functional in social groups” (Hufendiek, 
2015, p. 32). Rather, the main difference here then is that guilt and pride differ from emotions 
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like fear and disgust, because in the case of the former, the social context within which the 
emotions take place are of the utmost importance; it is a necessary condition, or as Hufendiek 
puts it, it is “sine qua non” (Ibid). 
 Even though there are well-known positives to Lazarus’ account such as that it is able to 
explain what differentiates various emotions from one another (they involve distinct 
evaluations), and that it can account for their normative assessability, the fact that his account 
overintellectualizes them by claiming that they involve conceptual content, Hufendiek takes to 
be a serious enough problem for us to abandon his view and look for an alternative option. 
However, rather than just leaving the discussion here, she provides further reasons speaking 
against the claim that emotions are the type of judgments that Lazarus’ envisions. Hufendiek 
(2014) says: 
1. Infants and animals have emotions, however, they “do not seem to possess the 
concepts necessary to engage in judgments.” 
2. At times emotions do not go away even though we prove them to be wrong, i.e., 
they are cognitively impenetrable. “Judgments, on the other hand, simply 
disappear if proven wrong.” 
3. In contrast to judgments, emotions come with “a distinct phenomenology.” 
4. Emotions tend to motivate us to act in various ways, whereas judgment merely 
“purport to state matters of fact.” 
5. “Emotions are fast and frugal; in contrast to judgments they are not the result of 
complex and time-consuming reasoning processes” (2014, p. 357).  
 
  Lastly, some of the above criticisms that Hufendiek wants to raise about a judgment-view 
like Lazarus’ are good ones, however others are not. One such example is #5; emotions are fast 
and frugal whereas judgments are not. For instance, it would appear as though some emotions, in 
fact, can be very slow and deliberate. While at first Betty was nervous about her husband’s 
promotion since it includes a lot of business travel, she over time comes around to being happy 
about his success. Or consider romantic love, this emotions is neither fast; it can develop over 
many years, nor frugal; it can be all consuming. 
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3) HUFENDIEK’S POSITION: EMOTIONS ARE EMBODIED, ACTION-ORIENTED REPRESENTATIONS SET 
UP TO REPRESENT AFFORDANCES 
  
 Erik Myin (n.d.), in his review of Hufendiek’s above-mentioned book, highlights the fact 
that she is a staunch realist about core relational themes. That is, for Hufendiek a dangerous 
snake or a poisonous mushroom, if present in the organism’s environment, constitutes an 
objective threat to his or her well-being. Thus, the properties of ‘being dangerous’ or ‘being 
poisonous’ are relational properties that existed in the world of our ancestors already before they 
were able to emotionally respond to dangerous or poisonous situations. Another way to think 
about this is to emphasize that part of what it means to say that they (the properties) are objective 
is to say that they would be there even if they were not noticed. For instance, if a dangerous 
killer is hiding in your closet, he or she would still have the property of ‘being dangerous’ even if 
you (or anyone else) were not at home. Thus, even though no one is in the apartment, in that 
moment, the apartment is still a dangerous place.       
 Based on the above discussion we can see why for instance, for Hufendiek (2015), fear 
represents danger (i.e., it represents something, such as the snake on the ground, as being 
dangerous), and danger (i.e., ‘being dangerous’) is a relational property existing between the 
emoter and the world (p. 90). She thinks that relational properties are objective facts; “That the 
snake is dangerous to certain organisms does not depend on subjective judgments or any 
representational capacity” (Ibid). Rather, it is dangerous because, it is disposed to harm the 
organism. More generally, Myin (n.d.) explains, “Hufendiek claims that core relational themes 
are ontologically real because some themes are objectively good or bad with respect to biological 
[having to do with, or being tied to survival and reproduction] or social [having to do with my 
standing within a social group(s)] norms” (para. 3).  
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 Moreover, because Hufendiek (2015) takes the view that relational properties are 
objectively real, she can appeal to teleosemantic approaches to explain how organisms came to 
acquire their representational abilities (Myin, n.d., para. 4). Namely, they did so by developing 
representational capacities to the already dangerous and poisonous things (e.g., a snake or a 
mushroom) around them. And furthermore, the latter took place before they were able to actually 
represent the objects or things as such (Ibid). For example, snakes have the relational property of 
being dangerous to us, and since our ancestors found themselves repeatedly in situations where 
they were faced with such dangers, they eventually developed a detection system or mechanism 
(i.e., a fear reaction) that helped them avoid these dangers. As Myian (n.d.) states,  
 “Hufendiek understands these objectively existing CRTs [core relational themes] as  
  operating in a causal way by exercising selection pressure on organisms...Thus, CRTs  
  cause organisms to evolve mechanisms which at the same time represent the CRTs and  
  motivate the organism to act with respect to them” (Ibid).  
 
  Hufendiek calls these special representational and motivating mechanisms action-
oriented representations (Ibid).77 She motivates their existence by, for instance, emphasizing that 
she thinks it counterintuitive to say that an emotion is a perception of a dangerous or offensive 
situation (object or state of affairs) where the bodily arousal and behavioral reactions do not 
enter into the picture until after there has been further cognitive operations, which evaluates 
whether the situation is good or bad for the individual. “It is counterintuitive that an emotion 
should be a mere perception of a dangerous or offensive situation that, only after further 
processing, is evaluated as being good or bad, which then trigger a certain pattern of bodily 
arousal and behavioral reactions” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 154). The latter here seems like a direct 
challenge to the more cognitivist accounts of emotions discussed previously, according to which 
                                                        
77 “These AORs, so Hufendiek argues, are constituted by an organism’s evolutionary appropriate embodied 
reactions to the CRT. Following the standard Millikanesque teleosemantic line, she takes these reactions to represent 
their normal conditions of functioning” (Ibid). 
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bodily reactions appear merely to follow upon the emotion (e.g., a concept involving judgment).   
  In contrast, for Hufendiek (2015), emotions are intrinsically motivating, and this 
character “structures their phenomenology” (p.154). She attempts to capture this motivational 
aspect of the emotions by describing how individuals usually feel when experiencing them; for 
instance, “in shame we feel that we want to vanish, in anger we feel like exploding, and when in 
love we feel the urge to be near to the beloved” (Ibid). Could we put this non-metaphorically? 
Yes, because a more careful formulation would go as follows. In shame we feel like we want to 
hide, in anger we feel like we want to hit, punch, throw, shatter, etc., something or someone, and 
when in love we feel the urge to be near to the beloved. 78  
 Moreover, Hufendiek holds the view that an organism’s bodily reactions represent the 
core relational themes in a particular way. When experiencing an emotion, she explains, we do 
not merely represent a core relational theme (by passively receiving information about it), but 
we also are simultaneously preparing for action, or simply acting. This is the case for Hufendiek 
since the bodily reactions that realize the emotions are skillful.79 Further, they (the skillful bodily 
reactions) are what make, i.e., they constitute, the emotions being Intentional (Hufendiek, 2015, 
p. 157).  As a result, this means that when an individual comes upon a snake while she is hiking 
in the woods, he or she does not only represent the snake as ‘dangerous,’ but as “a-danger-to-be-
avoided” [this is the formal aspect of the emotion] (Ibid). What is more, the latter, i.e., the 
representation of the snake as “a-danger-to-be-avoided,” for Hufendiek is a representation of an 
affective affordance.  
  Hufendiek (2015) draws on Gibson (1986) in her use of emotional affordance. Gibson 
(1987) introduces the term to explain what human beings and nonhuman animals perceive. 
                                                        
78 I will consider Hufendiek’s account regarding the phenomenology of emotions in greater detail below. 
79 I will discuss this further below. 
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Hufendiek describes Gibson as conceiving of the affordances as “features of the environment 
that exist objectively but only in relation to the organism and its abilities” (“Affective 
Affordances,” n.d). The features hold a certain value to the organism, and further she explains, 
they offer possibilities for action and make more salient (i.e., “highlights”) things that should be 
approached or avoided (Ibid). For instance, for a chimpanzee certain fruits will look edible, and 
for you, the reader (a person of a certain size and shape) certain objects will look sit-upon-able. 
Moreover, she says, “Gibson assumes that perception always involves proprioception and 
thereby has intentional objects that are fundamentally observer-related, although the external 
information that is picked up through perception is assumed to be real” (Ibid).80 Consequently, a 
tree that has fallen across the road might look jump-over-able to a horse but not to me. Or, a fork 
might look graspable to me, but not to a snake.  
  The reader can see then, that Hufendiek takes her combined affordance theory of 
emotional objects and embodied account of emotions (see the next paragraph for a discussion of 
how her view is embodied) as able to explain the intimate relations among (or relationship) 
between bodily reactions, world-directedness, and emotions’ motivating character. In her post 
“Affective Affordances” on the blog Philosophy of Brains Hufendiek demonstrates how she 
thinks about this relationship by, first, describing emotions’ aboutness as constituted by the 
particular bodily reaction (specific to each emotion) (Ibid). And secondly, she explains that since 
the latter was set up by a learning history (either biological or social) to represent an affective 
external affordance, it is able to do so. To be clear, for Hufendiek (n.d.), it is the evolved or 
                                                        
80 “An affordance theory of emotional objects fits nicely with an embodied account as it offers a good prima facie 
understanding of the relation among bodily reactions, world-directedness, and motivating potential in emotions: the 
emotions’ “aboutness” is constituted by the bodily reactions they involve, and these bodily reactions can represent 
an external affordance, because they were set up by evolution (or a learning history) to do so. The bodily reactions, 
by preparing the body for action, also give an observer-relative shape to the intentional object of the emotion as it is 
grasped by the subject” (Ibid). 
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learned bodily reactions in response to the relational property in the organism’s environment that 
turns the relational property into an affordance: ”something that is not only related to us as 
organisms, but also to us as agents with certain abilities” (more about abilities later) (“Affective 
Affordances,” my emphasis added). Lastly and thirdly, she adds, that the fact that the bodily 
reactions are preparing the emoter for action makes it so that there is “an observer-relative shape 
to the intentional object of the emotion as it is grasped by the subject” (Ibid).  
 In my discussion of Hufendiek’s account above I said that for her, emotions are 
embodied, action-oriented representations set up to represent affordances. We have already 
discussed the latter part, but I now also briefly want to consider how she captures the notion that 
emotions are embodied. Hufendiek (n.d.) says that, roughly speaking, when she claims that 
emotions are embodied, what she means is that the bodily reactions that they involve, and 
through which the organism interacts with his or her environment, “realize, or constitute, a kind 
of intelligent behavior” (“Embodied Action-Oriented Emotions,” n.d).81 The evolved bodily 
behavior (or reactions), I take it, are skillful engagements with the world on her view, because 
she thinks of them as involving a certain amount of training: 
 “Skills are abilities that presuppose a certain amount of training. Yet the kind of training  
  in question is not necessarily guided by a trainer, and does not necessarily involve  
  reflective thought and intention. It is a skillful ability to be able to hold one’s head up and  
  it takes a lot of training to learn how to hold one’s head up at a certain point in  
  development, yet acquiring this skill does not seem to require explicit guidance or  
  reflective thought” (Ibid).  
 
  The above means that for Hufendiek before an emotion’s evolved (or learned) bodily 
reactions “can successfully fulfill their purpose” (e.g., to prepare the individual to flee in fear, or 
to prepare him or her to fight in anger), certain things need to be learned (e.g., the ability to flee 
involves a certain amount of training, as do the ability to fight), and can be learned “in different 
                                                        
81 “The claim that emotions are embodied...is that emotions involve bodily reactions and that these bodily reactions 
realize, or constitute, a kind of intelligent behavior, or interaction, with the environment” (Ibid). 
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ways in different environments” (Ibid., my emphasis added; Hufendiek, 2015, p. 162). For 
instance, on her view, it is not until an infant is able to struggle against restriction (i.e., has 
learned to do so), such as a too tight embrace from a mother or father, that the emotion of anger 
can be present and fulfill its goal (i.e., to prepare the infant to fight back) (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 
163). Moreover and along the same lines, only an infant, who has learned to empathize, by for 
example carefully touching the distressed person’s arm, and show other “recompensive” 
behaviors such as a slumped posture, can experience guilt (and have the emotion fulfill its goal 
of making amends) (Ibid).  
  A small correction needs to be made to my recounting of Hufendiek’s account above. 
Even though she specifically says that the infant empathizes when engaging in recompensive 
behavior, it seems more appropriate for her to describe what is going on in this situation as 
sympathy. I say this based on the following distinction between empathy and sympathy. I can 
sympathize with someone without empathizing with him or her. That is, I can sympathize with 
someone by telling him or her that I want to provide comfort and respite for their suffering. 
However, to empathize with another individual it is required either to undergo the same emotions 
they are, or that I am able to vividly imagine myself doing so (Green, 2017, p. 884-5).82 As an 
example, I can sympathize with a rape victim, but I am going to find it difficult to empathize 
with them since I have not had that experience (or something similar to it). Here I do not mean to 
say that to empathize with someone I have to have experienced the same thing as him or her, but 
                                                        
82 “”[T]o empathize with another’s psychological state it is enough both to register or acknowledge it, and to draw 
on one’s acquaintance with states of that kind as an imaginative source for grasping what the other is going through 
(or what an earlier stage of myself did go through). Such acquaintance might come from a prior experience of an 
emotion (mood, or other psychological state or process), or from my engagement with an accurate and sufficiently 
detailed representation of that experience, for instance by reading a memoir or a work of fiction. It is compatible 
with this account that in some cases of empathizing with another, we find ourselves experiencing the same type of 
emotions they do. (This would help explain why empathizing with people who are experiencing morally troubling 
emotions, such as hatred toward certain racial or religious groups, can be fraught experiences). But that is an 
occupational hazard of empathizing with them rather than a requirement for doing the job” (Ibid). 
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I do need some basis such as knowing what it is like to be helpless, or to be terrified for my life. 
Thus, when looking at Hufendiek’s example with the infant, it seems more likely that what is 
going on in this example is that, rather than empathizing, the child is sympathizing, or otherwise 
showing concern for the other person. 
  However, even though Hufendiek thinks of the ability to have emotions as being present 
at birth, it still develops over-time through various social interactions. For example, she describes 
how guilt develops over time beginning with the child experiencing the emotional bodily 
reactions of distress, fear, sadness etc., in response to a punishment he or she receive in response 
to, say, his or cruel behavior. The child eventually makes the connection that these scenarios play 
out when he or she has violated some rule (such as, “do not bite a family member”). And further, 
the child learns, through trial and error, that behaving in certain ways (e.g., what Hufendiek calls 
recompensive behavior) will make reintegration into the social unit (the family) possible. “As a 
consequence, the child in the future will not (or not only) feel distress, sadness or fear when 
being punished but will feel motivated to make amends for what she has done” (Hufendiek, 2015, 
p. 147, my emphasis added). For Hufendiek it is when the latter happens, and this with the 
emphasis being on the child’s motivation to make amends, that there is a fully realized guilt 
reaction present.          
 What is more, she explains, each emotion “gains an individual shape over a learning 
period,” something which I read as an explanation to why my, say, anger or happiness might 
look different from yours (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 146). Perhaps when I get angry my right eye 
starts intensely twitching, while you always stamp your left foot repeatedly. Or, when I am 
happy about something I bite my lip as I smile, whereas you usually smile more from the left 
side of your mouth. 
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 As I explained previously, for Hufendiek (n.d.), relational properties occur in the 
biological environment. However, on her account, they are also present in the social environment 
of the organism (“Emotions and The Social World,” n.d).83 To see how this is so, consider again 
the previous example with guilt. Now, some philosophers would say that infants are unable to 
experience emotions such as guilt or shame, until they both have a concept of the self and a 
conceptual understanding of social rules and norms. Hufendiek (2015) does not agree; for her 
infants have an embodied sense of self, or as she calls it “a prereflective embodied sense of self,” 
that does not require a concept (p. 148). And further, since children grow up in “socially 
structured contexts,” they learn through various non-conceptual indicators (or signals) of 
naturally occurring information such as facial expressions, gestures, punishments, rewards, etc., 
whether or not they have violated a social rule. She explains that the rule violation (in the case of 
guilt in the above example, “do not bite a family member”)”is the relational property that needed 
to be detected (through say, the mother’s angry facial expression and raised voice) in guilt” 
(Ibid).  
  In an attempt to close out our consideration of how Hufendiek’s view is embodied, I want 
to leave the reader with the discussion of embodied emotion accounts that she gives in her paper 
“Affordances and the normativity of emotions” (Hufendiek, 2017, p. 4457). In it she says that 
embodied accounts agree (hers included) that emotions are best described as “embodied 
evaluations that evolved as direct responses to situations of a certain urgency for the organism” 
(Ibid). With this definition in mind, she goes on to present five general claims that the embodied 
accounts all concur on. First, and as we saw in her previous discussion, they explain embodiment 
as when bodily reactions play a constitutive role in emotions. Various bodily responses such as a 
                                                        
83 “A central claim of my approach is that sociall constructed relational properties exist independently of whether we 
represent them or not” (Ibid).  
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pounding heart, the increase of adrenaline throughout your body, and tensed muscles are all part 
of fear and together they make up a pattern that “is not just a consequence of some essential 
“cognitive emotional reaction” (Ibid). But rather, these bodily reactions follow from “an adaptive 
history” during which it “gained the function of constituting the emotions aboutness” (Ibid).   
  Second, just as traditional cognitivists about emotions, embodied accounts think that they 
are “intentional and evaluative” (Ibid). To account for emotions “aboutness” (as mentioned 
before in this chapter) these views often turn to Lazarus’ suggestion that every emotion has its 
own core relational theme. Hence, fear will be about something dangerous (the snake on the 
ground in front of me), while anger is about something being offensive (my husband eating the 
leftover candy even though I specifically told him not to). As we remember, Hufendiek’s own 
account took a unique approach to our representation of core relational themes saying that we not 
only represent something as being dangerous, but as a danger-to-be-avoided. Third, embodied 
emotion accounts tend to be “anti-vehicle-internalism.” This simply means that, as was discussed 
in chapter I, they work to replace the traditional view of “cognitive processes as consisting of 
complex inner representations realized by the brain alone” with an understanding of cognitive 
processes as “being constituted by the interplay” between a skillful body and its environment 
(Hufendiek, 2017, p. 4457).  Thus, our earlier example with the outfielder trying to catch the fly 
ball, and the two ways that we can explain what is taking place here clearly represents the 
different explanations referred to above.  
  Fourth, Hufendiek says that embodied accounts “widely agree on methodological and 
ontological naturalism,” meaning that they try to align what they say about emotions with 
findings from fields such as developmental psychology, ethnology, and behavioral studies and 
thus “further develop a picture of intelligent organisms as the result of an evolutionary process” 
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(p. 4458). Lastly, embodied emotion accounts believe in Diachronic Environmental Externalism 
(or DDE); the claim that organisms develop the ability to respond to certain types of objects only 
if there is an adaptive pressure to do so, and Synchronic Environmental Externalism (or SEE); 
the claim that to interact with the world in an intelligent manner, we do not need “complex, 
world-representing inner machinery” (Ibid). This is so since, “the world is out there and 
organisms are well-adapted to it” (Ibid). All in all, we can see that Hufendiek’s embodied view 
of emotions is consistent with these claims.  
 In regards to how emotions are appropriate or inappropriate on Hufendiek’s (2015) 
account, she says the following: the reason why emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate is 
because they have been “set up to respond to relational properties” in the organism’s 
environment (p. 173-4). Hence, if the relational property is really present, the emotion is 
adequate, and if it is not, the emotion is inadequate.84 Furthermore, Hufendiek emphasize how 
she before had mentioned that emotions can be both about things that have biological value, and 
about things that have social value (that are about social rules and norms). She adds to this now, 
that they can also be about the former without “thereby necessarily entailing conceptual content 
or explicit knowledge of what is represented” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 174). Instead, emotions for 
Hufendiek are about, or represent, core relational themes, such as “danger-to-be-avoided” for 
fear or a “rule-violation-to-make-amends-for” in the case of guilt. Now, since the adequate 
relational properties present in the world engage with the infant “through locally recurring 
natural information,” and which again-and-again bring about particular bodily responses that 
realize the action-oriented representation, nothing cognitive (such as judgment-like evaluations 
or conceptual knowledge) is required to explain it (Ibid). I will talk more about these different 
                                                        
84 I think one can push back at Hufendiek here. For instance, what if I am extremely angry about a very minor slight. 
Maybe that anger is appropriate/adequate in some sense, but the degree of anger is not.  
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normative (or assessability) dimensions of emotions according to her view towards the end of 
this chapter.  
  We saw above that Hufendiek criticizes Lazarus of having an account that is partly right, 
but that also on her view is overintellectualizing emotion by relying on concepts. Now in 
connection to the above quotation, a natural question would be to ask; how is Hufendiek going to 
avoid appealing to concepts? Hufendiek thinks about emotions as being intentional without at the 
same time also having conceptual content. That is, for her emotions have nonconceptual content. 
To make sense of this Hufendiek (2015) draws from the debate about nonconceptual content of 
perception emphasizing the connection between “perceptions being about something and feeling 
a certain way” (p. 84, my emphasis added). She says, 
“[F]rom phenomenological descriptions we gain a good understanding of the particular 
way in which perceptions present their objects to us. This is true of emotions as well. A 
description of how emotions feel offers a good prima facie understanding of the 
representational format that emotions have and the way that bodily reactions, aboutness, 
motivation, and valence are connected in emotions” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 174, my 
emphasis added on “representational format”).  
 
Hufendiek continues by identifying certain claims about the character of perceptual 
representation and how it is different from conceptual representation (such as judgments), and 
then she explains that the representational character of emotions are similar to the former rather 
than the latter. 
  Hufendiek (2015) first explains that we often think of perceptual representation as 
“different in kind” when compared to conceptual representation (such as judgments) (p. 174). In 
particular, the information that we get through perception cannot be described properly in words. 
That is, we cannot in precise detail express the input that we are receiving through sight, touch, 
hearing, taste, and smell. For instance, Hufendiek claims that you cannot describe things like the 
taste of an apple, what your favorite childhood stuffed animal feels like as you touch it, or what 
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the snow covered field outside your window looks like with enough detail to capture what our 
perceptual experience of those objects and states of affairs is actually like. Now, Hufendiek 
(2015) says that the same is true also in the case of emotions. “Even apparently similar emotions, 
such as embarrassment and shame, clearly differ in terms of how they feel, yet the difference can 
hardly be explained to somebody who has never felt the emotions herself” (Ibid).85 86 
  Second, visual perception in particular is more fine-grained than conceptual content. 
Hufendiek (2015) explains, “we can capture a part of what we see at a certain moment in a 
phrase like “there is a cup on the table,” but such an utterance will always reduce what we have 
seen to a very particular aspect…” (Ibid). That is, she says, when we saw the cup on the table, 
we also perceived things like it’s color and shape, the flowers painted on its side, the table that it 
was on and the room behind it. Moreover, even if we are able to put those details of our visual 
experience into words, we could never describe it in enough detail to someone else “to 
communicate [wholly] what we see” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 174). The same holds true in the case 
of emotions for Hufendiek, and she asks the questions what it means to say that “we represent 
emotional content in [a similarly] fine-grained format?” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 84) Now, since she 
wants to argue that bodily arousal (the phenomenological experience of emotions) is constitutive 
of emotions (so emotions have non-conceptual content), she also wonders what “role it plays in 
their being fine-grained?” (Ibid).  
  Hufendiek (2015) explains that the fine-grained structure of “emotional feelings” is 
different from visual perception “insofar as it is not constituted by the processing of the rich 
amount of data entering the retina, but mainly by the rich amount of information stemming from 
                                                        
85 Because she says that shame and embarrassment clearly differ in how they feel to an individual (that each emotion 
has a distinct phenomenology), I take her to be holding what I before called the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the 
phenomenology of emotions. Basically she thinks that just as cinnamon has one type of smell, whereas nutmeg has 
another, so does shame have one type of phenomenology, while embarrassment has another.  
86 I will raise an objection to this claim below. 
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the various sources of bodily feedback involved in emotions” (p. 85). Hence, on her view the 
intensity of the emotion plays a central role in what makes the phenomenological experience of it 
so fine-grained. For instance, my anger can be more or less intense; sometimes I yell out loud 
and hit the wall in anger, other times I merely clench my fist angrily in my pocket. In both cases 
the phenomenological experience is going to be different as well; in the first case we can easily 
imagine that my feeling of anger is more intense, than what it is when I merely clench my fist in 
anger. 
  “Intensity is an abstract notion for particular bodily reactions that do not all have to be  
  present and can vary in degree. Sometimes we feel our muscles tremble and our heartbeat  
  increase; sometimes we feel only a pricking sensation in the stomach when we are  
  afraid…Together with the heartbeat and muscle tension, breathing rhythm is another  
  factor that contribute to the bodily orchestra constituting the feeling of being afraid”  
  (Ibid).    
 
 To this discussion Hufendiek (2015) also adds, “an embodied account of emotions can 
include [in the notion of bodily arousal] fine-grained changes in facial expression, bodily 
posture, endocrine level, respiration patterns, and so on” (Ibid). And so, I think what she is 
saying is that emotions “involve a large number of bodily experiences such as trembling, 
sweating, feeling choked, being on the verge of tears, having a lump in one’s throat, blushing, 
having butterflies in one’s stomach, having one’s legs turn to jelly, and so on” and that these 
(i.e., the large number of bodily reactions) help explain the “fine-grainedness of emotional 
feelings” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 85). That is, it would seem that for Hufendiek, the various bodily 
reactions that go with different emotions (at least to a certain extent) together make up their 
distinctive feel (p. 87).87 
  Something important to notice in connection to the above quotation about fear and how it 
can feel differently for an individual from one day to another (i.e., intra-personally, see below for 
                                                        
87 “What I am arguing for is that all emotions fundamentally involve bodily arousal, which constitutes their 
intentionality and how they feel” (Ibid). 
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explanation of this term), is that for Hufendiek, the different cases of the emotion still must have 
more in common than not. That is, even though there can be changes between a person’s 
different instantiations of fear, they all fall into the category of fear in a unified way. To make 
this clear, consider the taste of cinnamon in bread (as in Swedish cinnamon buns), ice cream, and 
candy. When an individual treats herself to these things, they (most likely) will taste different 
from each other in subtle ways. However, they do still have a rather consistent unity. Similarly, 
in the case of emotions: even though my fear one day (I tremble) versus my fear the next day (I 
have a pricking sensation in my stomach) are different feelings, overall they also share a lot in 
common. For Hufendiek then, there has to be consistency across the subtle variations.  
  My reason for interpreting Hufendiek’s view in this way is the fact that she cuts the 
emotion landscape in a really sharp way. For instance, we see her above say that there is a certain 
distinctive way that shame feels, and a certain distinctive way that embarrassment feels. Since 
this is how Hufendiek portrays her position, she appears to be committed to there being a unity 
between the different instantiations of shame, and some unity between the different instantiations 
of embarrassment. However, given her previous explanation of different feelings of anger at 
different times, it is clear that she leaves open the possibility that tokens of an emotion type can 
differ in their phenomenology.  
  Moreover, in her discussion of the fine-grainedness of emotional experience Hufendiek 
(2015) also emphasizes the importance of their urgency:  
  “What is striking about emotional representations is not their fine-grainedness but their  
  urgency. In this respect emotions resemble sensations such as pain or hunger that are  
  intense, attention grabbing, and directly motivating…emotions…can be understood as  
 embodied representations to situations that are urgent or matter to us. Emotional feelings  
  owe their intense phenomenal character to the perturbations in visceral organs and  
  adjustments of skeletal muscles constituting them. The heart beating faster, adrenaline  
  rising, and muscles tensing constitute the feeling of fear and prepare the organism for  
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  action” (p. 86, my emphasis added).  
 
Her discussion here thus explains her previous claim that the emotions’ intrinsically motivating 
character, in part, structures their phenomenology.  
  Overall, in terms of the way the different emotions feel, I take Hufendiek to be saying the 
following. Just as there is a distinctive way that rotten eggs smell, and a distinctive way that 
sulfur smells, and a distinctive way that the corpse flower smells, there is a certain way that 
extreme anger (i.e., rage) feels, a certain way that grief feels, and a certain way that pride feels. 
As the reader remembers from our discussion of the Feeling Theory in chapter III, this is the 
Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the phenomenology of emotions. Again, what that means is that 
surprise has one phenomenological type, and regret has another phenomenological type and so 
on for every emotion word that we have. Hence, as in the comparison with the distinctive smells 
of rotten eggs, sulfur, and the corpse flower to the distinctive ways that anger, grief, and pride 
feels, cinnamon and nutmeg have distinctive smells, while embarrassment and shame have 
distinctive phenomenologies. Now, even though the Cinnamon-Nutmeg interpretation is 
plausible when discussing, say, smells of various kinds, we will soon see reasons to limiting its 
application to emotions. However, before we look at the latter, I want to ask the following 
question. Is there intra- or interpersonal consistency in terms of the phenomenology of the 
different emotions?    
  To explain what I meant by this question consider again the above discussion regarding 
the smell of rotten eggs. The claim it makes is ambiguous between a weak and a strong version. 
The weaker version (i.e., the view arguing for intrapersonal consistency) says, rotten eggs smell 
a certain characteristic way for Elizabeth (consistently across some substantial period of time), 
but it is an open question whether it smells a certain characteristic way for Richard. The stronger 
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version of the claim (i.e., the account arguing for interpersonal consistency) says that rotten eggs 
smell the same way for everybody. Now, the same holds true in the case of how emotions feel. 
The weaker claim (i.e., the view arguing for intrapersonal consistency) says that anger feels one 
characteristic way for Elizabeth (consistently across some substantial period of time), whereas it 
is an open question whether it feels the same for Richard. The strong claim (i.e., the account 
arguing for interpersonal consistency) would be that anger feels the same way for everybody. 
Hence, just as there is a potential ambiguity in claims about the way things smell; there is a 
potential ambiguity in the claims about how certain emotions feel. As I move forward in the 
dissertation, I am going to read Hufendiek as agreeing with the weaker version of the claim 
regarding the phenomenology of emotions.  
   Even if Hufendiek aligns herself with the weaker interpretation, one can still challenge 
her view. It is doubtful that whatever way, if there is one, that pride feels is different from 
whatever way, if there is one, that hope feels. Now, it is not only the case that an emotion like 
pride does not seem to have a distinctive feel, emotions’ phenomenology can also vary 
depending on the topics or objects they concern. Suppose I am disappointed socially, because 
someone that I wanted to hangout with rejected me. That phenomenology might be very different 
from the one I have when I’m disappointed financially, because I did not get the raise I wanted. 
Thus, it would appear that our emotions are bound-up with what we are focused on. 
  Moreover, on Hufendiek’s Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the phenomenology of emotions it 
appears that we should be able to tell emotions apart on the way they feel. After all, you can tell 
cinnamon and nutmeg apart on the way they smell. However, consider and compare pride to 
hope. Perhaps we can think of hope as some kind of gladness about something beneficial in the 
future. Pride is different; it is a puffing up of sorts after you, or someone you care about, has 
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done something that reflects positively on you. So the two emotions have different cognitive 
dimensions, but do they have different phenomenological dimensions? We can reasonably doubt 
whether or not they must also feel differently. 
   One can agree that embarrassment and shame are different, just as one can agree that 
hope and pride are different (as discussed previously, they have different cognitive dimensions), 
but it does not follow that their parts (or aspects) differ as well. Instead, they might for example 
be relatively similar in their phenomenology. Further, even if pride has a different bodily 
manifestation from, say, hope, it could be the case but it does not follow, that they also have 
characteristic ways they feel. If that is the claim Hufendiek wants to make, and which it seems 
like it is, then she needs to do more work to defend it.  
   As mentioned above, I take Hufendiek to be holding a view according to which the 
different bodily changes, internal and external (such as facial expressions, bodily postures, 
endocrine levels, respiratory patterns, etc.), make up the distinctive phenomenology of the 
various emotions. However, if this is so, then we should ask her the following question; in the 
case of, for example, fine-grained bodily changes, does the individual always experience those 
(i.e., do they always register in phenomenology)? From her writing it is not wholly clear where 
she falls on this question, but statements like the following two makes it seem as though that is, 
in fact, what she is saying.   
  “The large number of bodily reactions involved in emotions is what explains the fine- 
  grainedness of emotional feelings (at least to a large degree). Fleshing out a theory of  
  emotional experience means describing the calmness and relaxation associated with  
  sadness as an effect of decreased circulation…of the head hanging down on the  
  contracted chest, and of the lips, cheeks, and jaw all sinking downward to make the  
  whole body feel heavy and immobile rather than just calm and relaxed” (Hufendiek,  
  2015, p. 85, my emphasis added).  
 
  “A typical case of a fine-grained difference between two emotions is the difference  
  between embarrassment and shame. It is again a difference that can be described as a  
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  difference in intensity. One can blush in a more or less intense way and the stress  
  reactions guided by the HPA axis might also be more or less intense. But there might also  
  be differences in behavior: embarrassment is typically accompanied by a coy smile, while  
  shame is accompanied by a shrinking posture. The difference in intensity, plus the  
  difference in behavior, can account for a difference in how embarrassment and shame  
  present their objects and in how they feel” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 85-6, my emphasis  
  added).  
 
  As mentioned earlier there is a question whether or not any two tokens of distinct 
emotion types must be phenomenologically different. What is more, as shown in our previous 
discussion regarding pride and hope, I think that is implausible. Now, in connection to what 
Hufendiek says here, it appears likely that bodily differences, even of a fine-grained sort, can be 
constitutive of a particular emotional tokening of an emotion type; after all that is inline with an 
embodied account of affect. However, it does not follow that those fine-grained bodily changes 
are registered phenomenologically.  
  If we are correct in interpreting Hufendiek as having a view of emotions that says that 
each emotion type has a distinctive way that it feels (i.e., the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the 
phenomenology of emotions), then my belief that an individual can experience an emotion by 
having a more general phenomenological experience (positive or negative) will stand in stark 
contrast to her account. For instance, let us look back at the case with Isabel from chapter I. In 
this example, when Isabel’s classmate Christina loudly pulls out a bag of almonds from her 
backpack while they are watching a documentary, she contemptuously rolls her eyes as she 
moves her chair away form her.  
  In this scenario we have physiological and behavioral changes, but none of it needs to be 
phenomenological in the sense described above (i.e., the experiencing of a particular “what it is 
like quality” of the emotion in question; a distinctive way that the contempt feels, and that is 
shared by all other cases of contempt). It might be that phenomenologically all that is happening 
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is that Isabel: perceptually registers Christina as she pulls out the plastic bag, somatically marks 
an item of her experience negatively (i.e., Christina), and senses the pressure of her hands against 
the chair seat as she moves her chair away. There does not have to be anything else present here 
such as a specific and distinctive feeling of contempt (again think the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of 
the phenomenology of emotions). Rather, what Isabel is experiencing phenomenologically is a 
negative marking of her experience, and this is something that is much more general in 
(phenomenological) character than what Hufendiek is arguing for. Taken together then, since 
Hufendiek’s position appears to not be able to account for cases like Isabel’s, I find it worthy of 
questioning.88  
  As the reader can see, I am doubtful that there is such a thing as a distinctive experience 
of fear; there are distinctive experiences but they are not necessarily correlated with emotions, at 
least emotions as common sense posits them. Likewise there is no distinctive experience of 
shame as opposed to embarrassment; shame is not to embarrassment as cinnamon is to nutmeg. 
Rather, both shame and embarrassment are unpleasant, or negative experiences. And further, 
perhaps both of them make one want to, say, disappear or shrink. There might still be something 
that differentiates them, but that differentiation could be much more in terms of how they are 
embodied (the way you express the emotions in your behavior). While Hufendiek’s holds the 
Cinnamon-Nutmeg theory of emotional phenomenology, I suggest we think of the latter more in 
terms of the fundamental flavors that the human tongue can experience (sweet, salty, sour, bitter, 
and omani). That is, our emotional phenomenology is only as coarse-grained as such a 
differentiation.  
                                                        
88 Moreover, one thing to notice about this example is that Isabel’s behavior almost appears habituated, i.e., it is not 
novel. Most likely, and this due to past frustrating and annoying experiences with Christina in their Residential hall, 
the behavior exhibited above is manifested in Isabel often when Christina comes into close proximity to her. 
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 Next, I want to turn to moods and discuss how they fare on Hufendiek’s embodied view 
of emotions. As the reader remembers from the benchmarks in chapter II, any good theory of 
affect should be able to account for moods as well as emotions. To see how Hufendiek might be 
struggling to include the latter, consider the following. 
  On Hufendiek’s theory there are some states that seem on a first glance like they should 
count as emotions, even though we do not want to count them as such. Namely, hunger, thirst, 
dizziness, and sexual arousal. To understand how this is so, take a look at the subsequent 
discussion. For instance, what differentiates so to speak emotional perceptions of affordances 
(including several social affordances) from what one would have thought were non-emotional 
perceptions of affordances (ala Gibson), such as an individual seeing a chair as “sit-upon-able” 
when he is tired or a rock as “throw-able” when he is impulsive? After all, it seems plausible that 
when I register the sit-ability of the chair or the throw-ability of the rock; in the former case my 
legs are ready to sit-down, and in the latter case my hand is ready to grasp it. If those changes 
give a distinctive phenomenology, then fine, but notice that that is not particularly emotional. 
Thus, what gives emotions, such as pride and love, their particular emotional character?   
 One potential answer to this can be found in Hudendiek’s above-described emphasis on 
emotions being intrinsically motivating, and that this character of theirs structures their 
phenomenology. Remember for instance her discussion about how in shame we feel that we 
want to vanish, in anger we feel like exploding, and that when in love we feel the urge to be near 
the beloved. Now, perhaps on her account what differentiates an individual’s emotions from the 
registering of the chair as sit-upon-able and the rock as throw-able is that in these cases the 
registering of the chair as sit-upon-able and the rock as throw-able are not intrinsically 
motivating. But, if that is the case, then what about an individual’s bodily urges such as when he 
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or she is hungry or thirsty? In those instances the sandwich sitting on the plate or the glass of 
water sitting on the counter do not just look eat-able and drink-able, but they are also 
intrinsically motivating. However, neither hunger nor thirst is an emotion. The same seems to be 
the case also in instances of sexual arousal, and feelings of dizziness.  
  Another point that I want to make here is that Hufendiek’s previously considered 
discussion of emotions as skillful abilities seems equally applicable to the above examples of 
non-emotional perceptions of affordances. For instance, she says that each emotion involves a 
particular bodily reaction pattern that evolved to prepare the organism for various actions. And 
further, that these are skillful because they required a certain amount of training that did not 
necessarily involve reflective thought and intention (Hufendiek, n.d., “Embodied Action-
Oriented Emotions,” n.d).89 However, it appears that this could also be the case in regard to an 
individual’s holding a fork in her hand, drinking from a glass of water, kissing someone, or 
sitting on a chair. It is plausible that in all three cases, the individual learned the behavior from, 
firstly, merely being in a certain environment observing it being carried out, and secondly, 
because his or her body was developing in a particular way. Hence, Hufendiek’s thinking about 
emotions as skillful in some special way seems to get very close to a much broader category of 
perfectly reasonable, rational types of responses to things in the world that track affordances, but 
that does not involve anything unique about emotions.  
  However, Hufendiek has a response available to our above claim that surely we do not 
want to count states such as hunger, thirst, sexual arousal, etc., as emotions. She might reply that, 
                                                        
89“Skills are dispositions of agents. They enable living organisms to respond to certain situations in a spontaneous 
yet entrained way. Skills are abilities that presuppose a certain amount of training. Yet the kind of training in 
question is not necessarily guided by a trainer, and does not necessarily involve reflective thought and intention. It is 
a skillful ability to be able to hold one’s own head up and it takes a lot of training to learn how to hold one’s head up 
at a certain point in development, yet this acquiring this skill does not seem to require explicit guidance or reflective 
thought” (Ibid). 
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no, they do not count as emotions because they do not have core relational themes (i.e., it is a 
necessary condition for having an emotion). I say this because we know from the beginning of 
this chapter that Hufendiek thinks emotions always have representational content; they represent 
a core relational theme in a particular way. As a result of this, there is a question whether or not 
her theory applies to moods. Moods appear to be object and content permitting, but not object 
and content mandating. I can be anxious about the upcoming job interview, but I can also just be 
anxious and there is no answer to the question what I am anxious about. Rather, what happened 
was that I had three shots of espresso with my breakfast that day. In contrast, if someone is angry 
and you ask him what he is angry about, if he was to say that he does not know, then, that would 
not make any sense. Thus, by building in this notion of aboutness to her theory, Hufendiek is 
separating off emotions from moods. 
  Now, if Hufendiek responds that, yes she is committed to the view that moods do not 
have core relational themes (at least not always; you can be anxious about something, but you do 
not have to be), then, we can ask; would not a more satisfying view in this area (of embodiment) 
be one that discusses moods as well as emotions? After all, many mood tokens are body 
involving. For a view that can say that anger and fear tokens can be embodied, it should be a 
straightforward case to explain how mood tokens can be. It is harder to explain how the former 
can be embodied than the latter. As we have already seen in chapter II moods are relevant to a 
good theory of affect, and further it is clear that they are embodied. Consequently, if Hufendiek 
has nothing to say about moods, then that is a limitation on her view.     
  As promised previously, next I am going to consider how Hufendiek explains the 
Assessability dimensions of emotions (i.e., semantic, rational, and social norms) discussed 
above. We saw in section (2) that a cognitivist like Lazarus, who thinks that emotions can be 
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described as judgments, can explain all three dimensions. However, we also know that 
Hufendiek (2015) disagrees with his account, and as a result, the reader might wonder; how does 
she go about accounting for them? Below I will begin by considering how Hufendiek accounts 
for the fact that emotions are subject to semantic norms, and then I will continue on with my 
discussion by looking at how she explains also emotions’ rational and social norm dimensions.  
  For Hufendiek, and as mentioned earlier in this chapter, her proposed account can explain 
how emotions are subject to semantic norms, i.e., whether or not the formal aspect of the 
representation (such as “danger-to-be-avoided” in fear) is correct, by saying that if the relational 
property (e.g., “being-dangerous” in the case of a person’s fear of snakes), which the emotion 
(i.e., the embodied, action oriented representation of the snake as “a danger-to-be-avoided”) has 
been set up to respond to, is really present in the organism’s environment, then, the emotion is 
adequate. On the flip side, if it is not present, then, the emotion is inadequate (Hufendiek, 2015, 
p. 174).90  
  In regards to rational norms, according to which the representational character of the 
emotions are “the result of reasoning processes that stand in certain rational relations to the 
situation, other thoughts, and other emotions”, Hufendiek (2015) explains that emotions’ formal 
aspects are logically and not causally restricted (p. 27, 174). 
  “But obviously, emotions are logically or rationally restricted: the formal object of an  
  emotion restricts its intentional object by specifying the conditions under which having  
  this emotion about this object is appropriate or reasonable, but not the conditions under  
  which it is causally necessary” (p. 27).  
 
To make her point clear Hufendiek (2015) explains that it is, for example, due to a causal law 
that human beings can only perceive things that are 0.1 millimeters and larger, but she continues, 
                                                        
90 “It suggests that emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate because they are set up to respond to relational 
properties. If a relational property is really present, the emotion is adequate. If the relational property is not present, 
the emotion is inadequate”(Ibid). 
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no such law is behind the fact that a person can only envy “goods of others and not one’s own 
goods or another’s evils” (Ibid). For instance, for her, Evelyn cannot envy her own garden, 
because it already belongs to her (Ibid).91 However, she can envy her neighbor’s garden.  
  Moreover, Hufendiek (2015) describes how emotions seem to be connected to each other 
in ways that make sense” (Ibid). Here she is drawing from Bennett Helm whom she describes as 
emphasizing the connections between “backward- and forward-looking emotions” (Ibid). 
Hufendiek (2015) quotes Helm as saying, “it seems “rationally unwarranted, other things being 
equal, about feeling fear that one’s prize Ming vase is about to be destroyed, but feeling neither 
relief when it miraculously escapes unscathed not sadness or anger when one’s fear is borne out” 
(Ibid). And thus, she says that because emotions are connected in some particular way it is 
reasonable (i.e., it makes sense) that in a certain context we should “become sad if we had been 
afraid before, whereas in other situations it would make sense to be relieved instead” (Ibid).  
  As an example of emotions’ reasonable connections to each other, consider the following 
situation. Tracy realizes that she cannot unlock her IPhone, i.e., it keeps telling her that she is 
entering the password incorrectly. Since she is already running late for work and needs her phone 
to check when the next train is leaving, she can feel herself getting increasingly worried (after 
all, this would be the second time that week that she is late for the morning staff meeting). Now, 
if she suddenly was to realize what the correct password is, perhaps she before had by mistake 
been putting in her HBO-go account info, then, it seems likely that she would feel relieved. After 
all, now she will be able to make the train and get to the office on time. However, if she was not 
                                                        
91 It seems to me that a person could envy him or herself. For instance, could I not envy a previous state of myself? 
Perhaps I envy myself at some previous point in time when life was easier compared to what it is now. Moreover, 
couldn’t I also envy someone that unbeknownst to me is me? As an example, imagine that you put on a really nice 
watch and then forget that you have it on. Later that day you see a hand in the mirror (as you walk by say a mirror 
wall in the mall), and you don’t notice that in fact, it is your hand. Now, imagine further that you think to yourself; 
“what a nice watch, I wish I had one of those.” I don’t see what that should not count as an instance of envy. 
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able to remember the password, missed the train, and later found out that her best friend Heaven 
had intentionally changed her IPhone password to joke around with her, then, we can imagine 
her getting angry. 92  
  Furthermore, Hufendiek (2015) explains that emotions are connected to other mental 
states as well. For instance, “a state of fear can vanish because I judge myself not to be in danger 
anymore” (p. 174). Or, my anger with my husband for taking my IPhone headphones with him to 
work yesterday morning will subside when I later in the day realize that they were in my 
backpack all along. Lastly, Hufendiek also discusses the fact that at least some emotions are 
subject to social norms. As we know from the previous discussion about children’s ability to 
experience guilt, for Hufendiek some emotions do not represent biological values or bodily well-
being, but rather are concerned with (i.e., represent) social rules and norms. Thus, while fear 
represents “basic needs or biological norms” (e.g., in fear I represent the snake as “a-danger-to-
be-avoided”) guilt represent a social rule violation (i.e., the individual represents the situation as 
“a rule-violation-to-make-amends-for”) (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 32).  
  Before I end my section on Hufendiek’s embodied view of emotions, I want to also 
consider how her account accommodates the different benchmarks. Benchmark i: emotions do 
not have a cognitive component in the traditional sense, benchmarks ii and iii: emotions have 
both a physiology and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have behavioral 
signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children have emotions, 
benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can be both the result of 
careful reflection, and they can be automatic responses to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions are 
                                                        
92 Hufendiek (2015) uses the following example to explain that emotions are connected reasonably to each other:  
“If I am afraid that I have lost my wallet, I should be relieved when finding it in my bag or angry and frustrated if I 
found out that it was stolen” (p. 174). 
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embodied, but moods are not, and benchmark ix: emotions are not open to conceptual analysis, 
they are natural kinds.  
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1) INTRODUCTION 
  As the reader saw in the previous chapter, there are issues with Hufendiek’s account. 
Thus, our next question will be whether it is possible to adhere to a view somewhat like hers, 
without running into the Cinnamon-Nutmeg Problem. Feldman Barrett’s view of emotions as 
being constructed offers hope along these lines. Although this view does not have the resources 
to accommodate the embodiment fact, we can draw something from it in order to modify what 
we learned from Hufendiek in characterizing a proper space of emotion theories. Specifically 
Feldman Barrett’s account of affect may provide nearly what we need to account for the 
phenomenology of emotions. 
2) FELDMAN BARRETT’S POSITION THAT EMOTIONS ARE CONSTRUCTED 
  To understand Feldman Barrett’s constructed theory, we first have to consider the idea of 
interoception and the role it plays on her view of emotions.     
 Interoception is your “brain’s representation of all sensations from your internal organs 
and tissues, the hormones in your blood, and your immune system” (p. 56). It is the internal 
monitoring of the body’s status. Further, similarly to how the mechanics of hearing and vision 
are always operating, “even when you aren’t actively listening or looking at anything in 
particular,” interoception is continuous. At times the individual is aware of it, other times she is 
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not (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 72). She also does not feel (or experience) all of the movements 
inside of her (p. 66-7). Rather, she experiences interoception in a general way as “simple feelings 
of pleasure, displeasure, arousal, or calmness” (i.e., affect)93 (Ibid). This is due to the nervous 
system not being built for us to experience bodily changes “with precision” (p. 66-7). If we did, 
our attention would be overwhelmed (Ibid).  
  The idea of affect Feldman Barrett is discussing, she credits to psychologist James A. 
Russell who, “showed that you can describe your affect in the moment as a single point on a two 
dimensional space called a circumplex” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 73). The individual’s affect is 
a combination of valance and arousal portrayed as one point in the circle (Ibid). On this 
approach, everything that is objectively real about anything emotional can be captured by its 
position in this two-dimensional space. As an example, the affect of what would eventually be 
fear for Feldman Barrett, is located somewhere in the top left corner of the circumplex.  
 
Figure 1: An Affective Circumplex 
                                                        
93 “Let’s be clear on one thing: interoception is not a mechanism dedicated to manufacturing affect. Interoception is 
a fundamental feature of the human nervous system, and why you experience these sensations as affect is one of the 
great mysteries of science. Interoception did not evolve for you to have feelings but to regulate your body budget. It 
helps your brain track temperature, how much glucose you are using, whether you have any tissue damage, whether 
your heart is pounding, whether your muscles are stretching, and other bodily conditions, all at the same time. Your 
affective feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and calmness and agitation, are simple summaries of your budgetary 
state.” (Feldman, 2017, p. 73). 
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 With a grasp of the basis for interoception and affect, we can now move on to discussing 
how emotions are constructed on Feldman Barrett’s view.    
  In her book Feldman Barrett illustrates her idea of emotions as being constructed 
(Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 93). You are standing by the gate at the airport waiting for a friend 
whom you have not seen for years. In this situation your brain puts into motion thousands of 
predictions based on your emotion concepts. These are concepts such as “happiness” and “fear”; 
both emotions you could experience in this situation. You might feel happiness upon seeing your 
friend and realizing she is just the way you remembered her, or you might feel fear upon seeing 
your friend and realizing you no longer have anything in common. Further, the predictions your 
brain is running based on your concepts include various past instances of these emotions. For 
instance, happiness will include things such as, smiling, high-fiving, jumping up-and-down, and 
being motionless (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p.92). In these situations you might also have had wide 
or narrow eyes, an excitedly pounding heart, or maybe your experience was a calmer, more 
soothing one. In addition, you have perceived others expressing happiness in different ways. 
These are all possibilities your brain considers based on your “happiness” concept; however, it 
runs similar predictions for your fear concept as well. 
  Your brain next “weighs its predictions based on probabilities…[and] [u]ltimately, the 
most probable predictions become your perception” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 93). Added 
pieces of context, such as, the fact that when your friend walks through the gate, she smiles and 
runs toward you, helps your brain “hone the probabilities” until it settles on the best fitting 
concept (p. 108). In this case, happiness. When the most probable predictions are calculated and 
simulated (e.g., an excitedly pounding heart, a large smile, your jumping up-and-down, and the 
accompanying sensations), they are confirmed or denied by the incoming sensory input from 
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“the heart, lungs, kidneys, skin, muscles, blood vessels, and other organs and tissues as they 
perform their usual duties” (p. 69). The consequence of this is interoceptive sensation; for 
happiness a general aroused feeling of pleasantness. It is also explained that once your 
predictions are confirmed your “sensations [are] categorized” and you construct an experience of 
happiness explaining your sensations “in terms of a goal” (p. 109). You also make “a mental 
inference to perceive” your friend “as the cause of your feelings,” and the jumping up-and-down 
and large smile “as their consequence” (Ibid).94  
  When Feldman Barrett (2017) talks about emotion concepts, she is referring to goal-
based concepts. Although “happiness” comes with many different experiences and perceptions,  
“these sets of physical changes are equivalent for some goal” (p. 92-3). Your goal could be to 
feel accepted, to feel pleasure, or to have fulfilling friendships. When you are at the airport, your 
concept of “happiness” is focused, or “centered,” on such a goal; “binding together diverse 
instances from your past” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 93). Hence, the conceptualization you give 
of the phenomenology is not arbitrary; rather it is driven by your goal. If your goal is to feel 
accepted, you will have a predisposition to call the sensations a case of happiness, rather than 
one of disgust.   
   Taken together, it emerges that emotion concepts are what shape the affect of 
interoception. For Feldman Barrett (2017) thus emotions are constructed, and all that is 
objectively real about them are sensations of pleasantness, unpleasantness, arousal, calmness.  
                                                        
94 The conceptualization and categorization here happens quickly: “…[C]oncepts aren’t fixed definitions in your 
brain, and they’re not prototypes of the most typical or frequent instances. Instead, your brain has many instances—
of cars, of dot patterns, of sadness, or anything else—and it imposes similarities between them, in the moment, 
according to your goal in a given situation” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 89-90, my emphasis added).  
 
“Some individuals are more fit than others to pass their genetic material to the next generation. In a similar manner, 
some instances of concepts are more effective in a particular context to achieve a particular goal. Their competition 
in your brain is like Darwin’s theory of natural selection but carried out in milliseconds; the most suitable instances 
outlive all rivals to fit your goal in the moment. That is categorization” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 94, my emphasis 
added).  
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  In contrast to Hufendiek, Feldman Barrett is not thinking about bodily behaviors as 
skillful per se. Rather, she emphasizes the brain’s work in conceptualizing and categorizing 
affect, saying this is what requires training over time. She does not mention that to experience 
particular emotions, one has to have gained certain bodily capabilities. Instead, she stresses the 
importance of learning different emotion concepts. She describes this learning process as 
follows. In infancy “the seeds of emotion are planted” when you begin to repeatedly hear 
emotion words in different situations. An emotion concept then holds “diverse instances 
together,” and the word invites you to search for the features that the instances have in common” 
(Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 110). Once the concept has been established in your conceptual 
system, you begin to construct instances of the emotion (Ibid). On this picture, it is not until you 
have gained the concept that you can experience your sensations as a particular emotion. 
  One question the reader might have is: With her strong emphasis on individuals 
constructing their emotions through conceptualization and categorization, how will she explain 
that emotions at times are things that happen to us, that befall us, things over which we only have 
indirect control? For example, your fear when you are in bed and hear someone breaking into 
your apartment, or, your happiness after recently having applied for a large grant and receiving 
an email with the subject line “Congratulations!” Here surely you would be overwhelmed by fear 
and happiness; the emotion comes upon you without any active participation on your part. 
However as we have seen, Feldman Barrett would say that you actually conceptualized and 
categorized your sensations as such. Your sensations were explained and given meaning by your 
brain as an instance of fear, or as an instance of happiness.  
  However, if Feldman Barrett were to respond to the reader’s question that even in the fear 
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and happiness examples; conceptualization is taking place but just very quickly, we can say; it 
might be consistent with the data, but it is by no means mandated by the data. 
3) FELDMAN BARRETT ON EMOTIONS IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND PRE-LINGUISTIC CHILDREN 
  Feldman Barrett’s view of emotions commits her to denying emotions to nonhuman 
animals and prelinguistic children. Due to these individuals not being able to categorize with the 
kinds of emotion concepts that you and I use, all they have is affect. For instance, when a dog 
growls at a person he meets when out on a walk, he is not angry. Rather, he is merely 
experiencing negative, high arousal affect. Or, when a 2-year old smacks her friend in the face 
when he takes her favorite toy, she is not angry. Instead, she is experiencing negative, high 
arousal affect.  
  To say that in order for an organism to have anger, they must have a certain kind of 
mental concept seems contentious. After all, it is certainly not the case that in order to breathe an 
individual has to have a concept of “breathing.” Similarly, it is not the case that in order to 
metabolize I have to have a concept of “metabolizing,” or that in order to feel anxious from all 
the coffee that I just consumed I must have a concept of “anxiety.” If it is not the case that things 
like breathing, metabolizing, and anxiousness require concepts like the ones discussed by 
Feldman Barrett, then why is it a requirement for emotions? In the next section I will offer an 
alternative to her account that captures this intuition.  
4) WEAVING A PATH BETWEEN HUFENDIEK AND FELDMAN BARRETT 
   What would be an alternative to Feldman Barrett’s conceptualization requirement? As 
mentioned in chapter I, for the embodied emotion tokens we are interested in, the 
conceptualization required is of a minimal sort. This more primitive form of conceptualization 
enables an organism to see something as; “shining out with to-be-strokedness” or “standing out 
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as to-be-pushed-away from/to-be spat upon/ to-be wretched at/to-be touched,” etc. It engages my 
physical reactions in a particular, distinctive manner; it demands that I do something. It is a kind 
of marking of one’s environment in an affective way. Thus, it is a minimal differentiation of the 
world that is not as demanding as what Feldman Barrett suggests. On her understanding of 
conceptualization, although it can happen quickly, it still requires training prior to its 
actualization. On my suggestion, the latter is not necessary.  
  To describe the minimal conceptualization in more detail, consider the following. 
Philosophers of perception talk about aspect perception; e.g., one might see an image as a duck 
or one might see it as a rabbit. In seeing the image as a duck we are activating one aspect of the 
image as opposed to another. Seeing the shape as a rabbit versus seeing it as a duck demands 
conceptualization, but it is of a much weaker kind than what is implied by the constructed view. 
Likewise, in the embodied emotion instances the conceptualization might be as primitive as 
perceiving an object or situation as: “shining out with to-be-strokedness” or “standing out as to-
be-pushed-away from/to be spat upon/ to be wretched at,” etc. Both the conceptualization here 
and in the duck/rabbit example stand in sharp contrast to the perception involved when seeing an 
object as, say, “a nuclear reactor.” Seeing something as a nuclear reactor involves a more 
sophisticated concept, and as such it is the kind of conceptualization requiring training. 
  Instead of appealing to concept acquisition through training, which sounds like it is a 
collaborative, public, social process, the way we acquire minimal concepts is through learning. 
An organism can learn that a kind of plant she brushed up against bothered her skin so now when 
she looks at it, it appears or stands out to her in a certain way. In this case there would not yet be 
a concept of a particular type of plant, but rather she has simply learned that it is menacing. On 
this suggestion she has a minimal concept of the type of plant because it now looks menacing to 
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her. Further, she learned this on her own. No one trained her to know this in the way Feldman 
Barrett says we acquire goal-based concepts. Thus, what we are talking about is a more primitive 
form of concept acquisition since, the emoter does not have to know what “that” is; rather, all 
she knows is that it is one of “those.” She does not have a name for it, she does not have a 
biological description, but they hurt so she knows to stay away from it.  
  Similarly in the case of Isabel from chapter I, whom as a result of a classmate loudly 
pulling out a bag of almonds from her backpack, scornfully roll her eyes. Isabel might not have a 
sophisticated concept about Christina and her too carefree nature, but she can perceive her as 
standing out as “to-be-pushed-away from” since she has learned from experience that she should. 
Another plausible example of when minimal concepts might be at work is in the case of a young 
girl who has experienced her mother’s new boyfriend leering at her and/or trying to grab her. In a 
case like this, rather than appealing to Feldman Barrett’s sophisticated concepts; the young girl 
still sees the boyfriend as shimmering with “to-to-be-avoidedness.” Perhaps one way of thinking 
about minimal concepts thus is to say that they are concepts that are adequate to fulfillment of 
the immediate needs of the organism. For example, “threatening” so stay away, “edible” thus get 
close so you can eat it, or “providing safety” so approach it.  
  Lastly, and in contrast to what Feldman Barrett believes, because language and 
abstraction are not necessary for an organism to have minimal concepts; both nonhuman animals 
and pre-linguistic children are capable of emoting.  
5) BACK TO SOMATIC MARKERS 
   Next, we want to consider how Damasio’s somatic markers connect with the above 
picture of minimal conceptualization. To do this let us again turn to Isabel contemptuously 
rolling her eyes as she moves her chair away from Christina. Isabel is sensitive to her 
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surroundings; to the pressure of her hands against the seat, to the way her eyes move in their 
sockets, and to where her classmates are relative to her. However, the majority of her conscious 
attention is still on what is going on in the documentary. The contemptuousness is in the way she 
rolls her eyes, and not in any thoughts she is having. All that is required is Isabel having the 
perceptual experience (tactile, auditory, and visual) needed for her to be aware of her 
environment. Further, no complex conceptualization and categorization is necessary. Instead, 
what is involved is conceptualization of the minimal sort mentioned before.  
 The reader might wonder: does Christina have to be negatively somatically marked? 
Strictly speaking she need not be, but typically she is. It seems a natural description of what 
Isabel is experiencing. Drawing from the notion of somatic markers then, certain chemicals are 
released in Isabel’s body as she looks at Christina; thus, influencing how she perceives her. To 
Isabel, Christina shimmers with “to-be-pushed-away from.” As the reader recalls, for Damasio 
when items of experience are somatically marked, they are “highlighted” in accordance with 
their emotional significance to the person. Isabel who is experiencing the emotion, colors or 
charges her environment in a negative way (Christina in this case). As this happens Isabel has the 
impulse (or reaction) to roll her eyes and move away. 
  A lot of weight is being put on the word “experience” as used above. Isabel is 
experiencing an emotion toward Christina, but she does not have to conceptualize and categorize 
it as such. Notice, we are not saying emotions are manifested in purely behavioral terms. Rather, 
there is still an experiential component, but it is an experiential component making items of 
experience somatically marked in a general way. Hence, for the embodied emotion tokens of 
interest here, the relevant items of experience are somatically marked as opposed to “labeled” as 
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being an emotion of type E. On this picture, Feldman Barrett’s conceptualization is not 
necessitated; rather a minimal kind of conceptualization is sufficient.   
6) WHY IT IS A MISTAKE TO ARGUE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL HAS TO BE ABLE TO CONCEPTUALIZE HER 
EXPERIENCE IN THE WAY FELDMAN BARRETT SUGGESTS  
 
  Let us consider why I think it is a mistake to argue that an individual has to be able to 
conceptualize her experience like Feldman Barrett suggests. To make this point, I want to return 
to our discussion of the constructed view as applied to nonhuman animals and pre-linguistic 
children. If you start out with a controversial definition of emotions, of course you can get the 
result that these organisms do not have them. But, this is controversial since it assumes that in 
order to have an emotion, you must be able to conceptualize your experience in a certain 
complex way. However, this line of reasoning needs an argument, and Feldman Barrett appears 
to just start with it.  
 Another equally legitimate starting point is that emotions are better understood as affect 
programs in the sense Ekman suggested in chapter III; they just happen to you. For him as we 
know, there is no reason why we would need sophisticated concepts to have emotions per se. 
Feldman Barrett might respond to this emphasizing how she proved in How Emotions Are Made 
that views like Ekman’s could not be correct since, there is social variability in emotion 
expressions between cultures. However, it seems there are two possible responses someone could 
put forth to her. One could claim she overestimated the cultural variability, or one could say; 
even if there is variability, there is still an affect program. This is because for Ekman, as 
previously discussed, there are display rules. 
   One response Feldman Barrett could give here is pointing out that if we are allowed to 
appeal to display rules, then the position is not falsifiable. However, we can show that it is. To 
get to such an example, we first have to consider the following. Let’s imagine that we have a 
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situation where, first; we can rule out individual variation in emotion expression, and second; we 
have two individuals that are genetically just alike. For instance, picture we have two identical 
twins who are raised in the same culture, and as a result are exposed to the same display rules. 
Faced with such a case, Ekman’s prediction has to be that their emotional expressions are the 
same. This is so since, everything else has been held constant; both their genetics and 
environment. But, saying that the twins would have to express their emotions in the same way, 
does not seem correct. 
  As a result, if Barrett wants to undermine the Ekman position it is not enough to say that 
there is great variability in emotion expression across cultures. Rather, she would have to show 
an example in which people express their emotions differently in situations where we do not see 
any genetic or cultural variations that would make for a likely difference in experience. One such 
example would be the above twins actually expressing their anger differently (e.g., perhaps one 
of them tends to clutch his fists in anger, whereas the other clenches his teeth). Taken together, 
even though the latter might not be an easy example to find, it is possible, and that shows how 
Ekman’s view indeed is falsifiable.  
   If it is the case that not all emotion tokens require Feldman Barrett’s conceptualization, 
then there is room for a better theory of emotions that can account for nonhuman animals and 
pre-linguistic children. On this theory as long as infants and nonhuman animals can move 
through a particular affect program, which has as a dimension a particular somatic marker and a 
construal, they can emote. Consequently, such an explanation only asks for the minimal account 
of conceptualization; it is enough that the organism can mark their environment in an affective 
way. 
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  Another important question to consider is how one can square the possibility of emotions 
as, at times, being embodied with Ekman’s account of emotions as affect programs. One 
interpretation of the Ekman view, and which I consider to be a limiting one, is that emotions 
happen in the central nervous system with bodily behaviors manifestations of them. On this 
reading then, the bodily behaviors are distinguishable from the emotions themselves. Now, 
someone, e.g., Hufendiek whom wants to hold an embodied view of emotions would of course 
disagree with this interpretation. For an embodied emotion theorist like her, it is crucial that the 
bodily behaviors are included into the emotion; after all they are what constitutes them.  
  The above is one reading of the account of affect programs. However, another way to 
approach this view is by emphasizing the affect program part of the affect program view. On 
such an interpretation it is natural to say that the central nervous system is one locus in which the 
emotion in question occurs, but it is not the only one. That is, emotions happen in the central 
nervous system, but they also happen in the bodily changes. On this understanding; if one were 
to “shave off” one part of the emotion, say by applying a display rule, one would merely have a 
partial emotion. For instance, imagine that you are at a conference and someone says something 
funny at an inopportune time. In this situation, and according to the second interpretation of 
Ekman; were you to apply a display rule to your emotion so the bodily behavior was suppressed, 
this would not be a full emotion of happiness.95 Thus on this interpretation, where somatic 
markers are one dimension of the affect programs, emotions can be embodied. 
  One last feature of Feldman Barrett’s constructed view that I want to highlight is that 
according to it, an individual cannot be mistaken in thinking they are in one emotion state when 
in fact they are in another. But this just sounds implausible; surely a person can do this. After all, 
people are well-known to mistake the emotion they are undergoing. Hence, if her theory implies 
                                                        
95 Moreover, this emotion would have become a full one had the behavior not been removed. 
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a negation of this, then most would say that there is a problem with it. This unfortunate 
consequence of the view is not a problem for us since it is possible to still acknowledge her 
affect idea, without having to accept her overall emotion theory. To be clear, when we say that 
we agree with her on the affect idea, what we mean is the following. Namely, that from a 
phenomenological point of view when someone emotes, all that might be happening is that they 
occupy a certain point on the affect circumplex. Further, this is how we avoid the Cinnamon-
Nutmeg Problem. Now, we are not agreeing with Feldman Barrett that this might be all that is 
happening in terms of objective reality, but that on a phenomenological level it might be.  
  Moreover, I want to consider as well how the Constructed theory of emotions accounts 
for the benchmarks from chapter II. Benchmark i: emotions have a cognitive component, 
benchmarks ii & iii: emotions have both a physiology and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: 
emotions can have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic 
children do not have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: 
emotions can be the result of careful reflection and they can be automatic responses to stimuli, 
benchmark viii: emotions and moods are not embodied, and lastly, benchmark ix: emotions are 
possibly open to conceptual analysis since for Barrett emotions are not natural kinds, they are 
social constructions.  
Emotions 
can have 
a 
cognitive 
compo-
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Emotions 
can have 
a physiol-
ogical 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes, Yes No Possibly: for 
her emotions 
are not 
natural 
kinds, but 
(“social”) 
constructi-
ons. 
 
  At this point in the dissertation, let us take stock of where we are. From what we have 
seen; for every emotion type there is at least one token of that type that is embodied, they often 
occur in the context of a somatic marker, and when we have an embodied emotion token there is 
also going to be a construal right in the embodiment. Thus, a construal can take place in the 
privacy of an individual’s thoughts, in his cringing, and in the way he perceives something. Now, 
since we have learned our lesson from the embodiment fact, the core affect, the somatic markers, 
and the construals; in the next section I will be briefly consider the still acceptable logical 
emotion space. As will become apparent to the reader, I will not be presenting a specific emotion 
theory, but rather an emotion stage to consider. 
7) THE PRESENT EMOTION LANDSCAPE AND POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
  One question to consider at this point is if we can have two opposed theories of emotions 
that are both compatible with the embodiment constraint as have been laid down in the 
dissertation. As a matter of fact we have found reason to think this is how things are; for example 
in the dispute between the Hybrid theories and the non-hybrid, Uniform theories. A Hybrid view 
might say that some emotions truly are constructed, whereas other emotions are things that just 
happen to us. On such an interpretation: if you think that you are not angry, you could still be 
wrong. This kind of hybrid account would be consistent with everything we have said so far. 
Moreover, Paul Griffiths (1997) made this point, arguing that emotions are not natural kinds.  
  On the second view, you can hold, as does Hufendiek that emotions make up a uniformed 
134 
   
category. There is no construction according to this interpretation. However, even if this would 
be a Hufendiek styled-view, it is her view approved upon by getting her out of the Cinnamon-
Nutmeg problem. Taken together, more than one emotion theory survives after the embodiment 
fact filter, but the resolve of that debate is a topic for future research. Beyond the dispute 
between Hybrid and Uniform theories, there is also a further question about what embodiment is.  
  My conjecture is that clarification of the nature of embodiment will depend at least in 
part on clarification of the notion of behavior. I say this because of the following example. 
Imagine someone with what is called Locked-In Syndrome (LIS), “characterized by complete or 
near-complete loss of voluntary motor function with intact sensation and cognition” (n.d., “Mind 
Reading Computer System”). Now, research on this topic makes plausible that these authors 
could just as easily have referred to intact affect as well.  
  LIS is depicted as “being buried alive” and individuals suffering from it describe feeling 
“completely isolated from friends and family due to their inability to communicate” (Ibid). 
Researchers have been working on giving these people the ability to move objects, such as a 
computer cursor, using only their thoughts. Sensors that have been attached to the LIS person’s 
head can sense synaptic agitations of various kinds, and over time they learn to control the 
device to the point where by directing their thoughts (in different ways), they can move the 
cursor over different areas matched with certain vowel-sounds. The brain activity is thus 
translated into audio signals that can then be used to drive a voice synthesizer.   
 The weaker claim that all emotion types are sometimes embodied can completely bypass 
someone with LIS, but at the same time one would want to know if it has to, or, if there might be 
something useful to say here. As mentioned above, my conjecture is that one way of doing that is 
trying to understand if someone with LIS, who is directing their thoughts, at least when things 
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are going well is behaving. 
  The above example of a person working hard to learn how to direct their thoughts so they 
can move the cursor, seems like it should qualify as that person actually behaving. After all, they 
are trying, and sometimes they fail, and over time they get better at it. We can imagine that the 
first time they attempted to direct their thoughts in a particular way it did not work, but they did 
not give up and as time progressed, they improved and eventually were able to use the cursor like 
they wanted to. They are doing; they are performing actions. Further, directing your thoughts in 
this way seems different from an example in which someone is paralyzed and we, say, just flash 
a sentence in front of them and they understand it. In the latter case it happens to the individual, 
and they cannot help but understand the sentence. Thus, rather than being a behavior, it seems to 
be a case of processing information. However, in the example with the LIS person above, there is 
agency, and because of that there is behavior. 
  Further insight into the nature of embodiment will likely be facilitated or aided by 
thinking about the extent to which someone with LIS is behaving or not. One question to ask is 
what notion of behavior we can make sense of that would allow us to understand this kind of 
phenomena as behaving? Furthermore, if we can understand it as behavior, then it would seem 
that someone with LIS can also emote. That is, they can embody their emotions by doing such 
things as imagining, and thinking expressive thoughts etc. For instance, consider what the 
analogue of someone clenching their fist in anger would be for someone with LIS. It might be 
that person thinking negative thoughts about someone else, and this in a way they have control 
over. The latter would thus appear to be a discursive fist clenching.  
  Another example in this context of an embodied emotion, would be the analogue to 
Destiny, from chapter I, lovingly stroking her son’s hair. In this case, we can imagine that 
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tragically Destiny was in a terrible car accident that left her paralyzed. Now, as she is laying in 
her hospital bed she could be thinking of, forming mental images of her son’s hair and imagining 
herself stroking it. This appears like it potentially could be an embodied way of emoting, as long 
as we can make sense of those events being Destiny’s doings. Moreover, building on the 
example with Isabel rolling her eyes, we can imagine that later on in her teenage years she 
attempted to commit suicide by jumping off a bridge, but did not succeed and was left paralyzed. 
In this example, Isabel as she lies in her hospital bed might be thinking in an eye-rolling way 
about that stupid thing that her boyfriend said earlier when he was visiting. She visualizes herself 
rolling her eyes at him. In both of these cases Destiny’s and Isabel’s doings are not physical 
doings, but they are still doings. The point being that even though they cannot perform physical 
actions, they can still embody their emotions. 
  We previously clarified that all emotions are sometimes embodied; every emotion type 
has at least one instance in the universe that is embodied. Further, the latter is consistent with the 
fact that a person can go their entire life without a single instance of embodied affect. Given this 
weaker notion, there is a further, stronger, claim that might also be defensible. Namely, that for 
every individual, all emotions are sometimes embodied. What would be the argument for that? 
How would one go about establishing it? These are both questions worthy of consideration in 
future research. If it turns out that the Hybrid theory is correct after all, then perhaps we should 
dial back the above claim and say something like this: All non-constructed emotions are 
sometimes embodied. This is so since, even though for the basic non-constructed instances every 
person is such that their basic emotions are sometimes embodied, it is likely not plausible in the 
case of the constructed emotions. 
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